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9Introduction – Regarding Aspects of Technology
This study aspires to contribute to the philosophical questioning of technology. 
The research that occasioned this study was supposed to be about biotechnology, 
but ended up being about the Earth. It was supposed to philosophically question 
biotechnological beings, but ended up with the philosophical question of 
technological being. Here is what happened.
The explanation for this turn of events is to be found in a distinct sense of unease. 
Now, while it is safe to say that most, if not all PhD-students are exposed to a dose 
of unease at some stage during the course of their, let’s say, challenging vocation, in 
this case it has both topical and thematic relevance and is therefore worth pausing 
over, as doing so will clarify what this study is about, as well as how it goes about 
its way.
§ 1.1 A HAUNTING SHADOW –  A TOPICAL UNEASE 
A short historical account will be instructive here. Intended as a philosophical 
analysis of biomaterials, this research-project was originally closely associated to the 
schema of ELSA-research, which investigates the Ethical, Legal, and Social Aspects 
of new and emerging science and technology (Zwart & Nelis 2009). Converging 
with the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), one of the central ideas of 
ELSA-research is that contemporary science and technology are not developed in 
isolation (e.g. in R&D departments or laboratories), but from the outset involve 
a wide array of interactions that exceed and traverse the walls of universities and 
corporate laboratories. Pair this with a recognition of how science and technology 
tend to radically transform virtually all areas of existence, and it becomes relatively 
straightforward to see the merits of analyzing their various (ethical, legal, social) 
aspects, not in hindsight, but from their incubation onwards.
Biomaterials can be taken a clear case in point. Loosely characterized as biotechnology 
of matter, biomaterial research seeks to understand the processual (de)composition 
and behavior of biological, living tissue, in order to technologically harness and 
synthetically imitate these processes to use them for specific ends. As an example, 
in regenerative medicine, synthetic gels engage with bodily tissue in such a way that 
they compel the body to repair itself by generating bone-tissue. Much scientific 
effort continues to be dedicated to advancing bio-material research, for instance 
towards developing artificial organs, medicine delivery, artificial organelles and 
cells, etc.
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Such technologies are synthetic, not only in that various interacting artificial 
elements are synthesized to cooperate, but also insofar as their operation involves 
the synthesis of artificial and biological processes, for instance by modifying the 
genome of a bacterium to have it generate substances with specifically tailored 
molecular structures.
Particularly this latter sense of synthesis indicates why ELSA-research was considered 
relevant to this project. Where its sociologically oriented branches would investigate 
legal and social aspects of emerging biomaterial technology (think of the inherent 
politics: who benefits most from it?; how is it financed?; how is it presented in public 
discourse?; which stakeholders are involved? how democratic is its development? 
etc.) the philosophical orientation of this project would imply a focus on the ethical 
aspects, for example regarding the character, i.e. the ethos of human existence in 
relation to both the natural and the artificial, specifically in light of how biomaterial 
technology entails the synthesis of both sides of the associated boundary (cf. Zwart, 
Krabbenborg, & Zwier 2016).
While it may be evident that such aspects of technology are worth philosophical 
consideration, the first strides into the development of such considerations gave rise 
to what we might call a topical unease with respect to such aspects. The reason for this 
is as simple as it is decisive. If today (or a couple of years ago for that matter), one 
begins to seriously dig into the question concerning the ethos of human existence 
in its relation with nature and technology, one will eventually be placed face to face 
with a rather large ecological elephant in the room, which trumpetingly speaks 
to this ethos. And while most of us appear remarkably capable of looking away, 
this becomes increasingly difficult in light (we should perhaps speak of twilight) 
of im-permafrost, rising sea-levels, global warming, ocean acidification, the 
ongoing shattering of temperature records, changing weather patterns, ecological 
degradation, mass extinction, crop failure, and the looming presence of 400 ppm+ 
of CO2 in the air. To name a few.
Now, whereas certain developments in biomaterials explicitly address this ecological 
dimension (think of the development of biofuels), this remains an exception rather 
than the rule, particularly when it comes to medical and industrial applications. 
And while this might be legitimated for the techno-scientific research linked to 
biomaterials, e.g. by arguing that ecological considerations are simply beyond 
its scope, the same cannot be maintained when philosophically questioning the 
associated ethos of human existence in its relation to technology and nature. The 
reason for this is that in studying the legal, social, but particularly ethical aspects 
of biomaterials, such aspects now appear significantly surrounded, hauntingly 
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shadowed even, by the arguably vastly more urgent matter of our habitat, our 
faltering oikos on an increasingly unsettled planet. While many developments in 
biomaterial technology, as well as the associated analyses of their various ethical, 
social, and legal aspects take for granted a stable, settled ground upon which such 
developments can take shape, the Earth as it is encountered today no longer grants 
such unconditional stability. Now, while it would perhaps go too far to proclaim 
that all such developments and analyses should therefore be explicitly oriented 
towards the Earth, the fact of the matter is that the abovementioned unease gave 
rise to such an orientation with respect to the research documented here – as the 
Earth's unsettling and haunting shadow appeared, all other aspects of technology 
manifested themselves in a different light and seemed to dwindle in its pertinence.
In short, therefore, a topical unease engendered a topical shift. Abandoning our short 
history for the moment and moving to the present tense, this shift means that rather 
than focusing on specific (new and emerging) bio-technologies and their aspects, 
this study comes to question the Earthly context in which such technologies come 
into being. Phrased in more Earthly tones, it questions the terrain upon which such 
technologies acquire a foothold, as well as the manner in which they inhabit this 
terrain.
First of all, this topical shift implies that the same topic will be examined from 
a different angle, on a different level of analysis. On the one hand, the question 
concerning the ethos or character of technology in its relation to nature and human 
existence remains central here. On the other hand, however, rather than examined 
on the level of specific (bio)technologies and associated aspects, the topos of this 
question becomes a matter of the Earth.
Secondly, anticipating what will be clarified later on, this topical shift implies a 
thematic shift as well, as the questioning of technology developed here will not 
primarily bear upon specific technologies and their aspects, but will rather concern 
the more primordial manner in which we gain a perspective, i.e. how we encounter 
technologies, the unsettled Earth as their settlement, and ourselves as Earthly 
inhabitants.   
This study therefore aims to cultivate the significance of the unsettled Earth for 
the philosophical questioning of technology and human existence. It does so by 
responding to the following central question, which echoes the subtitle and can be 
formulated as follows:
How to come to terms with technology on an unsettled planet?
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The associated hypothesis to be developed and delineated in the course of this 
dissertation is threefold. First, technology does not primarily concern technological 
beings but technological being, which is to say that the unsettled Earth commits 
us to an ontological way of questioning technology. Secondly, the habitation of 
the unsettled Earth as oikos gives rise to a specific oiko-nomic interpretation of 
this ontological question. Thirdly, the issue of technological waste is relevant 
to understanding the tryptic of ontology, economy, and technology, and is of 
significance for coming to terms with technology and the Earth.
§1.2 FROM ASPECTS TO OIKOS
Chapter II, entitled “The Ideal of a Zero-waste Humanity – Philosophical Reflections 
on the Demand for a Bio-Based Economy”, is a first attempt to address the central 
question, the first result of the topical shift that gave rise to it. By transposing 
the study of bio-technology to a higher aggregation level, it addresses the ideal 
of the Bio-Based Economy (BBE) as the context in which various new (bio)
technologies emerge. Focusing on the BBE resonates well with the central question 
of this dissertation, because its ideal explicitly responds to contemporary ecological 
problems, whilst placing strong emphasis on developments in bio-technology. The 
chapter critically questions the philosophical underpinnings of the ideal of BBE. By 
introducing Georges Bataille as one of the first philosophers who addressed issues of 
productivity and waste from a continental perspective, it argues that the BBE adheres 
to the specific mode of thinking that Bataille articulates as the “restricted economy”, 
but in so doing leaves undiscussed – to its own peril – what he articulates as the 
“general economy”. The chapter will show how in its idealization of "zero-waste", 
the BBE strictly concerns a way of thinking, i.e. a way of encountering things, that 
is oriented towards scarcity. It thereby unquestioningly assumes that the ethos of 
human economical existence is characterized by a lack that requires compensation 
via (bio)technological means. This assumption is confronted with Bataille’s idea 
that such a restricted economy of lack and neediness remains encompassed by what 
he calls "the general economy" of abundance, which eventually calls for a surpassing 
of the restrictions that tie human existence to technological compensation of 
scarcity. Besides a critique of the BBE, resulting in an exploration of the possibility 
of surpassing its economical restrictions, the chapter takes the first strides towards 
transposing the question of (bio)technologies to their economical context, where 
it is worth emphasizing that the latter is not to be understood in a monetary sense, 
but rather as pertaining to the oikos or habitat in which such technologies appear.
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§1.3 TECHNOLOGY AS A PHILOSOPHICAL THEME – OIKOS 
AND PHENOMENON
Transposing the questioning of technologies to their economical context can 
perhaps be seen as running  against the grain of the contemporary discourse of 
philosophy of technology, where the theme of technology tends to be addressed 
differently. To clarify this, a brief sketch of this discourse and its background is 
necessary.
With respect to shifting the theme from specific technologies to their broader 
economic context, contemporary philosophy of technology tends to move in the 
opposite direction. It does so in response to what is generally referred to as “classical 
philosophy of technology” (Achterhuis 2001; Brey 2010), which can in turn be 
seen as a response to the technological optimism rooted in the Enlightenment.
Such optimism – the echoes of which still reverberate in contemporary discourse – 
regards technology as progressively emancipating humanity from its all too natural 
bondages. It does so, for instance, by overcoming hunger through agricultural 
technology, overcoming diseases through medical technologies, overcoming small-
minded provinciality by way of technologies associated with navigation and travel, 
overcoming ignorance by way of technologically opening the book of nature whilst 
rendering this book public via printing technologies, etc. Generally speaking, 
such optimism aligns with the Enlightenment idea of how science and technology 
progressively lead humanity towards a greater control of nature, the most adamant 
expression of which is perhaps found in Descartes' famous adage of humanity as 
"master and possessor" of nature (Descartes 1994). And while Descartes specifically 
puts science and the scientific method central stage, it is clear that technology 
is closely associated to this. Phrased in the oft quoted words of Francis Bacon’s 
Novum Organum:
"Again, we should notice the force, effect, and consequences of inventions, 
which are nowhere more conspicuous than in those three which were 
unknown to the ancients; namely, printing, gunpowder, and the compass. 
For these three have changed the appearance and state of the whole world 
(…) and innumerable changes have been thence derived, so that no empire, 
sect, or star, appears to have exercised a greater power and influence on 
human affairs than these mechanical discoveries." (Bacon 2000: 100)
zwier-layout.indd   13 08/01/2018   13:57
14
Chapter I
If Enlightenment thought thus acknowledges and salutes the “power and influence” 
of technology to change “the appearance and state of the whole world”, and 
optimistically imagines the technological "effecting of all things possible" (as per the 
task of the technologists of Solomon's House in Bacon's New Atlantis (2009: 51), 
classical philosophy of technology can be seen as a critical response to this. Roughly 
situated in the beginning and second half of the 20th century, classical philosophy of 
technology does not necessarily deny the merits of technological liberations, but it has 
also worked through the experience of the more sinister side of modern technology. 
This includes vast capitalist industrialization, urbanization and massification; the 
associated advent of the division of labor and the demeaning monotony of the 
conveyor belt; pollution and degradation of (inhabited) environments; as well as, 
perhaps most emphatically, the atrocities of mechanized (world)warfare. In a much 
more pessimistic countercharge to Enlightenment optimism, it accordingly critically 
evaluates technology as a novel form of captivity and subservience, which instead 
of liberating humanity, chains it to the (techno)logic of what Lewis Mumford has 
called "the megamachine" (1971). Here, we can think of scholars like Adorno and 
Horkheimer (2002) who argued that the Enlightenment led to the techno-rational 
domination of both nature and humanity itself, or Marcuse, for whom human life 
under capitalist industrialism comes to be dictated by a one-dimensional system 
of production and consumption (1964). Most significantly, it is worth remarking 
that Martin Heidegger – to whom we shall return at length – is often shared among 
these classical philosophers of technology, given how he considered technology as 
a way of revealing, which is to say as determining the very way in which human 
beings relate to the world, a world that is thereupon exclusively encountered to 
'stand in reserve' for technological application. 
If classical philosophy of technology critically responds to Enlightenment optimism, 
contemporary philosophy of technology in turn critically responds to classical 
philosophy of technology. It does so by challenging the former's articulation of 
technology as a general (dominating, pervasive, determining) force. This is not 
only deemed one-sidedly negative and pessimistic, but is also understood to 
reduce technological existence in its entirety to a particular  essence of technology. 
Contemporary philosophy of technology argues that such 'essentialism' overlooks 
the more positive roles that technologies play in human existence, a role that it 
takes to be irreducible to a monolithic, megamachinic logic or essence. It therefore 
pursues a more nuanced analysis that does not take technological culture as an 
abstract theme of research, but enacts an "empirical turn" (Achterhuis 2001; Brey 
2010). This means that instead of analyzing technology as one overarching and 
abstract phenomenon that can be understood according to a singular technological 
essence, it turns to close empirical analysis of the various aspects of our involvement 
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with concrete technologies, e.g. how they mediate our experience of the world 
(Verbeek 2005), what role they play in the constitution of scientific knowledge (cf. 
Ihde 2001), what their hidden and overt political and normative implications are, 
etc. (cf. Feenberg 1999; 2010). To give an example, Peter-Paul Verbeek interprets 
Heidegger's philosophy of technology to succumb to the prior essentialism, 
or more specifically "transcendentalism", in that it orbits around a reduction of 
all technologies to what remains essential to them, namely their condition of 
possibility, which is understood in terms of a world that "stands in reserve" for 
exploitation (Verbeek 2005: 61). For Verbeek, this disregards how the technologies 
that are actually produced by way of such exploitation do not themselves coincide 
with their condition of possibility, but surpass it in various ways. Accordingly, a 
smartphone may have a world of raw materials that stand in reserve for exploitation 
as its condition of possibility, the device itself “does not reveal one’s interlocutor as 
standing-reserve but as a unique individual person” (Verbeek 2005: 66, cf. Wellner 
2016).
In light of this sketch, philosophy of technology after the empirical turn can be 
said to turn away from the theme of the (essentialist) condition of technologies, to 
instead take technological artefacts themselves as its central theme, including their 
wide array of aspects (political, normative, etc.).1 As such, it enters into close kinship 
with both the previously mentioned sociologically oriented studies of technology in 
STS, as well as to ELSA-research, as is further evidenced by how authors like Bruno 
Latour and Michel Foucault have an influential voice in all of these discourses (cf. 
Verbeek 2011; Dorrestijn, 2012).
Now, if chapter II transposes the questioning of technologies to their economical 
context, the question becomes whether this runs against the grain of contemporary 
philosophy of technology in the sense of reverting to a more classical approach that 
abstracts from concrete technologies. This study will develop a rebuttal  to this 
question, because while it will go against the grain of the empirical turn, it will do 
so in a different way, not by abstracting from concrete artefacts (thereby regressing 
into a position of  essentialism), but by moving even closer towards them as it were. 
This is to say that it will question the way in which empirical studies encounter 
artefacts, specifically in relation to their unsettled terrestrial habitation.
1. As Verbeek mentions, the objective of his philosophy of technology is to “to make visible as many 
aspects of reality as possible” (2005: 162).
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Were we to set out three markers, we can first of all say that if there is one philosophical 
method that concerns itself with the question of how we encounter things, it has to 
be phenomenology. Secondly, if there is one branch of contemporary philosophy of 
technology that has a similar concern whilst also making the empirical turn, it has 
to be postphenomenology. Thirdly, if there is one so-called 'classical' philosopher 
of technology who connects technology and ontology by discussing technology as a 
way of relating, it has to be Martin Heidegger.
With reference to these markers, chapter III, entitled “Phenomenology and the 
Empirical Turn – A Phenomenological Analysis of Postphenomenology” can be 
understood as an exercise in triangulation. It undertakes a phenomenological 
analysis of post-phenomenology, and confronts the latter with Heidegger's 
understanding of the phenomenological method. Based on this confrontation, the 
chapter defends the claim that in its execution of the empirical turn and associated 
attending to how specific technologies shape the way in which humans relate to the 
world, postphenomenology forfeits a phenomenological, i.e. ontological dimension 
of questioning. This claim is developed by arguing that the postphenomenological 
method of questioning technology adheres to what Heidegger calls "the theoretical 
attitude", which permits it to perceive concrete technological artefacts and 
their various aspects from a theoretical distance. The chapter correspondingly 
maintains that Verbeek is right – more than he admits to even – when he interprets 
postphenomenology as mediation theory. While not denying its merits, the chapter 
diagnoses postphenomenology with phenomenological forgetfulness, because 
postphenomenology overlooks how mediation theory about ontic technological 
beings itself involves a specific ontological mode of relating to such beings, whereas 
questioning this mode is and remains the methodical and ontological concern of 
phenomenology. 
The chapter subsequently  articulates why this ontological dimension is worth 
considering, by demonstrating how postphenomenology qua mediation theory 
is itself technically mediated in an ontological way. The upshot of this is that in 
its dismissal of Heidegger's questioning of technology as belonging to classical 
philosophy of technology, postphenomenology implicitly adheres to what 
Heidegger calls technology as Enframing. In raising this issue, chapter III will 
emphasize how Enframing cannot be understood as another generalization that 
abstracts from specific technologies and reduces them to a singular essence or 
condition of possibility. Instead, it stresses the genuinely phenomenological 
import of Enframing, by laying out how rather than a general category, it concerns 
the way in which our encounter with things is structured – a structuring that 
postphenomenology unwittingly adheres to. In light of these diagnoses, the chapter 
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calls for a phenomenological questioning of the dimension that postphenomenology 
leaves undiscussed, meaning that it concludes with a plea for a rehabilitation of the 
ontological dimension in philosophy of technology.
§1.4 THE EARTH ENTERS THE (S)CENE – REHABILITATION 
MEETS HABITATION 
By thus going against the grain of the empirical turn, the theme of philosophically 
questioning technology changes. Instead of concrete technological things, the theme 
of questioning comes to concern the relation that we already enact in our theoretical 
encounter with such things. This brings us back to the thematic relevance associated 
with the aforementioned unease via-à-vis the unsettled Earth. The reason for this 
is that whereas studying specific technologies and their aspects necessarily assumes 
a theoretical distance from which they can be perceived, the ecological issue of the 
unsettled Earth does not altogether allow us to perceive it from a distance, given 
how it inescapably and hauntingly surrounds us, thus infiltrating the very way in 
which we inhabit our Earthly oikos.
Given its methodological and ontological orientation, chapter III, while not yet 
explicitly engaging with the oiko-logical issue of the unsettled Earth, prepares the 
ground for such an endeavor. As evidenced by the sketched research-agenda that is 
presented in its final pages, the chapter can be read as a preparatory exercise for such 
an engagement. Proceeding on the path thus prepared, the ensuing chapters will 
question the rehabilitation of ontology that chapter III calls for in relation to the 
Earth. This will make clear that while the call for a rehabilitation of the ontological 
dimension in the philosophy of technology asks of the empirical turn to re-turn to 
Heidegger, this neither implies a full-fledged reversal, nor an uncritical alignment 
with everything Heidegger has to say about technology as Enframing. Instead, 
the ensuing chapters will confront Heidegger's thought with the unsettled Earth, 
to unravel how the unsettled Earth inevitably unsettles Heidegger's ontological 
questioning of technology as well.  
In chapter IV and V, this confrontation will be staged around the concept of the 
Anthropocene. Now, although a full historical and conceptual analysis of the 
highly prolific, still evolving, and swiftly mutating concept of the Anthropocene 
would evidently exceed the scope of this introduction, a few general remarks will 
be instructive to indicate why the Anthropocene is deemed a relevant stage for the 
aforementioned confrontational dialogue with Heidegger.
zwier-layout.indd   17 08/01/2018   13:57
18
Chapter I
The Anthropocene was first conceptualized by climate scientist and atmospheric 
chemist Paul Crutzen to identify the decidedly new (kainos) and decidedly human 
(anthopos) geological era that has come to supplement the Holocene, at least since 
the Industrial Revolution (Crutzen 2002; cf. Lorimer 2016). As suggested by its 
nametag, the Anthropocene lists humans as the dominant "global geological force" 
(Bonneuil 2015:19), since human activity – which is to say technological activity 
– is considered the major influence on the dynamics of the Earth. Examples of 
such far reaching influence include erosion due to deforestation, agriculture, global 
warming, the chemical composition of the atmosphere, the acidity of both soils and 
ocean, biodiversity, etc. 
Besides interest from the natural sciences, the concept has gained considerable 
traction outside of the scientific fields of Earth-system science and geology, and 
is currently widely discussed in the humanities, arts, and philosophy (cf. Lorimer 
2016). There, the concept more or less comes to function as an umbrella term for 
environmental issues, reviving certain worn-out narratives pertaining to 'climate 
change' and 'sustainability', specifically by explicitly (and further) accentuating 
their planetary and geological, i.e. Earthly scope. Consequently, on the one hand, 
the concept is enthusiastically received, not in the least because of how it provokes 
conversation and creativity in philosophy, the sciences, as well as in the arts 
(Lorimer 2016).2 On the other hand, less enthusiastic evaluations have surfaced 
as well. Scholars have criticized the concept for its ideological underpinnings (cf. 
Baskin 2015); its blatant anthropocentism and associated false generalization of 
"the anthropos" (cf. Baskin 2015; Harraway 2015); or how it fails to specify that 
it is specifically human activity under capitalism that comes to change the Earth's 
dynamics to the extent that it could properly be referred to as 'geo-force' (Moore 
2016).
Now, while this makes clear that many interpretations of the Anthropocene 
populate the discourse – ranging from enthusiastic to all out disparaging –  the 
trajectory pursued in this dissertation limits discussion of the Anthropocene to its 
significance for philosophy of technology, the ontological rehabilitation called for 
in chapter III, and the confrontation between this rehabilitation and its Earthly 
habitation. The reason for involving the Anthropocene is therefore threefold: first, 
2. It is worth noting that the concept of the Anthropocene is currently gaining traction in the 
philosophy of technology as well, as evidenced by a recent special issue (co-edited by myself ) 
dedicated to the concept in Techné: Research in Philosophy of Technology (cf. Lemmens, Blok & 
Zwier 2017). 
zwier-layout.indd   18 08/01/2018   13:57
19
Introduction – Regarding Aspects of Technology
the Anthropocene significantly accentuates the Earth; secondly, it is contiguous to 
Heidegger's ontological interpretation of technology; thirdly, it foregrounds an 
unsettling Earthly experience that Heidegger leaves unconsidered.
Chapter IV, entitled “Saving Earth – Encountering Heidegger's Philosophy of 
Technology in the Anthropocene” proceeds upon this trajectory. In attending to 
the ecological engagement for which chapter III paved the way, it lays out the 
argument that the Anthropocene makes us particularly sensitive to the ontological 
dimension of contemporary technology. The chapter will provide an ontological 
interpretation of the Anthropocene, meaning that it will take the Anthropocene 
to involve a managerially oriented way of encountering things, where the world 
appears as managerial resource to us as managers of our planetary oikos. By 
interpreting the Anthropocene in this way, chapter IV will once again take up the 
abovementioned experience of unease, i.e. the premonition that our contemporary 
ecological predicament does not merely pertain to technological things and their 
aspects, but concerns the more primordial encounter with such things. This will be 
laid out by demonstrating how the very inescapability of relating to the unsettled 
Earth by way of management can be seen as a concrete indication of our inclusion 
in what Heidegger phenomenologically and ontologically articulates as the whole of 
Being. In the Anthropocene, the experience of such inclusivity becomes concrete, 
for instance by recognizing how a theoretical distantiation from the Earth that 
makes its description possible, neither is, nor can be fully distantiated from a 
prescriptive, i.e. managerial way of relating to that what is described. Put in the 
terms employed in chapter III, we could say that the Anthropocene thereby offers 
a concrete experience of how the theoretical attitude is itself already included in a 
technical, managerial way of relating.
This interpretation of the Anthropocene is subsequently confronted with 
Heidegger's interpretation of the essence of technology as Enframing, to suggest 
that the Anthropocene further offers a concrete experience of Heidegger's abstract, 
notoriously difficult, and according to critics even “totalitarian” notion. As will be 
argued, this is relevant for the philosophy of technology after the empirical turn, 
since the concrete experience engendered by the Anthropocene demonstrates that 
the theme of the philosophical questioning of technology can no longer be limited 
to the ontic domain of artefacts, but must rather concern and become sensitive to 
technological being, in accordance with Heidegger's ontological formulation.
Besides presenting a more concrete, terrestrial elaboration of the relevance of 
turning the empirical turn towards Heidegger's thought, Chapter IV will also 
foreground an unsettling Earthly experience that Heidegger leaves unconsidered, 
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thus maneuvering the question concerning technology beyond his (Holocenic, pre-
Anthropocenic) interpretation of Enframing. Although the argumentation for this 
cannot easily be summarized here and is therefore best left to the chapter itself, it is 
worth anticipating that it will be the unsettled Earth itself that is bound to unsettle 
Heidegger's ontological understanding of technology. Chapter IV will therefore 
argue that in the Anthropocene, the Earth acquires ontic-ontological status. In light 
of this, the chapter will offer what could be called an Earthbound interpretation of 
Heidegger's consideration of the “danger” and “saving power” of Enframing, which 
will associate the “saving power” with the Earth in such a way that “the saving 
Earth” will surface.
§1.5 FOSTERING FUMES
It may then be clear, albeit merely in outline, how chapters II, III, and IV will entail 
an elaboration of what was instigated by the unease emerging in the wake of the 
unsettled Earth. While the topic of research thereby shifts from specific technologies 
and their aspects towards their economic and ecological context, the accompanying 
considerations will give rise to a diagnosis that does not understand this context as 
a mere abstraction, but interprets it ontologically, as a way in which our encounter 
with things is always already structured. At the same time, in a maneuver that we 
might, with reference to the empirical turn, call a “terrestrial turn” (Lemmens, Blok 
& Zwier 2017), the Anthropocene comes to coalesce this way of relating with a 
remarkable being, namely the Earth.
Chapter V, entitled “Seeing through the Fumes – Technology and Asymmetry in the 
Anthropocene” will build on chapter IV to further explore the relation between 
technology, ontology, and the Earth. In engaging Heidegger's thought on 
cybernetics with the cybernetic Earth-system as discussed in earth-system science, 
the chapter suggests that the Anthropocene offers a concrete experience of our 
inclusion in a cybernetic relationality. This cybernetic relationality will be articulated 
as symmetrical, because it concerns a collective measure (sym-metry) of regulative 
steering. It will be shown how, for Heidegger, technological activity is symmetric 
in this sense, and therefore entails ontological oblivion. However, by staging and 
interpreting Bataille as a philosopher of technology, a rebuttal to this will be offered. 
Taking a Bataillean perspective, technology will be interpreted to be divertive from 
that by which it is ontologically constituted, and forgetful of this diversion itself. 
Yet, during the Anthropocene, this diversion comes to be reminded of itself by way 
zwier-layout.indd   20 08/01/2018   13:57
21
Introduction – Regarding Aspects of Technology
of the technological waste of CO2, thus engendering an ontological responsivity to 
asymmetry. The chapter will therefore suggest that waste is of central importance 
for philosophically questioning technological being in the Anthropocene.
§1.6  FROM PAPERS TO THESIS
Besides these introductory comments, two additional remarks are in place here.
First of all, perhaps the introductory account of the mood of uneasiness has already 
made this sufficiently clear, but it is worth mentioning that the present study 
neither is, nor is intended to be an author study or exercise in exegesis. Although 
the oeuvres  of Heidegger and Bataille have been crucial sources of inspiration, this 
dissertation does not aspire to provide systematic account of their thinking as such. 
Rather, given the original topic of this dissertation, as well as its unease induced 
topical shift, the theme of the unsettled Earth in relation technology is prioritized. 
This does not mean, however, that the works of these authors are  simply  “applied” 
to this theme in a straightforward manner. Rather, this study aspires to confront 
their philosophical thought with the unprecedented experience of the unsettled 
Earth, this disturbing situation which, in the Anthropocene, we encounter in such 
a way that it changes the understanding on both sides of the confrontation (cf. 
Zwart et al. 2017).
Secondly,  it is worth noting that the bulk of this dissertation, namely chapters II, 
III, and IV, and V, were originally written as stand-alone papers that have either 
been published in (II, III, IV), or are about to  be submitted to (V) philosophy of 
technology journals. As a consequence, the transitions between these chapters will 
not be as smooth as in the case of a monograph. However, this introductory chapter 
should shed sufficient light on how these chapters or papers are interrelated and the 
concluding chapter will recapitulate the trajectory undertaken in this study.
Moreover, the chapters / papers are presented here in their original form, including 
abstracts and lists of references. Only slight alterations have been made to render 
the style of referencing and formatting uniform. A comprehensive overview of the 
consulted literature will be provided at the end this dissertation.
Chapter II: "The Ideal of a Zero-Waste Humanity – Philosophical 
Reflections on the Demand for a Bio-Based Economy" has been published 
in the “Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 2015, Volume 28, 
Issue 2, pp 353-374”. The paper has been co-authored by Vincent Blok, 
Pieter Lemmens, and Robert-Jan Geerts.
zwier-layout.indd   21 08/01/2018   13:57
22
Chapter I
Chapter III: "Phenomenology and the Empirical Turn – A Phenomenological 
Analysis of Post-Phenomenology" has been published in “Philosophy & 
Technology, 2016, Volume 29, Issue 4, pp 313-333”. The paper has been 
co-authored by Vincent Blok and Pieter Lemmens.
Chapter IV: "Saving Earth – Encountering Heidegger's Philosophy 
of Technology in the Anthropocene" has been published in “Techné: 
Research in Philosophy of Technology ,2017 (online first, DOI:  10.5840/
techne201772167)”. The paper has been co-authored by Vincent Blok. 
Chapter V: "Seeing Through the Fumes – Technology and Asymmetry in 
the Anthropocene" will be submitted to “Human Studies”. The paper has 
been co-authored by Vincent Blok.
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THE IDEAL OF A ZERO-WASTE 
HUMANITY: PHILOSOPHICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMAND 
FOR A BIO-BASED ECONOMY
Published as: Zwier, J., Blok, V., Lemmens, P. & Geerts, R. J. (2015). The ideal of 
a zero-waste humanity: Philosophical reflections on the demand for a bio-based 
economy. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 28(2), pp. 353-374.
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ABSTRACT
In this paper we inquire into the fundamental assumptions that underpin the ideal 
of the Bio-Based Economy (BBE) as it is currently developed . By interpreting 
the BBE from the philosophical perspective on economy developed by Georges 
Bataille, we demonstrate how the BBE is fully premised on a thinking of scarcity. 
As a result, the BBE exclusively frames economic problems in terms of efficient 
production, endeavoring to exclude a thinking of abundance and wastefulness. 
Our hypothesis is that this not only entails a number of internal tensions and 
inconsistencies with regard to the ideal of BBE, but ultimately undermines the 
ideal itself, by pushing purported regenerativity into a cataclysmic and terminal 
discharge. We here point to the strategies that the BBE employs in this exclusion, 
the fundamental assumptions regarding the relation between energy and economy 
that underpin this endeavor, as well as to the resulting inconsistencies and their 
catastrophic consequences. We finally argue for the introduction of the presently 
excluded question of abundance and wastefulness and explore the implications of 
such a question for the ideal of a zero-waste humanity.
Keywords: Bio-based economy – Georges Bataille – Restricted economy – General 
economy – Abundance - Scarcity
zwier-layout.indd   26 08/01/2018   13:57
27
The Ideal of a Zero-Waste Humanity
And sun, Oh, sun enough! - Ezra Pound
§2.1 INTRODUCTION
‘‘In a world with growing pressures on resources and the environment, the EU 
has no choice but to go for the transition to a resource-efficient and ultimately 
regenerative circular economy’’ (European Commission 2012b: 1). With these 
resounding words the European Commission’s Manifesto for a Resource-Efficient 
Europe places the demand for a Bio-Based Economy (BBE)1 center stage. The BBE 
is defined as ‘‘the production of renewable biological resources and the conversion 
of these resources and waste streams into value added products, such as food, feed, 
bio-based products and bioenergy’’ (European Commission 2012a: 3). The demand 
for a BBE has in fact been developing for some time; while spuriously mentioned in 
the 1990s, the BBE was officially launched in 2005 (European Commission 2005) 
and has received increasing attention since (cf. McCormick and Kautto 2013).
In this paper we inquire into the fundamental assumptions that underpin the 
ideal of the BBE as it is currently developed. By interpreting the BBE from the 
philosophical perspective on economy developed by Georges Bataille, we show how 
the BBE is fully premised on a thinking of scarcity. As a result, the BBE exclusively 
frames economic problems in terms of efficient production, endeavoring to exclude 
a thinking of abundance and wastefulness. Our hypothesis is that this not only 
entails a number of internal tensions and inconsistencies with regard to the ideal 
of the BBE, but ultimately undermines the ideal itself, as it pushes the purported 
‘regenerativity’ into a cataclysmic and terminal discharge. We here point to the 
strategies that the BBE employs in this exclusion, the fundamental assumptions 
regarding the economy that underpin it, as well as to the resulting inconsistencies 
and their catastrophic consequences. We thereby argue for the introduction of 
the question of abundance and wastefulness which presently remains excluded in 
conceptualizations of the BBE.
In the first part of this paper we provide an overview of central constituents of the 
BBE and situate our questioning alongside existing discussions. In the second part 
we introduce the concepts of restricted economy and general economy as developed by 
Georges Bataille in order to raise the presently overlooked philosophical question 
1.  What we here call BBE is sometimes referred to as ‘Knowledge Based Bio-Economy (KBBE)’, 
or simply ‘Bio-Economy’. Although subtle differences between the various definitions exist, 
we maintain that our arguments here concern general aspects that can be found in all of these 
definitions.
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pertaining to the fundamental relation between energy and economy. In part three, 
we examine the BBE in terms of this question. The themes of solar energy and 
waste are analyzed from the perspective of the BBE on the one hand and Bataille’s 
thought on the other. This contrasting analysis reveals how current BBE approaches 
understand both of these concepts exclusively in terms of scarcity, thereby 
rendering the BBE the ultimate restricted economy sensu Bataille. This results in 
several inconsistencies with respect to the ideal of BBE, which will be shown to 
ultimately prove fatal. Accordingly, in part four, we argue that a perspective in 
which the relation between energy and economy is oriented towards abundance 
and dissipation remains wrongfully absent in current discussions of the BBE. We 
indicate several ways in which such a (Bataillean) perspective can be developed, 
and how this encompasses a vital dimension of questioning that, at the present, is 
absent.
§2.2 WHAT IS THE BIO-BASED ECONOMY?
In order to situate the subject, it is first of all necessary to ask what the BBE is 
and how the demand for a BBE acquired its footing. If the BBE is defined as ‘‘the 
production of renewable biological resources and the conversion of these resources 
and waste streams into value added products (…)’’ (European Commission 2012a: 
3), we must ask what problem this is supposed to resolve, and what the central ideas 
for resolving these issues are.
§2.2.1 Context and Central Ideals of the BBE
The opening citation serves as the starting point for answering both of these 
questions2 : ‘Growing pressures on resources and the environment’ constitute 
the backdrop of the BBE-ideal. Natural resource scarcity, climate change, and 
environmental pollution are three of the fundamental obstacles that the BBE is 
designed to overcome (cf. Asveld et al. 2011b: 18–21; McCormick and Kautto 
2013: 2589). As for the second question, it becomes clear that the problem we 
are currently facing is to be surmounted by moving ‘to a resource-efficient and 
ultimately regenerative circular economy’.
One may recognize three central themes to the envisioned solution: circularity, 
cascade, and zero-waste. As for the first theme of circularity, the problem of natural 
resource depletion is said to necessitate a new and different economic approach, i.e., 
a shift from non-renewable towards renewable resources. The traditional approach, 
2. A somewhat simplified answer to both questions suffices for the present purposes. For a more 
detailed overview, see McCormick and Kautto (2013).
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sometimes referred to as petrol-based, may be thought of as linear: depletable fuel as 
input and products and polluting substances as output. The bio-based approach, on 
the contrary, is envisaged to be circular: renewable bio-fuels as input and recyclable 
products as output.3 The transition from a linear chain towards a closed loop is both 
a fundamental ideal and a challenge for the realization of the BBE (cf. Koppejan and 
Asveld 2011: 73). Figure 1 shows the schematics of how circularity is envisioned 
to operate.
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the BBE. Image source: Ministerie van Landbouw, 
Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit (2007).
The circularity is established as follows: Solar energy (center) is transformed into 
crops (bottom center), which in turn are transformed into biomass (center-left). 
This biomass can be refined into products (top). The residual waste resulting from 
this production process is fed back into the loop (clockwise) and is either used as 
compost to help grow crops, turned into food or animal feed, or used to supply the 
energy required by other steps in the entire process.4
3. True circularity would, of course, render terms like input and output redundant.
4. See Wubben et al. 2012 for the complexity of biomass valorization in supply chains.
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This last mentioned ‘feedback’ points to the second of the three themes envisioned 
within the BBE. To guarantee circularity, the production process must operate 
according to what is referred to as a cascading model (cf. Asveld et al. 2011b: 22). 
This means that all of the production processes within the BBE are connected 
in a cascade. The original biomass is initially turned into high value products 
(e.g. pharmaceutical materials). The waste stream of this production process is 
subsequently utilized as the supply stream for a lower-level production process that 
produces products of lesser value. This process of feeding waste-streams back into the 
cascade is repeated until the waste-stream can no longer be refined into products. In 
the final stage of the cascade, the waste is incinerated, providing additional power 
to energize various operations (e.g. transport, heat etc.) within the closed loop.5
The third theme concerns the ideal of zero-waste. It follows the logic of the circularity 
and the cascade: waste streams of production processes are to be redeployed to serve 
other processes internal to the system, thereby ideally eliminating waste entirely.6 
‘‘The sun is the main source of energy, and some clever logistical planning prevents 
even a cell of biomass from being lost. The chain hence becomes a closed loop’’ 
(Asveld et al. 2011b: 24). In light of this short exposé, we can understand what 
the European Commision’s definition of the BBE amounts to: ‘‘the production 
of renewable biological resources’’ is thematized as circularity and ‘‘the conversion 
of these resources and waste streams into value added products’’ (European 
Commission 2012a: 3) bears upon the theme of cascade. The resulting closed 
loop ideally produces zero-waste: ‘‘Ideally, the bio-economy should be an efficient 
economic system that produces no waste…’’ (Asveld et al. 2011a: 11).
§2.2.2 Situating Our Inquiry Alongside Existing Criticisms
The ideal of the BBE as presented in terms of its circularity, cascade, and zero-waste, 
has not been received without resistance. Critiques have been developed from various 
directions: First of all, there are those who doubt whether this ideal can be realized 
at all. Examples include Latham and Wilson, who wonder whether the BBE ‘‘is not 
so much a real and substantial prospect but more a fantasy future’’ (2007). They 
criticize the EU’s conception of BBE for lacking proper proof concerning economic 
and technological prospects. Others wonder whether this presentation of the BBE 
5. ‘‘Most bio-derived products are now produced in facilities dedicated to a single primary product… 
Ultimately the industry is expected to move toward large integrated biorefineries cost-effectively 
producing biofuels, high-value bioproducts and potentially cogenerating heat and/or power for 
onsite use’’ (US Department of Energy 2011: 1-5).
6. For a more detailed and scientifically elaborate analysis of these processes, see Ragauskas et al 
(2006).
zwier-layout.indd   30 08/01/2018   13:57
31
The Ideal of a Zero-Waste Humanity
can actually deliver on its promises with regard to sustainability, particularly in light 
of the vast amounts of biomass that will need to be produced (Koppejan and Asveld 
2011; Cf. Pfau et al. 2014: 1233).
Additionally, questions have been raised from ethical and political perspectives. 
One of the critiques here is that BBE is primarily framed in terms of economic 
gains, whereas risks and ethical issues are seen as less important (Hilgartner 2007). 
Further, Parry challenges the uniqueness and novelty of the biotechnologies by 
means of which the BBE is supposed to be realized, arguing that the emphasis 
on biotechnological solutions contributes to a political agenda that favors certain 
specialists’ positions (Parry 2007: 387). A somewhat similar charge is made by 
Birch, Levidow, and Papaioannou, who argue that BBE frames the problem of 
sustainability exclusively as a problem of inefficiency (Birch et al. 2010; McCormick 
and Kautto 2013: 2597). As a result, solutions are considered solely through 
the lens of (bio) technological progress, which serves the drafting of a unilateral 
‘master narrative’ that excludes alternative solutions. Due to this heavy emphasis on 
solutions derived from the life-sciences and the development of biotechnologies, 
the BBE is accused of blatantly disregarding other social actors like small-scale 
farmers, who end up in second place when it comes to distributing (bio) resources 
(cf. Blok and Lemmens 2015).
While siding with the abovementioned critiques insofar as we agree that these 
are matters that need to be discussed, we will here argue that a crucial dimension 
of questioning currently remains absent. This dimension concerns fundamental 
assumptions that underpin the ideal of the BBE. More precisely, it concerns the 
philosophical perspective vis-à-vis the unobserved horizon of energy and economy 
towards which both the ideal of BBE and many of the accompanying critiques are 
oriented. Even though the abovementioned critiques demonstrate that controversy 
exists with regard to (bio) resource production in the BBE, we observe that the 
relation between energy on the one hand and economy on the other remains 
uncontroversial and therefore unquestioned.
In what follows, we argue that there is good reason for controversy on this point, 
and we maintain that a philosophical questioning of the relation between energy 
and the economy is in order. Methodologically, the philosophical approach means 
that we are not primarily concerned with the viability or desirability of particular 
solutions envisaged in the BBE. This means that we presently forego the question as 
to whether the themes of circularity, cascade, and zero-waste are realistic, or indeed 
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pertain to the ‘fantasy future’ that one of the abovementioned critiques suggests.7 
The present inquiry involves a reflection on the mode of thinking that undergirds 
this ideal itself. It will become clear that the mode of thinking present in the ideal of 
BBE implicitly assumes the relation between energy and economy to be universally 
marked by scarcity.
In order to pursue the philosophical question regarding energy and economy in 
the BBE, we will interpret the ideal of BBE from the perspective of the French 
philosopher Georges Bataille. His work is especially relevant to the BBE for two 
reasons. First, because it provides a framework for analyzing the relation between 
energy and economy. Second, because it allows us to consider the implications of the 
BBE for the ideal of a ‘zero-waste humanity’. Our hypothesis is that the BBE fully 
belongs to what Bataille calls a restricted economy: it implicitly understands the 
relation between energy and economy in terms of scarcity and utility alone (§2.4.1). 
Our interpretation lays bare the hidden premises that steer the BBE in this direction. 
At the same time, we will demonstrate a number of resulting inconsistencies and 
tensions that ultimately undermine the ideal of BBE in a catastrophic way (§2.4.2). 
This gives rise to a consideration of the ideal of a zero-waste humanity (§2.5). We 
must begin, however, with an inquiry into the foundations of Bataille’s philosophy 
of economy and energy, which is the topic of the next section.
§2.3 GEORGES BATAILLE ON ECONOMY
Georges Bataille published his theoretical work on economy first in 1949 under 
the title The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy (1991).8 The first part, 
subtitled ‘Consumption’, was supposed to be the first part of a trilogy, but parts 
two and three were never published during his lifetime. Apart from a number of 
satellite texts, we will chiefly focus on this first part (usually simply referred to 
as The Accursed Share) where Bataille presents his reflections on economy most 
systematically. We first ask what Bataille means when he speaks of economy and 
how this differs from our ordinary understanding of economy. Next, we review how 
Bataille analyzes this ordinary understanding of economy as the restricted economy, 
which must be seen as embedded in the radically different general economy. We 
then analyze how Bataille detects a prevailing yet disastrous disregard of the general 
7. Particularly the theme of zero-waste is questionable in this regard, since it ultimately seems to 
suggest a perpetual motion machine which defies the laws of thermodynamics. Whether realistic or 
not, it is an important part of the ideal of BBE.
8. Originally published in French : La part Maudite. Essai d’économie générale [1976b (1949)].
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economy and how he conceives of an alternative. Bataille’s diagnosis will prove to 
be of vital importance for our discussion concerning the BBE in §2.4, because in 
the BBE, the general economy remains unconsidered.
§2.3.1 What does Economy mean for Bataille?
In the introduction to The Accursed Share, Bataille explains that in his reflections 
on economy, he ‘‘wanted to avoid redoing the work of the economists’’ (Bataille 
1991: 13). What this amounts to is that unlike ordinary considerations of economy 
as the study of the production, distribution, and consumption of goods, Bataille is 
concerned with economy in terms of a much larger framework. This framework is 
indicated as the general economy and is understood in terms of the circulation of 
energy that is constitutive of ‘‘living matter in general’’ (Bataille 1991: 23), meaning 
a continuum that involves the vegetal (e.g. leaves of plants as products of the 
circulation of energy called photosynthesis) and animal (offspring, reproduction), 
up to socio-cultural phenomena (human economies and works of art). The products 
of this circulating energy—things in the world—are appropriated in what Bataille 
calls the restricted economy, where ‘the economists’ self-evidently consider of them 
as economic goods. The latter perspective of the restricted economy of goods is 
said to overlook the general economy which concerns the transition of energy into 
living matter in general. The difference between the general and restricted economy 
bespeaks a difference in relation between energy and economy, and it is Bataille’s 
contention that this difference is forgotten in ‘the work of the economists’ who 
falsely universalize the restricted economy and therefore solely see energy as an 
economical good. They thereby fail to see how this only corresponds to a particular 
situation that exists within the larger framework of the general economy. In order to 
see Bataille’s point and its consequences for the BBE, we first ask how the relation 
between energy and economy is understood within the restricted economy.
§2.3.2 Restricted Economy
The restricted economy designates a particular situation that perceives of energy as 
an economic good like any other; it is valued according to a system of production 
and consumption which is characterized by a logic of scarcity and utility. The 
characteristic of scarcity does not primarily point to a specific quantitative shortage 
of the specific good of energy (e.g. electrical energy), but designates the category 
in which energy appears. In the restricted economy, energy is considered within 
the category of scarcity, which is to say that it is considered like any good of which 
one does not have enough and is therefore in demand. Demand of goods requires 
supply of goods, which is understood in terms of utility, denoting the attempt to 
overcome scarcity by means of useful labor, viz. the production of the goods that are 
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in demand. The restricted economy thus implicates a means-end relation, in which 
the end is the overcoming of scarcity by means of the production of goods. In this 
relation, energy appears as an economical good that can be deployed as a means to 
produce other demanded goods. We will see in §2.3.3 how this understanding of 
energy as just another economical good overlooks a more fundamental dimension 
regarding energy and economy, i.e. the general economy.
The restricted economy corresponds both to how one commonly conceives of 
economy, as well as to modern economic science. The situation of scarcity and 
utility is commonly taken for granted, considering that one generally acknowledges 
the need to do useful, productive work in order to make up for what is lacking: one 
needs to go to work because it is necessary to produce the goods that are demanded 
in society. Further, one must do so in order to get a wage which can be used for what 
is needed. Farmers must labor in order to produce crops (utility), both because food 
is in demand (scarcity) and because it yields a wage which can be used to supply the 
needs (scarcity) of themselves and their families.
Likewise, economic science corresponds to the restricted economy, because in its 
study of the production, distribution and consumption of goods, scarcity and 
utility are ubiquitous. To consider some classical definitions: Lionel Robbins 
defines economy as the ‘‘science which studies human behavior as a relationship 
between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses’’ (1932: 16); and Adam 
Smith sees economy as ‘‘a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator [with 
the objective of providing] a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people’’ (1976: 
428).9
In sum, the restricted economy designates an economical understanding of reality 
in which the world is encountered in terms of scarcity, lack, and need, all of which 
is to be compensated for by means of useful labor. It involves a particular mode 
of thinking that is present in both colloquial comprehension of economy as well 
as in economic science,10 and which Bataille articulates as ‘‘the consciousness of 
a necessity, of an indigence (…)’’, where individuals come into view as ‘‘nothing 
but eternally needy individuals’’ (Bataille 1991: 23). Such an economy of neediness 
9. Smith of course calls this ‘political economy’.
10. It is debated whether Bataille is correct is subsuming all of modern economic science under the 
restricted economy. Jean-Joseph Goux denies this (cf. Goux 1990: 206), whereas Alan Stoekl 
criticizes Goux for misreading Bataille (cf. Stoekl 2007a: 137-138; Stoekl 2007b: 271). This 
discussion is beyond the scope of the present paper, which is not concerned with modern economic 
science in general, but focuses on the BBE.
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implies a specific understanding of the relation between energy and economy in 
which energy is approached as a good existing within an economy of supply and 
demand.
§2.3.3 General Economy as Ground for the Restricted Economy
According to Bataille, the restricted economy corresponds only to a particular, 
isolated (i.e. restricted) situation, which is part of a much larger framework (Bataille 
1991: 20). The latter constitutes the ground of the former, but is itself usually 
forgotten.
Bataille’s economical thought centers in on this larger framework. It concerns the 
general flow of energy, which he examines in terms of what he calls the general 
economy. This bespeaks an important difference in the relation between energy 
and economy: here, energy is not primarily considered as a good existing within a 
particular economy, but is understood ontologically as that what first constitutes 
and literally sets all processes and activities of life on the surface of the globe, 
including particular economic processes of production and consumption of goods, 
in operation. This means that a particular, restricted economy in which energy 
appears as a good is itself constituted and driven by the more general flow of energy 
in an ontological sense. Bataille’s general economy takes account of this constitutive 
energy as characterized by abundance and dissipation.
Regarding energy as constitutive for goods as well as its characterization in terms 
of abundance and dissipation, the sun exemplifies what is at stake in the general 
economy. For Bataille, solar energy is the origin and source of all life and wealth: 
‘‘Solar energy is the source of life’s exuberant development. The origin and essence 
of our wealth are given in the radiation of the sun’’ (Bataille 1991: 28). Life and 
living matter are constituted by the sun in the sense that they are transformations 
of solar energy. Such transformations are essentially characterized by abundance: 
on the one hand, the sun gives without ever receiving (cf. Bataille 1976a: 10), 
which is to say that solar energy is dispensed relentlessly, cannot be given back, 
and must go somewhere. On the other hand, the particular living systems that 
exist as transformations of this gift of solar energy have ‘‘at [their] disposal greater 
energy resources than are necessary for the operations that sustain life’’ (Bataille 
1991: 27). Because particular living systems do not and cannot consume the sun’s 
gift completely for self-maintenance, a surplus of energy accrues. Bataille speaks of 
‘‘a superabundance of energy on the surface of the globe’’ (Bataille 1991: 29), and 
conceptualizes this in terms of rising pressure. This pressure first causes particular 
living systems to grow, to extend maximally (Bataille 1976a: 11). Hence, the living 
systems that are first constituted as transformations of solar energy are put under 
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pressure by the sun’s gift and therefore tend to extend maximally. However, given 
that the surface of the globe is limited, and the sun’s gift is unremitting in the face 
of such a limited space, ‘‘the impossibility of continuing growth makes way for 
squander’’ (Bataille 1991: 29). At this juncture, squander is understood as ‘‘the 
production of increasingly [costly] forms of life’’ (Bataille, 1991: 33).11 If plant 
life uses most of the sun’s gift for growth or extension, higher organisms waste or 
dissipate vast amounts of energy in eating and death: they eat plants and animals 
without growing to the same extend, thus making self-preservation and growth a 
‘costly’ affair. Additionally, the extravagant, intricate, and painstakingly extensive 
sexual behaviors of higher organisms imply a costly way of procreation: ‘‘the 
mammalian organism is a gulf that swallows vast quantities of energy’’ (Bataille 
1986: 60). It squanders or dissipates the sun’s gift, thereby releasing the pressure. 
In short, living matter as constituted by energy and confined within a limited space 
responds to the sun’s abundant and pressurizing gift by dissipation in the form of 
costliness and inefficiency.
Humans occupy a specific position in this constellation. Although humans are 
conditioned by the same movement of life, their activity, by way of labor and 
technology, ‘‘opens up a new possibility to life, a new space’’ (Bataille 1991: 35–36). 
The specificity of this new possibility first designates association with an augmented 
supply of energy. The application of increasingly sophisticated technologies and 
organization of labor makes it possible to exploit living and dead matter (e.g. animal 
domestication and fossil fuels), thereby gaining access to gigantic energy resources. 
In unlocking greater parts of the sun’s gift when only a small fraction of this energy 
is used or self-preservation, an increasing surplus of energy accumulations results, 
giving rise to an increasing pressure. As with other systems of life, this pressure is 
first incorporated in terms of increased extension or growth, where growth is now 
to be understood in the form of demographic expansion, conquer, and imperialism. 
However, expansion cannot continue indefinitely due to confinements of space, 
which means that the incorporation of pressure is eventually hindered by limits to 
growth.
§2.3.4 Catastrophically or Gloriously
The question of what happens when limits to growth have been reached and 
expansion or conquer can no longer absorb the excess of energy goes to the core 
of Bataille’s project. His answer is that the accumulating energy ‘‘must be spent, 
willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically’’ (Bataille 1991: 21). The latter option 
11. Hurley translates ‘onéreuses’ as ‘burdensome’, but we maintain that ‘costly’ is a more accurate 
translation. (cf. Bataille 1976b: 40).
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is said to occur when a particular system can no longer grow, yet continues to be 
put under increasing pressure by the sun’s relentless giving: ultimately something 
has to give, causing the system to burst in a feat of cataclysmic explosion. This in 
fact constitutes the ominous backdrop of Bataille’s considerations of economy. He 
writes his studies in the aftermath of what he views as two massive occurrences 
of catastrophic energy spending: the two world wars as ‘‘the greatest orgies of 
wealth (…) that history has recorded’’ (Bataille 1991: 37). Although these wars are 
not claimed to be singularly caused by the colossal amounts of surplus generated 
through rapid industrialization, Bataille does take them to be calamitous and 
violent exudation of the resultant accumulations of energy that had to be spent. 
Such disastrous and destructive expenditure constitutes the outlet for a system that 
can no longer incorporate the sun’s gift by means of expansion.
The alternative to the catastrophic and unwilling expenditure of energy in war 
consists in spending energy willingly and gloriously. This alternative implies 
radically acknowledging one’s position within the general economy, which comes 
down to considering the relation between energy and economy in its corresponding 
terms. Energy is then not to be taken as a (scarce) good that must be produced, 
accumulated, and deployed, but instead it comes into view as the constitutive 
ground which sets all particular economies, organic and human alike in operation. 
This entails understanding energy as the sun’s constitutive and abundant gift, which 
evokes a response to this gift in terms of abundance and dissipation.
Bataille is the first to admit that such a response remains difficult to fathom, 
since it ‘‘is to go against judgments that form the basis of a rational economy’’ 
(Bataille 1991: 22). It calls for a radical changeover of perspective that ‘‘actually 
accomplishes a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking’’ (Bataille 1991: 
25). The reference to Copernicus makes clear that although such a reversal may be 
strange, it is not inconceivable.
In an attempt to articulate the conceivability of reversal, Bataille traces several 
occurrences of the logic of abundance throughout cultural history, with the 
analysis of the potlatch as the most famous and important.12 As a ritual performed 
by indigenous people in the American northwest, the potlatch concerns the 
obliteration of accumulated resources for the purpose of humiliating, challenging 
and obligating rivals, thereby gaining rank over them. Examples of such destruction 
12. The Potlatch was first described by Marcel Mauss in his ethnographical studies of Native American 
cultures in the American northwest (cf. Mauss 2011); Bataille emphasizes its importance in a note: 
‘‘reflection on potlatch led me to formulate the laws of general economy’’ (Bataille 1991: 193, note 
25).
zwier-layout.indd   37 08/01/2018   13:57
38
Chapter II
include the killing of one’s own slaves, the wrecking of canoes, up to setting one’s 
own village on fire (Bataille 1991: 67–68). Although the ritual displays a certain 
purposefulness and thus utility in the gaining of rank over a rival, Bataille is adamant 
in pointing out that ‘‘the principle of [such utility] is nevertheless determined 
by a resolute squandering of resources that in theory could have been acquired’’ 
(Bataille 1991: 72). Compared to straightforward rapine, the potlatch designates 
an extremely costly way of gaining profit. In short: ‘‘There would be no potlatch 
if… the ultimate problem concerned the acquisition and not the dissipation of 
useful wealth’’ (Bataille 1991: 68). Bataille interprets the potlatch as exemplifying 
a transgression of the restrictions of utility and scarcity, thereby manifesting the 
conceivability of encountering the sun’s gift in terms of abundance and dissipation.
The potlatch is only one of many cases that Bataille investigates along these 
lines. Other examples include the construction of pyramids which, to the eyes of 
rational economists who operate in terms of profit and efficiency, must appear ‘‘a 
monumental mistake; one might just as well dig an enormous hole, then refill it 
and pack the ground’’ (Bataille 1991: 119), and Lamaist monks who parasitize 
upon the surplus produced by Tibetan workers, dissipating it ‘‘in contemplative life 
… [which] avoids activity’’ (Bataille 1991: 109). Bataille provides such examples 
as articulations of dissipation or expenditure of accumulated energy, which implies 
acknowledgement of the general economy.
Without doubt, thinking in terms of abundance is peculiar: by contemporary 
judgment, setting one’s own village on fire is nothing short of demented. Yet for 
Bataille, instances like the wasteful potlatch are revealing precisely because of this 
peculiarity. Because ‘‘the movement it structures differs from ours, it appears stranger 
to us, and so it is more capable of revealing what usually escapes our perception’’ 
(Bataille 1991: 72). This points to both the necessity and glorious conceivability 
of thinking the question of energy and economy in terms of abundance and 
dissipation. To take its necessity first, the very fact that the potlatch appears so 
peculiar shows that our customary mode of understanding is sturdily anchored in 
the restricted economy, which ‘‘excludes in principle non-productive expenditure’’ 
(Bataille 1985: 117). Bataille views the generalization of this customary mode of 
understanding as ultimately ending up in a catastrophic explosion akin to the world 
wars. In principally excluding the wastefulness or nonproductive expenditure such 
as exemplified in the potlatch, the situation in which energy appears as a good 
within the categories of scarcity and utility becomes generalized. Bataille observes 
such a generalization of the restricted economy in both colloquial understanding 
of economy as well as in economic science: ‘‘The human mind reduces operations 
[…] to an entity based on typical particular systems […] Economic science merely 
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generalizes the isolated situation’’ (Bataille 1991: 23). Such universalization of a 
specific relation between energy and economy neglects that the situation to which 
it corresponds is itself a particular, isolated, and restricted product of the flow 
of energy in the sense of the general economy. Since the restricted economy is 
itself literally set in operation by energy in the constitutive sense of the general 
economy, it is itself subject to the sun’s abundant and pressurizing gift. This 
pressure remains unconsidered, because generalization of the restricted economy 
entails solely encountering energy within the categories of scarcity and utility. As a 
result of forgetting energy in this ontological sense, that is, of forgetting the general 
economy, the universalized restricted economy can only incorporate pressure by 
extending and must ultimately explode once extension is no longer possible. The 
peculiar wastefulness encountered in the potlatch teaches us something about our 
customary mode of understanding the relation between energy and economy, 
which in its generalized form leads to catastrophe. It indicates that if catastrophe is 
to be avoided, it is necessary to refrain from universalizing the restricted economy 
and instead seriously consider the peculiarity of wasteful expenditure, which is to 
say, to precisely transgress the restrictions of the restricted economy. As Bataille puts 
it: ‘‘the extension of economic growth itself requires the overturning of economic 
principles’’ (Bataille 1991: 25).
Bataille sees a glorious alternative to catastrophe in such transgression or overturning 
of economic principles. It is the transgressive that constitutes an alternative: one 
must precisely transgress or move beyond the principles of the restricted economy 
that exclude wasteful expenditure in order to keep the restricted economy from 
its catastrophic terminus. Approaching the question of why such an alternative 
is thought to be glorious is best illuminated with the case of the BBE in mind. 
We therefore first turn to the BBE and the implications of Bataille’s thought for 
this ideal. Afterwards, we will return to the question of the glorious alternative to 
catastrophe, which also turns out to be central to the BBE.
§2.4 THE BBE FROM A BATAILLEAN PERSPECTIVE
Bataille’s thought has important implications for the BBE. We explore these 
implications in the present section. First, we will review the BBE in light of Bataille’s 
conceptualization of the restricted economy and general economy. We argue that 
the BBE turns out to be the apex of the restricted economy. Secondly, we show how 
this makes the BBE vulnerable to the problems that Bataille diagnoses with regard 
to the restricted economy: it implicitly and wrongfully universalizes the relation 
between energy and economy that belongs to the restricted economy. We will see 
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how such universalization not only leads to internal inconsistencies with respect 
to the ideal of the BBE but ultimately causes this ideal to undermine itself in a 
catastrophic way. Thirdly, we plot a trajectory in which the BBE can avoid such 
catastrophe. In line with Bataille, this points to a peculiarity that is necessary and 
glorious. We conceptualize this trajectory by claiming that the BBE is in need of a 
pressure valve.
§2.4.1  The BBE as Restricted Economy 
Bataille’s thought on the relation between energy and economy is of interest for the 
discussion of the BBE, because the latter fully adheres to the restricted economy. 
This can be shown by investigating the relation to the sun on the one hand, and the 
themes of circularity, cascade, and zero-waste on the other.
As is the case in Bataille’s thought, the sun occupies a central position in the ideal 
of the BBE. Figure 1 depicts the BBE as a perfectly heliocentric operation where 
the sun constitutes the main source of energy. The relation between this source of 
energy and economy corresponds to the restricted economy, which is to say that 
the sun appears in terms of scarcity and utility. This may seem an odd claim at first, 
since the sun is obviously the BBE’s energy source of choice precisely because it is 
not scarce but virtually inexhaustible. This inexhaustibility is, after all, what is to 
facilitate a transition from a petrol-based towards a bio-based economy. However, 
scarcity must presently not be taken to refer to a specific quantity of solar energy, but 
instead designates the category or mode in which solar energy appears. It appears 
as a good of which we do not have enough (scarcity) and which must therefore 
be produced (utility). This can be observed in the BBE’s endeavor to maximize 
the utility-potential of solar energy. In the design of the BBE, one finds a strong 
demand for increase of predictability, efficiency, and control with regard to solar 
power and its products.13 As seen in the first section of this paper, this is tantamount 
to optimally capturing solar energy, while at the same time rendering this energy 
maximally useful through circularity, cascade, and zero-waste: ‘‘Ideally, the bio-
economy should be an efficient economic system that produces no waste’’ (Asveld 
et al. 2011a: 11). This means that even though solar energy may be abundant, one 
is nonetheless required to render this energy maximally useful by capturing and 
controlling it without any, i.e. ‘zero’ waste.
13. Cf. Birch et al. who analyze this point in terms of an intensification of the productivity of natural 
resources (2010: 2907), and Boyd et al. (2001) who analyze this idea of productivity in terms of the 
Marxian concepts of formal and real subsumption of nature.
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The ideal of the BBE thus relates to the sun in terms of a need for maximum utility. 
In light of a Bataillean perspective, this relation appears as the relation of ‘needy 
individuals,’ and involves the understanding of the relation between energy and 
economy that belongs to the restricted economy. In short, if the restricted economy 
designates the relation between energy and economy according to which energy 
appears like any other good that is in demand and must therefore be produced, i.e. 
where reality is encountered in terms of scarcity on the one hand and utility as the 
compensation for scarcity on the other (§2.3.2); and if the BBE relates to energy 
in terms of a need for maximum (zero-waste) utility in reference to the good of 
energy; then it follows that this ideal of the BBE is completely oriented towards the 
restricted economy.
§2.4.2 The Bio-Based Catastrophe
The BBE thus belongs to the restricted economy. Further, in demanding maximum 
utility and zero-waste, it generalizes the corresponding relation between energy and 
economy. It solely encounters energy as a good that must be harnessed, produced, 
and not wasted. This disregards energy in the ontological, constitutive sense: the 
ideal of the BBE forgets the general economy in favor of a universalized restricted 
economy. It accordingly mistakes an abundant gift for a scarce one; by exclusively 
focusing on utilizing the sun’s gift, the BBE fails to take notice of the question 
where this energy is supposed to go.
The consequences of this forgetfulness first of all point to an internal inconsistency 
within the ideal of the BBE itself, since it must deny its own demand for circularity 
and grow. If the BBE is prompted to maximally capture solar energy, and if nothing, 
i.e. zero of this energy goes to waste, then the result can only consist in ever increasing 
energy accumulations: a rising pressure in Bataillean terms. This increasing pressure 
forces the BBE to grow, but such growth is at odds with the ideal of the BBE itself. 
Although portrayed as a ‘regenerative circular economy’ (European Commission 
2012b), the BBE must, by virtue of its own logic, deny this demand of circularity 
and increase. The mode in which solar energy is encountered leads to an increasing 
pressure that breaks open the closed-loop or circular system, turning it into an ever 
expanding spiral. Whereas one may of course argue that such economic growth is 
part of what the BBE is designed to achieve,14 this would mean that it is not at all 
envisioned to be a circular economy, but rather to incorporate particular circular 
production processes as constituents of an overall spiral or growth economy.
14. For example: ‘‘The Bioeconomy offers Europe a unique opportunity to address complex inter-
connected challenges, while achieving economic growth’’ (‘‘Bioeconomy - ensuring smart green 
growth for Europe-Research - European Commission’’ n.d.). Retrieved January 3, 2015, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/’’.
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Besides being inconsistent with regard to the ideal of the BBE, the second, more 
problematic consequence of forgetting the general economy is that incorporation of 
the sun’s energizing gift by means of extension cannot go on indefinitely, since the 
available space is limited. As became clear from the previous section, a Bataillean 
perspective shows how with regard to living systems ‘‘the impossibility of continuing 
growth makes way for squander” (Bataille 1991: 29) in forms of costly procreation. 
But the BBE cannot allow for the latter, given its adherence to zero-waste.15 The 
BBE must grow, and upon reaching its own limits to growth, it must let pressure 
build up within its restrictions. Pressure cannot be piled up interminably within a 
limited space: ultimately something has to give in a feat of cataclysmic explosion.
The current ideal of the BBE can thus be observed to undermine its own ambition 
in a catastrophic way. Its ambition is to guarantee a sustainable future by becoming 
regenerative and circular, but regenerativity understood as zero-waste or absolute 
utility can only spiral out of control towards a catastrophic discharge. Based on this 
diagnosis, we argue that the BBE overlooks a vital and essential element: a pressure 
valve. In the following section, we will elaborate the meaning of this concept, as 
well as its implications for the BBE and the ideal of a zero-waste humanity.
§2.5 ON THE NECESSITY OF A PRESSURE VALVE
The catastrophic self-undermining that marks the present conceptualizations of 
the BBE roots in a disregard of the general economy, which implies a mistaken 
universalization of the specific relation between energy and economy that belongs 
only to the restricted economy. In Bataille’s words, such a mistake ‘‘causes us to 
undergo what we could bring about in our own way’’ (Bataille 1991: 23). We learned 
from §2.3 how Bataille thinks that accumulating energy eventually must be spent, 
either catastrophically or gloriously. Against the present conceptualization of the 
BBE that must undergo the catastrophic variant of expenditure, we here opt for 
bringing about the glorious.
This amounts to claiming that what is missing from the BBE as depicted in Fig. 1 is 
a pressure valve. Conceptually speaking, the pressure valve points to a way in which 
a closed, circular system that is put under pressure by the sun’s giving can exhaust 
15. The previously mentioned criticism regarding the scientific invalidity of zero-waste (cf. §2.2.2, 
particularly note 7) is of no avail here: even if zero-waste is physically impossible due to the laws of 
thermodynamics, solar energy remains abundant. This abundance is not dispelled by the necessary 
loss present in every energy conversion which thermodynamics discusses. If this were the case, the 
economy of energy would be in equilibrium, which is not the case, as evidenced by the phenomena 
of growth and squander.
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accumulating pressure. If the system portrayed in Fig. 1 must by virtue of its own 
logic (zero-waste) grow and eventually burst, a pressure valve indicates a way to deal 
with accumulating pressure.
§2.5.1 Implications of the Pressure Valve for the BBE
The pressure valve has four important implications for the ideal of the BBE. First 
of all, it signifies the acknowledgement, rather than the forgetting of the general 
economy. It takes seriously the idea that the relation between energy and economy 
as depicted in the restricted economy is not universal, but particular. That is, the 
situation in which energy appears as a good that is characterized by scarcity and 
utility is itself set in operation by energy in the constitutive sense of the general 
economy. The pressure valve acknowledges this and takes account of the fact that 
the general economy pressurizes the restricted economy and hence pressurizes the 
BBE. This means that if the BBE is to fulfill its ambition of working towards a 
sustainable future, it must incorporate the pressure valve as designating the explicit 
consideration of the relation between energy and economy instead of the presently 
manifest disregard for the question concerning this relation and its implicit 
restriction to the logic of the restricted economy (§2.2.2).
Secondly, the pressure valve signifies the necessity and conceivability of spending 
of the sun’s accumulating gift in a non-catastrophic way. This implies allowing 
for wasteful expenditure of energy. It may be clear that the current ideal of the 
BBE cannot allow for expenditure such as witnessed in the potlatch, since the 
wastefulness portrayed there is antipodal to zero-waste. Yet if catastrophe is to be 
avoided, the BBE must find a way to include considerations that transgress the 
restrictions of its habitual mode of thinking that is solely based on a thinking of 
scarcity: it must consider energy in terms of abundance, which means that zero-
waste has to be replaced with wastefulness and dissipation. For the BBE, in addition 
to considering the relation between energy and economy, the pressure valve further 
implies the overturning of zero-waste and instead admits questions of abundance, 
dissipation, and wastefulness.
Thirdly and more concretely, the pressure valve points to a different order of the 
transformation of solar energy. The BBE as presently developed ultimately restricts 
its considerations of such transformations to scarcity and utility. The qualitative 
transformations of solar energy that occur in the BBE (e.g. crops and derived 
products, §2.2) are considered as products or goods that are valued in the terms of 
scarcity (zero-waste, maximal efficiency) and utility (assurance of circularity). The 
pressure valve, conversely, suggests a qualitative shift regarding the transformation 
of solar energy, which implies moving production beyond the restricted economy.
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We can recognize several domains toward which the BBE can look to incorporate 
pressure valves as qualitatively different transformations of energy. A possible 
domain to which Bataille points is art. We have encountered the example of the 
pyramid (§2.3.4) and can expand this to involve the arts more generally. Art 
and artworks can of course be considered to be transformations of energy that 
are understood according to a logic of scarcity and utility, i.e. as economic goods. 
However, they cannot, by definition, be fully comprehended as such. Artworks 
are never solely valuable because of their usefulness or scarcity; their signification 
and significance goes beyond such criteria. They are prime instances of wasteful 
expenditure, as exemplified by the case of the pyramid as possibly the least efficient 
way to bury someone. So although works of art can be seen as economic goods 
from the perspective of the restricted economy, they do not primarily accumulate 
energy in a quantitative way: they are instead the result of a glorious spending 
of energy. From this perspective, art can be seen as a pressure valve that prevents 
the catastrophic expenditure of the accumulated surpluses of energy in the BBE. 
This means that contrary to viewing art as cultural adornment of the economy 
or taking it into consideration as an aberrant fringe phenomenon, a BBE that 
aims to be sustainable should recognize pressure valves like art, i.e. instances of 
qualitative transformation and spending of accumulated energy, as an integral part 
of a sustainable economy.16
Another domain toward which the BBE can look for incorporation of pressure 
valves concerns what could be called an ethic of passivity, where the latter term 
does not necessarily mean the lack of any activity whatsoever, but rather the lack of 
an activity that reinvests its products. We have seen how Bataille gave the example 
of Lamaist monks (§2.3.4) who consume a surplus without reinvesting it to the 
economy from which this surplus stemmed. The artist from our previous example 
fits this role as well. One could further think of science, although it would need 
to be understood as involving more than providing fundaments for application. 
Scientific knowledge and the vast expenditure of resources needed to acquire 
such knowledge would then move beyond a valorization simply in terms of the 
eventual production of useful products or goods, and would rather be considered 
as transformations of a qualitatively different order, more akin to the arts than 
to instruments. On this point, philosophy and theology are suitable candidates 
as well. The excessiveness encountered in such an ethic of passivity constitutes a 
possible pressure valve for the BBE, which means that it should not simply be 
condemned and debarred as unproductive wastefulness, but rather be hailed as the 
16. The further exploration of the role of art in our society in general and in the BBE in particular is 
beyond the scope of this article.
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pressure valve that a circular, regenerative economy needs. Fidelity to such an ethic 
of passivity quite obviously requires the Copernican transformation mentioned in 
§2.3.4, and is further complicated by entailing political questions regarding which 
(groups or classes of ) people are included in, or excluded from such an ethic. None 
of these issues are easily dispelled, but if the BBE needs pressure valves, and if 
an ethic of passivity is a good candidate for such a valve, the principle of such 
wastefulness (contrary to zero-waste) deserves serious consideration
While our analysis is far from exhaustive, we have given several suggestions as 
to how the BBE might incorporate pressure valves. Such suggestions cannot, in 
any simple way, be expanded to provide a full-fledged recipe for avoiding the 
catastrophe that the BBE faces, for the practical reason that the BBE is a project 
that is still in development. This means that deliberations such as the ones above 
should be developed alongside future discussions regarding the development of the 
BBE. We maintain that the concept of the pressure valve helps illustrate what is at 
stake and should thus be accorded a place in such discussions. However, next to this 
practical reason, a more fundamental reason exists. This reason points to the fourth 
implication of the pressure valve, which gives rise to the ethical question of a zero-
waste humanity, the topic of the next and final section of this paper.
§2.5.2 The Pressure Valve as a Glorious Possibility: Beyond a zero-
waste Humanity
We have argued that the BBE needs a pressure valve and have indicated both what 
this implies and how the BBE can incorporate it. Yet the nature of this pressure 
valve calls for further reflection. If Bataille argues that economic growth requires 
the overturning of its own principles (§2.3.4), and if we argue that the BBE needs a 
pressure valve (§2.5), we are in fact implying that what is needed is an instrument for 
avoiding catastrophe: the pressure valve is then considered as a safety measure. And 
indeed, we maintain that the BBE needs such a measure, i.e. an overturning of zero-
waste in order to avoid a catastrophic terminus. Such a pressure valve is necessary, 
conceivable, and possibly successful in the context of the BBE. Abovementioned 
expenditures (arts, passivity), can be integrated into the BBE in order to deny zero-
waste and occasionally release pressure, thereby guaranteeing circularity.
What must be recognized is that the pressure valve thereby points to a paradox with 
regard to utility: the valve is useful as a safety measure precisely because it involves 
something wasteful, i.e. useless. Our argument for the necessity of the pressure 
valve involves a similar paradox, since it calls for moving beyond the restricted 
economy and its accompanying consciousness of necessity, but is at the same time 
itself framed in terms of an economy of necessity, i.e. the need to avoid catastrophe. 
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This returns us to a question left open at the end of §2.3.4, as it demonstrates what 
is at stake when Bataille speaks of the glorious, i.e. the expenditure of energy as an 
alternative to the catastrophic. This notion of the glorious is of particular interest 
for the BBE, because it gives rise to the ethical question concerning the character of 
humanity associated with the BBE.
For Bataille, the glorious indicates the venture beyond an economy of need, as it 
derives its legitimacy from this transgression itself, rather than from the ultimate 
utility of this venture. We can return to our example of art as a pressure valve to 
clarify this. We have argued for the incorporation of art as a qualitatively different 
transformation of energy, i.e. as a pressure valve that is needed to secure the 
sustainability of the BBE. This means that one can recognize the useless, wasteful 
expenditure of energy occurring in art to ultimately have a use insofar as it helps 
to avoid catastrophe: the uselessness is rendered useful. Importantly, in order to 
see this usefulness of the useless, one must make two steps with regard to the 
relation between energy and economy: first, suspending the demand for zero-waste 
or absolute utility and acknowledging the general economy and its corresponding 
abundance of energy as pressure; second, recognizing that useless expenditure has 
its use as a pressure valve. Via these two steps, the legitimacy of art can be derived 
from its utility. Conversely, the glorious for Bataille derives its legitimacy and value 
not from an ultimate goal or use, but rather from the transgressive venture itself. It 
takes the first step but not the second.
Bataille analyzes the glorious in terms of an experiential domain that is opened 
in instances of expenditure, in which utility and scarcity are of no concern. This 
domain specifically concerns humans, since they are involved in the transformation 
of vast amounts of energy (§2.3.3) and can be conscious of this involvement 
(§2.3.4). Therefore, humans can be said to take part in the glorious, insofar as 
the economy of neediness can be consciously transgressed. On multiple occasions, 
Bataille analyzes this in terms of ecstatic and rapturous experience, for example, the 
experiences connected to eroticism (a wasteful practice that can never be exclusively 
considered in terms of efficient procreation) (cf. Bataille 1986), being moved 
by art, or being absorbed in (religious) festivities and rituals (cf. Bataille 1988, 
1989). What these have in common is that they concern instances in which one’s 
everyday consciousness of neediness and accompanying character as functionary of 
an economy of need are momentarily suspended, as one moves to an experiential 
domain beyond restrictions of scarcity and utility. This is called glorious precisely 
because it is not for the sake of something else, for future results, or to acquire ends, 
but rather transgresses the restrictions of necessity altogether to sovereignly exist for 
the sake of itself.
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This indicates a question for the humanity that is associated with the BBE: if the 
BBE needs a pressure valve, and if consideration of this pressure valve involves a 
transgression in the sense of a suspension of zero-waste and of acknowledgement 
of the general economy, then the question is how humanity living in a BBE relates 
to this transgression. This clearly is an ethical question, although it differs from the 
existing ethical questions pertaining to the BBE which generally concern matters 
of risk and consequences for particular groups of people (§2.2.2). The ethical 
question raised in terms of the pressure valve concerns the character of humanity 
that belongs to the BBE.
Must humanity belonging to the BBE be considered a zero-waste humanity? The 
latter’s character would then come down to being a functionary or worker17 that 
guarantees the operations of cascade, circularity, and zero waste as portrayed in 
Fig. 1 (§2.2). Based on the previous deliberations, we can say that such a zero-
waste humanity existing in a zero-waste BBE is anything but sustainable. A truly 
sustainable BBE rather implies a wasteful humanity. The ethical question then 
concerns how one relates to this wastefulness. One possibility is to evaluate it by 
the standard of utility and see how it guarantees stability and sustainability, which 
would render humanity a wasteful functionary in the service of the stability of a 
(bio-based) economy. Yet Bataille’s notion of the glorious suggests a venture beyond 
this as well. In terms of the glorious, wastefulness does not find its legitimacy in its 
ultimate utility, but points to the possibility of a domain beyond utility altogether.
For the BBE, the pressure valve therefore finally involves the question of allowing 
for contemplation that is beyond an economy of need. This points to a radical 
rethinking of not only a closed-loop, zero-waste economy, but also of the humanity 
that exists economically.18 To be sure, such a rethinking cannot consist in simply 
replacing utility with wastefulness, but rather resides in accepting wastefulness as 
the continuation of utility, as well as accepting that this raises the ethical question 
of what wastefulness means for humanity. This question is important for the BBE, 
precisely because of its focus on absolute utility and zero-waste. In light of the 
above, it may be clear that this ethical question is not of the order of questions that 
admits a finally defined answer. Indeed, demanding a defined, ready-made answer 
to the question pertaining to the character of humanity that belongs to a BBE 
17. See for the concept of humanity as worker: Jünger, E. Der Arbeiter (Klett-Cotta: Stuttgart 1982); 
cf. Blok, V. Rondom de Vloedlijn. Filosofie en kunst in het machinale tijdperk. Een confrontatie tussen 
Heidegger en Jünger (Aspekt: Soesterberg 2005).
18. One promising line of thought can be found in Emmanuel Levinas’ concept of enjoyment, which 
is developed against the background of abundance and economy as well (Levinas, E., Totality and 
Infinity. An essay on Exteriority (Duqeusne UP: Pittsburgh 2011). The further exploration of a 
Levinassian concept of humanity in relation to the BBE is beyond the scope of this article.
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means already answering the question, as it presumes the character of humanity to 
ultimately be a defined or definable element existing in a closed, circular economy. 
Bataille’s notion of glorious expenditure points to the human possibility beyond 
well-defined restrictions. Accordingly, the challenge that the BBE offers can then 
be considered to reside in the possibility of shifting from an ultimately needy, zero-
waste humanity towards a humanity that accepts wastefulness and is willing to face 
the glorious, beyond the restrictions of need.
§2.6 CONCLUSION
The argumentation presented in this paper consisted of six steps. First, we have 
argued that the ideal of the BBE as presently developed fully corresponds to what 
Bataille calls the restricted economy. Secondly, the BBE was shown to implicitly 
generalize a specific relation between energy and economy, implying a mode of 
thinking fully characterized by scarcity and utility. As a result, energy appears solely 
as a good to be rendered optimally useful while nothing, zero, goes to waste. Thirdly, 
we have argued that this forgets its own ground, a ground that Bataille articulates 
as the general economy within which energy appears as constitutive and abundant. 
Fourthly, we have shown how the general economy puts the BBE under pressure, 
whereas this pressure remains unseen from the perspective of the BBE. This results 
in an internal inconsistency within the ideal of the BBE, since economic circularity 
must be denied in favor of growth. This growth was in turn shown to fatally 
undermine the BBE’s ambition of being a regenerative and circular economy. The 
demand for zero-waste implies that pressure can only be incorporated in growth, 
which means that the system must ultimately explode when growth ceases to be 
an option. Fifthly, we have argued that the BBE is in need of a pressure valve, 
which designates the need to transgress its own standards of absolute utility and 
zero-waste by way of wasteful expenditure. We have claimed that future discussions 
concerning the BBE and sustainability must take seriously this idea of a pressure 
valve and have indicated several directions in which this can be further developed. 
Sixthly, by discussing the nature of the pressure valve, we have pointed to a paradox 
revolving around the utility of the useless. In reference to Bataille’s notion of the 
glorious, we pointed out how the pressure valve gives rise to the ethical question 
pertaining to the character of humanity that belongs to a BBE.
The BBE offers a challenge on this point. The pressure valve that the BBE needs 
raises the question of our willingness to take considerations regarding economical 
humanity beyond an economy of need. We maintain that this challenge remains 
overlooked if the relation between energy and economy remains unconsidered. The 
zwier-layout.indd   48 08/01/2018   13:57
49
The Ideal of a Zero-Waste Humanity
implications of the notion of the pressure valve as developed in this paper may serve 
to bring this question into view, thereby making possible an ethical dimension that 
deserves consideration in future discussions regarding the BBE.
This, then, is both a critique of the current conceptualizations of the BBE and at the 
same time an exploration of the possibility for a radical reconsideration of economy 
and humanity in light of a bio-based future. It is a critique insofar as we argue that 
because of the unobserved assumptions regarding the relation between energy and 
economy, the BBE is inconsistent and self-undermining. It is an exploration of the 
possibilities for reconsidering humanity’s bio-based future insofar as we argue for 
the need of a pressure valve, but discover in the articulation of this latter need, a 
possibility to consider our neediness as such. This finally concerns the question of 
humanity as it asks whether a bio-based future involves a humanity fully captivated 
by the logic of scarcity and utility—a zero-waste humanity—or perhaps a humanity 
that is willing to gloriously lay to waste the restrictions in which it finds itself.
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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a phenomenological analysis of postphenomenological 
philosophy of technology. While acknowledging that the results of its analyses are to 
be recognized as original, insightful, and valuable, we will argue that in its execution 
of the empirical turn, postphenomenology forfeits a phenomenological dimension 
of questioning. By contrasting the postphenomenological method with Heidegger’s 
understanding of phenomenology as developed in his early Freiburg lectures and 
in Being and Time, we will show how the postphenomenological method must 
be understood as mediation theory, which adheres to what Heidegger calls the 
theoretical attitude. This leaves undiscussed how mediation theory about ontic 
beings (i.e. technologies) involves a specific ontological mode of relating to beings, 
whereas consideration of this mode is precisely the concern of phenomenology. 
This ontological dimension is important to consider, since we will argue that 
postphenomenology is unwittingly technically mediated in an ontological way. 
The upshot of this is that in its dismissal of Heidegger’s questioning of technology 
as belonging to “classical philosophy of technology”, postphenomenology 
implicitly adheres to what Heidegger calls technology as Enframing. We argue that 
postphenomenology overlooks its own adherence to the theoretical attitude and 
ultimately to Enframing, and we will conclude with calling for a phenomenological 
questioning of the dimension that postphenomenology presently leaves unthought, 
meaning that we will develop a plea for a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension 
in the philosophy of technology.
Keywords: Postphenomenology –  Empirical turn – Heidegger –  Theoretical 
attitude –  Enframing
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§3.1 INTRODUCTION
Postphenomenology unmistakably belongs to the philosophies of technology 
that embrace what Hans Achterhuis (2001) has dubbed “the empirical turn”. 
This implies a critical distance towards accounts in which technology appears as 
a singular overarching process and instead investigates technological dynamics 
on a micro-scale. Postphenomenology aims to empirically analyze how particular 
technologies as “the things themselves” mediate the relation between humans and 
their world. This has given rise to numerous analyses and detailed descriptions of 
how human existence is deeply and polymorphously interwoven with artifacts.
While acknowledging that the results of its analyses are to be recognized as original, 
insightful, and valuable, we will argue that in its execution of the empirical turn, 
postphenomenology forfeits a phenomenological dimension of questioning. 
This dimension can be brought to light by turning to the phenomenology of 
Martin Heidegger, whose work stands as both one of the most important sources 
of inspiration for postphenomenology as well as one of the most prominent 
targets of postphenomenological critique (cf. Ihde 2010: 1). By contrasting the 
postphenomenological method with Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology 
as developed in his early Freiburg lectures and in Being and Time, we will show how 
the postphenomenological method must be understood as mediation theory, which 
adheres to what Heidegger calls the theoretical attitude. This adherence leaves 
undiscussed how mediation theory about ontic beings (i.e. technologies) involves a 
specific ontological mode of relating to these beings, whereas consideration of this 
mode is precisely the concern of phenomenology (§3.3, §3.4). This ontological 
dimension is important to consider, since we will argue that postphenomenology 
is unwittingly technically mediated in an ontological way. The upshot of this is 
that in its dismissal of Heidegger’s questioning of technology as belonging to 
“classical philosophy of technology”, postphenomenology unwittingly adheres to 
what Heidegger calls the essence of technology as Enframing. Our claim will be 
that postphenomenology overlooks its own adherence to the theoretical attitude 
and ultimately to Enframing, and we will conclude with calling for a questioning 
of the dimension that postphenomenology presently leaves unthought, meaning 
that we will develop a plea for a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension in 
the philosophy of technology (§3.6). In order to develop these points, we begin 
with a review of postphenomenology as a philosophical method for questioning 
technology (§3.2).
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§3.2 THE POSTPHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD
In this section, we inquire into postphenomenology as a method for questioning 
technology and how this method derives from phenomenology. Since our aim consists 
in providing a clear formulation of the postphenomenological method, we will 
neither pursue historical comprehensiveness with regard to the discussion of classical 
phenomenology nor investigate the legitimacy of how the latter is appropriated by 
postphenomenology. Critical examination of the postphenomenological method is 
postponed to the next sections.
To understand postphenomenology as a method for studying technology, we can 
take Don Ihde’s work as point of departure. Ihde provides the following equation: 
“pragmatism + phenomenology = postphenomenology” (Ihde 2012: 117; 128). We 
first ask how phenomenology is part of the equation and subsequently investigate 
the meaning and implication of the addition of pragmatism.
§3.2.1 Phenomenology in Postphenomenology
The postphenomenological questioning of technology1 departs from 
phenomenology, because the latter augments what Ihde calls a “naïve objectivist 
account” (1990: 97). Such an account would study technology in terms of 
perceived objective qualities such as physical or material properties. This is not 
deemed wrong, but too limited insofar as it solely regards technologies as quality-
bearing objects from the perspective of a conscious subject that is positioned 
over against such an object. The insight taken from Husserl’s phenomenology is 
that such a perspective is not a neutral starting point, but is itself the specifically 
structured product deriving from a prior experiential correlation. In its demand 
for a “radically empirical beginning” (Ihde 2012: 16) phenomenology observes the 
famous call by Husserl to move “to the things themselves”, thereby following the 
phenomenological “principle of all principles”:
that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, 
that everything originarily (so to speak, in its ‘personal’ actuality) offered to 
us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but 
also only within the limits in which it is presented there. (Husserl 1983: 44)
Ihde adopts this maxim and accordingly defines phenomenology as “an examination 
of experience that deals with and is limited by whatever falls within the correlation 
of experienced-experiencing” (Ihde 2012: 34). This means not presupposing a 
1. In this essay we focus on postphenomenology as developed by Don Ihde and Peter-Paul Verbeek.
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structure in which subject and object are simply given as opposites, but beginning 
with and limiting oneself to the correlation of what is experienced (which Husserl 
called the noema or noematic correlate) with its mode of being experienced (the 
noesis or noetic correlate) (cf. Ihde 2012: 25). The correlation of noema and noesis 
is called intentionality, and careful description and examination of intentionality 
shows how a conscious subject cannot be simply presupposed as a starting point, 
but is discovered from within the movements of experience.
Postphenomenology finds one of its central ideas here. It claims that technologies 
cannot be reduced to quality-bearing objects that are perceived by a subject. Rather, 
technologies are woven into the movements of experience in ways that exceed the 
scope of objectivist accounts. Ihde’s example of skilled woodchopping serves to 
illustrate this point.2 When examined phenomenologically, i.e., when the analysis 
is limited to what is given in experience, the praxis of woodchopping shows how 
a conscious subject, an “I” or any noetic correlate for which technologies come 
into view as quality-bearing objects, is not plainly given from the start, but appears 
at a late stage in the analysis. For the skilled person engaged in woodchopping, 
“perceptual attention is concentrated upon the piece of wood to be cut: (Ihde 2012: 
29–30). The piece of wood stands out from the environment as the “focal core” 
(Ihde 2012: 30) to which conscious attention is directed, whereas one’s axe, the 
various techniques associated with it (pose, aim, amount of applied force, etc.), 
as well as the notion of oneself as a cognizant subject are not primarily presented 
to perceptual experience. One becomes aware of oneself, one’s environment, one’s 
tools, and one’s techniques only reflexively. So rather than simply perceiving a 
fully aware and conscious subject (e.g. the logger) that finds itself opposed to a 
defined object (e.g. the piece of wood), using a delineated tool-object (e.g. the axe 
with a certain weight, length, color, etc.), a phenomenological description of what 
Ihde calls the “straightforward experience” present in our practical engagement 
with the world yields an experiential correlation in which the noema, the piece 
of wood to be cut, is presented first (Ihde 2012: 27). What follows is that “[the] 
‘I’, particularly in its thematized form, comes late in the analysis rather than being 
given as a first. This is to say, the ‘I’ has a certain genesis or recognizable origin 
in the movements of experience” (Ihde 2012: 29). Technologies (the axe in this 
example) do not solely appear as pre-given quality-bearing objects for conscious 
reflection by a pre-given “I” or subject, but are woven into the wider movements of 
experience. Postphenomenology calls this interweaving “technological mediation” 
2. The fact that this example is quite obviously indebted to Heidegger rather than to Husserl is of 
historical, rather than methodological importance for the present purposes.
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and studies it under the heading of “human-technology relations”, with the goal of 
“[discovering] structural features of those ambiguous relations (Ihde 1990: 75; see 
also Ihde 1993: 71; Verbeek 2005: 7).3
It may thus be clear how Husserlian phenomenology inspires postphenomenology 
to emphasize human-technology relations, thereby moving beyond a subject-
object dichotomy (cf. Verbeek 2005: 110) to investigate technologically mediated 
relations in which “both the objectivity of the world and the subjectivity of those 
who are experiencing it and existing in it are constituted” (Verbeek 2011: 15; see also 
Verbeek 2005: 111–113).
§3.2.2 Pragmatism in Postphenomenology
In postphenomenology, the mediated constitution of subject and object involves 
pragmatism, the second term of Ihde’s equation. Pragmatism is incorporated 
into postphenomenology to ward off the alleged essentialist thought present in 
classical phenomenology and philosophy of technology.4 Essentialism means the 
reference to an essence that transcends the experiential correlation, subject-object 
constitution, or human-technology relation. Ihde finds such essentialism in Husserl’s 
phenomenology because Husserl ultimately grounds the phenomenological 
analysis in a transcendental subject, thereby falsely retaining the Cartesian “vestigial 
epistemology that still divides realities into something like bare material objects and 
something else like a meaning-giving subject” (Ihde 2012: 122–123). Likewise, with 
regard to technology, postphenomenology is critical of accounts in which technology 
is reduced to a singular, overarching essence. Culprits that are often mentioned in 
this regard are Karl Jaspers, Jacques Ellul, and most of all Martin Heidegger—to 
whom we will return. According to Ihde, postphenomenology is pragmatist insofar 
as it takes an “anti-essentialist” position: “I claim, pragmatically, that there is no 
essence of technology” (Ihde 2010: 119). Instead of viewing technologies according 
to a fixed essence, their character is considered to be “multistable” (2010: 126), 
meaning that a technology can assume various “stable” identities which depend on 
3. Ihde has famously discovered several kinds of human-technology relations, called embodiment 
relations, hermeneutic relations, alterity relations, and background relations. Verbeek has suggested 
that what he calls cyborg relations and composite relations can be added to this scheme. Analysis of 
these types of relations is omitted here. For a more detailed discussion of these human-technology 
relations, see Ihde (1990: 72–112); Verbeek (2005: 122–127; 2011: 139–152).
4. Postphenomenology follows the pragmatism as developed by John Dewey, and also makes occasional 
reference to William James and Richard Rorty. An elaborate study of the postphenomenological 
interpretation of these pragmatic philosophies is beyond the scope of this paper. Ihde (2009: 5–25) 
provides a historically oriented review of postphenomenology and pragmatism. The question 
whether and how (some of ) the arguments presented in these pages would have a bearing on 
pragmatism beyond the scope of postphenomenological pragmatism cannot be answered within 
the confines of this paper and is therefore left open.
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the context in which it is used. One of Ihde’s examples concerns sardine cans that 
were left behind by gold prospectors in New Guinea, and were subsequently used as 
ornamental headgear by the local inhabitants (Ihde 1990: 125). Verbeek also adheres 
to this pragmatism: “[technologies] are only technologies in their concrete uses, and 
this means that one and the same artifact can have different identities in different 
use contexts” (2005: 118).5 For postphenomenology then, anti-essentialism means 
that the character of technologies is pragmatically defined, which is to say that 
it depends on use-context. Investigating specific technologies and their respective 
mediations as appearing in specific use-contexts implies investigating technologies 
empirically, or taking the empirical turn.
In light of this survey, we can define the postphenomenological method as the 
empirical inquiry into the structural ways in which particular technologies mediate 
experiential correlations and associated subject-object constitutions that appear in 
specific contexts of technology use.
§3.3 POSTPHENOMENOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM
It may be observed that even though postphenomenology consists of 
phenomenology and pragmatism, it takes its name from the former rather than 
the latter. At least part of the rationale behind this can be found in Ihde’s argument 
that postphenomenology, given its anti-essentialism, pragmatism, and empirical 
turn, is “more phenomenological” than its (essentialist) predecessors (Ihde 2010: 
19; 128). This implies that pragmatism is in line with, and actually advances a 
phenomenological agenda. In this section, we begin to investigate this implication 
by questioning the phenomenological status of postphenomenological pragmatism. 
This will lay the groundwork for our critique of the fusion of phenomenology and 
pragmatism, which will be further developed in the next section. In order to do 
this, we first turn to the question what the phenomenon for postphenomenology is 
and ask how pragmatism is associated with this.
§3.3.1 The Phenomenon in Postphenomenology
What is the phenomenon in postphenomenology? It is technology understood as a 
human-technology relation. For Verbeek: “Phenomenology … is the philosophical 
analysis of the structure of the relations between human beings and their lifeworld” 
(2011: 7; our emphasis), and postphenomenology studies these relations in terms of 
human-technology relations. Ihde maintains that technology must be understood 
5. For Verbeek, this also means that postphenomenology “overcomes…the essentialism…that 
characterized classical phenomenology” (2005: 113).
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“phenomenologically, i.e. as belonging in different ways to our experience and 
use (…), as a human-technology relation, rather than abstractly conceiving of 
[technologies] as mere objects” (1993: 34; our emphasis).
This understanding of the phenomenon involves a noteworthy change in the 
understanding of the technological thing. When understood as phenomenon, a 
technology no longer appears as the self-contained thing that “naïve objectivism” 
yields, but as a human-technology relation. When Ihde states that “a technology is a 
human-technology relation” (1993: 40), he suggests that technology itself contains 
a variety of things. We have seen how the human-technology relation is understood 
as the site in which both objectivity and subjectivity are constituted (§3.2). This 
implies that objects and subjects are constituents, i.e., things that are constituted 
within the human-technology relation. To return to a previous example, Ihde’s 
description of woodchopping demonstrated how the woodchopper (constituent 1) 
is constituted as woodchopper insofar as he embodies the axe (constituent 2) and 
is engaged in chopping a piece of wood (constituent 3), etc. In Verbeek’s terms, 
“the ‘subjectivity’ of human beings and the ‘objectivity’ of their world are the result 
of mediations” (2012: 392). For postphenomenology, therefore, constitution is 
always the mediated constitution of things (constituents) within the confines of the 
phenomenon understood as human-technology relation.6
Accordingly, the postphenomenological questioning of technology concerns “what 
things do”, as the title of Verbeek’s book has it (2005). In light of the phenomenological 
interpretation of technology as human-technology relation and site of constitution, 
Verbeek’s “things” do not solely refer to specific artifacts that mediate in experiential 
correlations (e.g., the thermometer mediating my interpretation of temperature), 
but to all constituents. Therefore, questioning “what things do” means investigating 
how the (mediated) constitution of things, subject and object alike, takes place in 
a human-technology relation. In sum, the phenomenon of postphenomenology is 
the human-technology relation, which further designates the site in which “things 
do”, i.e., in which the (mediated) constitution of things as constituents takes place.
How does pragmatism relate to this understanding of the phenomenon? In what 
follows, we will develop the argument that it relates on two levels: first, the ontic level 
where it concerns the content of the phenomenon. This level is explicitly addressed 
in the postphenomenological method. The second level is ontological and concerns 
the access to the phenomenon. This level remains implicit in postphenomenology 
6. For an elaborate account of constitution in relation to technical mediation, see Kiran (2012a). For 
a critical analysis of “constitution” in postphenomenology, see Smith (2015).
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and will be made explicit by our analysis and introduction of a phenomenological 
concept of technical mediation. We will explain the former in the remainder of this 
section, and work our way towards the latter in §3.4.
§3.3.2 Content-Pragmatism
On the first—ontic—level, pragmatism is included in postphenomenology to 
ensure correct descriptions of the phenomenon. Here, pragmatism concerns the 
content of the phenomenon, which is ontic insofar as it concerns the character of 
the beings or constituents within the human-technology relation. In what follows, 
we will refer to this as “content-pragmatism”. It implies that postphenomenology 
denies the constituents in human-technology relations a stable, essential identity, 
and instead understands this identity in an anti-essentialist way, which is to say as 
multistable and dependent on use-context. Reiterating Ihde’s example: within a 
specific human-technology relation, the subject is constituted as woodchopping-
subject, the piece of wood is constituted as potential firewood, the axe is constituted 
as embodied, etc.7
The introduction of content-pragmatism is said to lead to a “more phenomenological” 
outcome (Ihde 2010: 19; 128). When we ask why this is more phenomenological, 
the answer is that it provides a more adequate depiction of the phenomenon or 
human-technology relation. We can turn to the postphenomenological critique 
of Heidegger to see how this works. Our discussion will be limited to how the 
postphenomenological critique grounds in adequacy of analysis.8 Subsequently, we 
will investigate the appeal to adequacy itself, which paves the way for an evaluation 
of the critique.
Heidegger stands as a foundational example9 of classical and therefore inadequate 
philosophy of technology that is to be overcome by the introduction of pragmatism 
and the associated empirical turn. His famous “Question Concerning Technology” 
7. We should note that Ihde, building on the work of Rorty, further ties postphenomenological 
pragmatism to a “nonfoundational, nontranscendental, [and] anti-Cartesian” orientation (Ihde 
2012: 116), and further follows Carl Mitcham’s discussion of pragmatism as a “shift from a 
representationalist belief epistemology to an actional or practice-oriented analysis” (Ihde 2012: 116–
117). In this paper, we emphasize postphenomenological pragmatism in terms of anti-essentialism 
and multistability. The way we see it, ant-iessentialism marks the main postphenomenological 
response to foundationalism, transcendentalism, and Cartesianism. These are all grounded in 
an essence (e.g., the Cartesian ego, cf. §3.2.2), whereas postphenomenology contends that the 
character of things is not essential but is pragmatically constituted in contexts of action, practice, or 
use.
8. For a more detailed discussion of the postphenomenological critique of Heidegger’s question 
concerning technology, see Verbeek (2005: 47–95); Ihde (2009; 2010).
9. On multiple occasions, Ihde calls Heidegger the founder of philosophy of technology. See for 
example Ihde (1993: 103; 2010: 28–55).
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(1977) views the essence of modern technology as the way in which being 
reveals itself as Enframing. The latter means that the world appears as inventory 
of a standing reserve [Bestand] (Heidegger 2012: 34), as resource in the sense 
of a “gigantic gasoline station” [Riesentankstelle] (Heidegger 1969: 50), i.e., as a 
material and immaterial resource, always ready to be utilized and exploited at will. 
The forest now appears as potential firewood, the river appears as a power source 
for a hydroelectric dam or as a tourist attraction, etc. (cf. Blok 2014). Verbeek 
summarizes: “reality is understood in terms of what is available to and can be 
controlled by human beings” (Verbeek 2005: 52).
Ihde finds Heidegger’s analysis to be essentialist, which means that all technologies 
are reduced to the same essence of Enframing. As Ihde rhetorically asks: “do all 
technologies fall under this description? No.” (Ihde 2010: 120). Hence, the problem 
is that Heidegger fails to see that technologies are not “one size fits all” (Ihde 2010: 
114), and Ihde provides many counterexamples that do not suit Heidegger’s 
interpretation of technology as Enframing, for instance, musical instruments 
(2010: 122– 125). As Ihde concludes: “To attend to the ‘essence’ of technology, 
I argue, blinds Heidegger to the differing contexts and multi-dimensionalities of 
technologies that a pragmatic-phenomenological account can better bring forth” 
(2010: 115).
A similarly oriented critique is voiced by Verbeek, who sees Heidegger’s analysis 
succumbing to the “Orphic temptation” (2005: 113) of solely looking backwards to 
conditions of possibility of technologies, where these conditions mean Enframing.10 
In so doing, Heidegger “fails to connect with specific technologies” (2005: 95), 
as he neglects “what things do” in human-technology relations. Verbeek calls this 
“transcendentalism” and argues against it by claiming that analysis of technologies 
must also include “looking forwards” to see how actual involvement with technologies 
goes beyond Enframing (cf. Verbeek 2005: 144–145). As an example, an analysis 
of a car (driving, maintaining, etc.) cannot be reduced to the stockpiled beings that 
are the conditions for the car’s being (construction materials, oil, electrical energy, 
air conditioner fluid, asphalt, etc.), but must be expanded in terms of how the car is 
embodied when driving it, how it mediates the constitution of one’s identity, and so 
on. Because Heidegger overlooks these aspects by solely emphasizing the condition 
of possibility, the final verdict is that “Heidegger’s transcendentalist approach is not 
able to give an adequate account of modern, technological artifacts” (2005: 94, our 
emphasis).
10. Cf. Ihde: “Heidegger [asks] a question that belongs to the transcendental tradition of philosophy: 
what are the set of conditions of possibility that make technology possible?” (2010:31).
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Both the critiques concerning essentialism and transcendentalism make clear that 
Heidegger’s analysis is disregarded because it provides an inadequate description of 
technologies. Instead of reducing all of technology to the same essence or conditions 
of possibility, postphenomenology aims for a more appropriate depiction of 
technologies and therefore turns to empirical analysis of specific human-technology 
relations. Accordingly, essentialism and transcendentalism are countered with the 
empirical turn and are supplanted with multistability. This shows how content-
pragmatism is grounded in adequacy of analysis.
§3.3.3 Adequacy and Phenomenology
To summarize, we have seen how the phenomenon in postphenomenology is the 
human-technology relation, which is the site in which “things do” viz. in which 
mediated constitution takes place (§3.2.1). We have further seen that content-
pragmatism provides a “more phenomenological” i.e., more adequate analysis of 
the phenomenon than provided by classical, “essentialist” or “transcendentalist” 
interpretations (§3.3.2). This gives rise to the following question: how must the 
appeal to adequacy be understood phenomenologically?
Adequacy is associated with truth as correspondence. In the traditional formulation: 
truth is the adequation of things and the intellect (veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus). 
Now, in its adoption of phenomenology, postphenomenology recognizes that such 
adequation belongs to a rather specific experiential correlation. Phenomenological 
analysis of intentionality does not assume a structure of correspondence between 
“things” and “intellect”, because instead of presupposing the associated objective and 
subjective domains and asking how they correspond, phenomenology studies how 
such domains themselves have a genesis in the movements of experience (cf. §3.2). 
Again, following Ihde’s analysis, the woodchopper is not primarily an “intellect” 
or subject that has adequate representations of “things” or objects, but rather he 
embodies the axe and focusses on the piece of wood to be cut. The question of the 
adequation of thing and intellect can only appear “later” upon reflection: it comes 
“late in the analysis” (Ihde 2012: 29). Verbeek: “To understand oneself as a subject 
facing objects, an explicit act of separation is needed” (2011: 28).
This exposes an ambiguity with respect to the postphenomenological take on 
adequacy. On the one hand, postphenomenology regards the notion of adequacy 
to belong to a specific experiential correlation that cannot simply be presupposed, 
but must be analyzed as having a genesis in the movements of experience. On 
the other hand, postphenomenology adheres to adequacy in its appeal to content-
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pragmatism: multistability is presented as providing a more adequate account of 
technologies than essentialism or transcendentalism, which is to say that depicting 
technologies as multistable is more truthful than depicting them as Enframing.
The ensuing question is: if adequacy denotes a specific experiential correlation 
that cannot be presupposed when phenomenologically analyzing a woodchopper, 
would this not also be the case for a postphenomenological researcher analyzing 
human-technology relations? Must the postphenomenological method not make 
a presupposition which makes it possible to adequately analyze human-technology 
relations as well as criticize other accounts (e.g., Heidegger’s) for coming up short? 
Put differently: in what kind of experiential correlation is the postphenomenological 
researcher taken up when relying on content-pragmatism to provide an adequate 
depiction of the phenomenon? For an answer to these questions, we turn to 
Heidegger’s phenomenology.
§3.4 HEIDEGGER’S PHENOMENOLOGY
In order to develop the question concerning the experiential correlation from 
which postphenomenology operates, we must begin by inquiring into Heidegger’s 
understanding of phenomenology and the phenomenon. We therefore turn to the 
early Freiburg lectures, as well as to Being and Time. The former are less frequently 
discussed than the latter in discourses about Heidegger, but there are two reasons 
to concentrate on the Freiburg lectures: first, Heidegger can here be found to lay 
the groundwork for his interpretation of phenomenology, which he will later take 
up in Being and Time.11 Second, and more importantly, we will see that the terms 
employed by Heidegger in the Freiburg lectures particularly resonate with what 
we hold to be the central problematic inherent in the postphenomenological 
method. They are therefore distinctly suited to elucidate the previously raised 
question pertaining to the postphenomenological appeal to adequacy and the 
experiential correlation from which this appeal is made. In what follows, we will 
make clear how Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology partly overlaps with 
the postphenomenological method, but argue that it also differs in two important 
ways: first, for Heidegger, the phenomenon of phenomenology is not the object of 
a theory. Second, phenomenology cannot be understood to be a theoretical science.
11. This does not suggest that Heidegger’s phenomenology from the Freiburg period is completely 
carried over to Being and Time without alteration. There are, for example, differences in the relation 
between the orientation of philosophy and science (cf. Blok 2005: 56–72). We cannot elaborate on 
these differences in this paper, and instead focus on the continuum relating to the understanding of 
the phenomenon, which is central to our argument.
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§3.4.1 The Theoretical Attitude
In Being and Time, Heidegger makes the frequently quoted claim that 
“Phenomenology signifies primarily a methodological conception”. This expression 
does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-
matter, but rather the how of that research” (Heidegger 2008: 50). This indicates an 
important difference between phenomenology and theoretical science. The latter 
is geared towards acquiring objective knowledge of the “what as subject-matter”. 
Phenomenology holds that research about an object or domain of objectivity (a 
what) already involves a certain way of relating (a how) to this “what.”12 Scientific 
inquiry is not interested in this “how”, but rather operates on the assumption that 
objects are accessible to theoretical thinking (e.g. via objective theory and scientific 
method). Conversely, this “how” is the theme of philosophy as phenomenology.
In further spelling out the difference between phenomenology and theoretical 
science, we can turn to Heidegger’s Freiburg lectures, where he contrasts the 
phenomenological method with what he calls the theoretical attitude [Theoretische 
Einstellung] (Heidegger 2004: 32–33).13 The theoretical attitude designates 
a specific mode of access to a theme of research, thereby involving a specific relation 
between being and thinking. Attitude here means that the theme of research 
stands as an object (being) over against the theoretical viewpoint of the researcher 
(thinking). The notion of the theoretical can be understood literally here (θεωρεῖν), 
as it denotes the taking of a perspective or view-point14, which makes it possible 
to articulate propositions about the object and verify these for correctness. In 
aiming for correct theoretical propositions about objects, the sciences adhere to 
the theoretical attitude. This attitude is taken as self-evident and is not questioned 
(unlike the scientific content of propositions made by way of this attitude). For 
example, geneticists may study the structure and functions of (parts of ) a genome, 
but do not ask how the genome appears as an object to experience and associated 
scientific theory.
12. Recall our discussion of the postphenomenological method in §3.2.1, where the subject-object 
relation is understood to involve a specific experiential correlation.
13. For a full elaboration on Heidegger’s criticism of the theoretical attitude and the development of his 
phenomenological method, see Blok (2005: 64-84).
14. It is worth noting that the translation of the corresponding passage from Being and Time is flawed. 
The German “jeweils” means “always”, “each time” or “all the while” rather than “sometimes”: “This 
kind of Being towards the world is one which lets us encounter entities within-the-world purely in 
the way they look (εἶδος)…Looking at something in this way is sometimes (sic) a definite way of 
taking up a direction towards something – of setting our sights toward what is present-at-hand.” 
(Heidegger 2008: 88)
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According to Heidegger, the theoretical attitude is usually overlooked as a specific 
“how” because of an orientation towards objects and associated “knowledge 
of the objective order” [objektive Ordnungserkenntnis] (Heidegger 2001: 123). 
This orientation is marked by a care for the conformity of objects and theories, 
thereby following an “ordering, collecting, typifying tendency to classify” 
[ordnendsammelnden, typisierenden Klassifikationstendenz] (Heidegger 2001: 21; 
translation modified). The theoretical attitude is absorbed in this task of ordering and 
therefore overlooks how the terms that are to be aligned (i.e., objects and theories, 
viz. being and thinking) belong to a specific experiential correlation. Heidegger: “I 
direct myself only to the matter, I focus away from myself toward the matter. With 
this ‘attitude’ [Einstellung] the living relation to the object of knowledge has ‘ceased’ 
[eingestellt]” (Heidegger 2004: 33). Here, having ceased means that this relation 
becomes an attitude in such a way that it is no longer considered as a relation. It 
becomes, to borrow an example from Aristotle, transparent like water for a fish.
To be sure, none of this is a critique in the sense of a value judgment. Heidegger 
refers to the theoretical attitude as the “sound instinct” of the sciences (2001: 121).15 
However, he is critical of philosophical accounts that adhere to the theoretical 
attitude.16 If the principle of phenomenology is to investigate the things themselves 
as they show themselves, and if the theme of phenomenology is the relation 
between being and thinking, then phenomenology cannot prejudge this theme to 
be the object as observed from a theoretical perspective. This latter maneuver would 
not access the theme as it shows itself, but rather according to a specific mode of 
appearance that belongs to the specific experiential correlation associated with the 
theoretical attitude. For Heidegger, therefore, phenomenology cannot assume the 
theoretical attitude.
What follows is that the phenomenon of phenomenology is not simply the content 
of a theory, to wit, an object or objective domain in reality to be studied from a 
theoretical perspective. Rather, the phenomenon is not only the content [Gehalt], 
but also the relation [Bezug] between being and thinking that one always already has 
to enact [Vollzug] in order for such content to appear (cf. Heidegger 2004). In other 
words, the phenomenon of phenomenology is not itself an (ontic) object or a being, 
15. This ‘instinct’ is not limited to the theoretical sciences. For Heidegger, it follows an orientation that 
rules throughout the tradition of western metaphysics. Cf. “A glance at the history of philosophy 
shows that formal determination of the objective [i.e., according to the theoretical attitude] 
entirely dominates philosophy” (Heidegger 2004: 43). A detailed discussion of this issue cannot be 
developed here. See for example Heidegger 2010, particularly §10. See also footnote 13.
16. Heidegger develops this point in a critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. An inquiry into the details 
and justification of this critique is beyond the scope of this article. For a good discussion of this 
issue, see Bernet (1994).
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since all objectivity already presumes and enacts a relation (ontologically) between 
being and thinking, and this relation is precisely the theme of phenomenology. 
Along the same lines, phenomenology cannot be understood as a theoretical science 
regarding a specific domain of objects, since it simultaneously investigates the 
relation that has to be enacted in order to make objectivity possible.
This points to a fundamental difference between Heidegger’s phenomenology 
and postphenomenology. Elucidating this difference will shed light on the 
previously raised question pertaining to the experiential correlation from which 
postphenomenology can appeal to adequacy (cf. §3.3.3). It subsequently facilitates 
a phenomenological analysis of postphenomenology.
§3.4.2 Postphenomenology as Mediation Theory
We recall that the phenomenon in postphenomenology is the human-technology 
relation, the site in which “things do”, i.e. in which the mediated constitution 
of constituents (subjects, objects, artifacts etc.) takes place (§3.3.1). In light of 
Heidegger’s understanding of the phenomenon and the theoretical attitude, 
we can see that the human-technology relation signifies a domain of reality, an 
objective “what” that is accessed theoretically. The postphenomenological method 
is geared towards making adequate propositions about the human-technology 
relation. In order to do this, postphenomenology relies on content-pragmatism: 
if the human-technology relation is to be adequately depicted, essentialism and 
transcendentalism must be dismissed, and one must recognize how, within human-
technology relations, the character of constituents is multistable and acquires 
stability depending on different use contexts. By way of its appeal to adequacy 
of analysis, we can observe that the postphenomenological understanding of the 
phenomenon is oriented towards what Heidegger called “knowledge of the objective 
order”. Even though the content of this order is reinterpreted to be multistable and 
context-dependent, this order itself is accessed as an object, i.e. something that is 
literally thrown-opposite (obiectum) to the perspective of a postphenomenological 
researcher. This shows that postphenomenology adheres to the theoretical attitude. 
In alignment with the sciences, it ultimately aims to offer an adequate theory 
about phenomena called human-technology relations and associated (mediated) 
constitution of pragmatically defined constituents. Verbeek is therefore right – more 
than he admits to – in referring to postphenomenology as “mediation theory” (2012; 
our emphasis). We previously asked in what kind of experiential correlation the 
postphenomenological researcher is taken up when relying on content-pragmatism 
to provide an adequate depiction of phenomena. The answer we now arrive at is: 
the experiential correlation characterized by the theoretical attitude.
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This diagnosis does not involve a devaluation of postphenomenology’s theoretical 
merits. It is evident that mediation theory opens up a rich dimension with regard to 
the questioning of technologies that remains foreclosed to any “naive objectivism”. 
Further, recalling §3.3, we can say that Ihde is justified in suggesting that 
postphenomenology advances a phenomenological agenda and can even be said to 
be “more phenomenological” insofar as it discloses the intricacies of technologically 
mediated constitution that takes place in human-technology relations. Our diagnosis 
also suggests, however, that a phenomenological way of questioning has more to 
offer than postphenomenology presently acknowledges. Whereas mediation theory 
is principally about the content of the phenomenon, Heidegger’s work indicates 
that phenomenology is not solely about the (ontic) content or “the what”, but 
simultaneously about the (ontological) relation between being and thinking or “the 
how” that is already enacted in an encounter with such content. This gives rise to the 
idea that notwithstanding its theoretical virtues, the postphenomenological method 
neglects “the living relation to the object of knowledge”, which is to say that it 
overlooks the element in which it is itself absorbed when confronting human-
technology relations.
§3.5 POSTPHENOMENOLOGY, TECHNICAL MEDIATION, 
ENFRAMING
All of this calls for elaborating an analysis of postphenomenology that advances on 
a phenomenological path left unexplored by mediation theory. In what follows, we 
take postphenomenology itself as phenomenon and further analyze its adherence 
to the theoretical attitude. This introduces pragmatism on a different, ontological 
level, which we specify by means of a reinterpreted, genuinely phenomenological 
concept of technical mediation. This in turn gives rise to a renewed confrontation 
with Heidegger’s understanding of the essence of technology as Enframing.
§3.5.1 Postphenomenology and the Phenomenon of Technical 
Mediation
We have argued that the postphenomenological method adheres to the theoretical 
attitude (§3.4.2). The ensuing question is where postphenomenology as mediation 
theory finds it ground. The problem encountered at this juncture is that several 
traditional answers are prohibited. If the theoretical attitude marks a relation between 
being and thinking, then it is noteworthy that neither the side of being nor that of 
thinking can provide a ground for propositions about human-technology relations. 
This can be clarified by asking a simple question: why are the postphenomenological 
propositions about human-technology relations more adequate than those of 
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Heidegger? Is it because postphenomenological theory represents what the world is 
really like and Heidegger has failed to notice this? Such an answer would eventually 
rely on invoking an essence on the part of being or objectivity. This is prohibited 
by the anti-essentialist character of postphenomenology. Is it more truthful because 
of how our thinking of the world is necessarily structured? This would invoke both 
transcendentalism and essentialism on the part of thinking or subjectivity, which 
cannot be allowed for similar reasons. We thus encounter a peculiar situation. By 
incorporating content-pragmatism and having multistability trump essentialism, 
postphenomenology claims to offer a more adequate theory about phenomena 
called human-technology relations. Yet it remains unclear on what grounds this 
theory can be said to be adequate.
Verbeek recognizes the abovementioned difficulty and argues that it would be 
inconsistent to make appeals to either transcendentalism or realism, because this 
would solicit an essence which postphenomenology cannot allow (2005: 113). He 
goes on to make the important observation that the fact that things “are accessible 
only in mediated ways does not interfere with our ability to say something about 
the roles they play” (2005: 113). Although Verbeek is right—and the growing 
collection of postphenomenological studies attests to this fact—it does seem to 
interfere with one’s ability to invoke adequacy and claim that what one says about 
human-technology relations is more adequate than what Heidegger says about 
them.
This ambiguity gives rise to the question what “mediated access” means. For Verbeek, 
it means that the things studied by postphenomenology are always constituted in 
human-technology relations and cannot be traced back to some primordial quality 
or essence outside of those relations (cf. §3.3.1).17 However, we must now add to 
this that the human-technology relation is itself accessed in a “mediated way”, since 
access is mediated by the theoretical attitude. If we further scrutinize this theoretical 
mediation in light of the abovementioned ambiguity pertaining to theoretical 
adequacy, the theoretical mediation appears as technical mediation. This can be 
made clear by returning to the postphenomenological critique of Heidegger.
17. cf. “Only in this sense is postphenomenology a relativistic philosophy – it finds its foundation in 
relations” (Verbeek 2005: 113).
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In retrospect of the development of his own thought, Ihde reiterates what we can 
now call his theoretically mediated critique of Heidegger’s essentialism and its 
inadequate “one size fits all” approach: “I saw that for Heidegger, every technology 
ended up with exactly the same output or analysis” (Ihde 2006: 271, original emphasis; 
cf. §3.3.2). He then goes on to say about Heidegger’s analysis of technology:
As a pragmatist and a rigorous phenomenologist, I realized this meant, 
simply, that such an analysis was useless, since it could not discriminate 
between the results of playing a musical instrument, also a technological 
mediation, and the process of genetic manipulation! (Ihde 2006: 271, 
original emphasis)
This is repeated more strongly when Ihde discusses other critiques leveled at 
Heidegger, and finally claims: “I think the more biting criticism … is that it has no 
utility” (Ihde 2006: 272, original emphasis).
Without doubt, Ihde’s remarks concerning the difference between genetic 
manipulations and musical instruments are intended to be hyperbolic18, but more 
important than these somewhat overblown examples is the shift in the critique’s 
orientation. The appeal to adequacy of analysis is now reoriented towards utility: 
the final problem with Heidegger is not that his analysis is inadequate in the sense 
of getting “too much wrong” (Ihde 2006: 271), but that it lacks utility. Utility 
here means that propositions about technologies have a further practical or 
theoretical use. For instance, in Ihde’s work in particular, further theoretical uses 
have been developed in terms of the historical study of science and technology, 
where he discusses the technological embedding of various scientific discoveries 
(Ihde 2001). Now, the yields of these studies are not disputed here, but the 
reorientation towards utility invites phenomenological questioning. On the one 
hand, Ihde’s postphenomenology is theoretically mediated insofar as it aims for 
adequate propositions about human-technology relations. On the other hand, this 
theoretical mediation is itself pragmatic insofar as it grounded in utility and effect, 
and can therefore be understood as technical mediation.
This latter concept of technical mediation differs from the postphenomenological 
concept of technological mediation. It does not primarily concern the ontic 
content of human-technology relations in terms of content-pragmatism, i.e. the 
technologically mediated constitution of things within those relations (e.g. the axe 
18. Ihde also offers more nuanced evaluations of Heidegger, for example with respect to gigantic 
industrial technologies, where he finds Heidegger’s analysis to be “insightful and penetrating” 
(2010: 119). See also footnote 9.
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mediating the constitution of the woodchopper; cf. §3.3.1). Rather, the concept 
of technical mediation is phenomenological and ontological in a sense that is not 
made thematic in postphenomenology and that characterizes the pragmatic horizon 
towards which the understanding of the phenomenon is oriented.19
Verbeek’s solution to the aforementioned difficulty pertaining to the grounding of 
mediation theory indicates a similar orientation. While consistently following the 
idea that things are accessible only in mediated ways, he argues:
The ambition of the postphenomenological perspective is in no way to 
formulate a theory that aims to ‘explain’ empirical reality. My ambition is 
not to seek out laws that reality obeys, but rather to find concepts with 
which to make visible and understand as many aspects of reality as possible. 
(Verbeek 2005: 162)
The interpretation of “aspects” matters a great deal at this juncture. If these 
aspects are considered on the ontic level of human-technology relations studied 
by mediation theory, then the touchstone for this theory ultimately comes down 
to “what it does” i.e. what it makes visible. In fact, Verbeek proceeds in this way. 
Recalling the critique of Heidegger, it becomes clear that Heidegger’s analysis is 
deemed inadequate insofar as it does not sufficiently disclose the intricacies of 
human-technology relations:
The most important critique (…) is that Heidegger does not fully succeed 
in developing an adequate (…) perspective on technology, for he reduces 
technology to its conditions of possibility and thereby fails to connect with 
specific technologies. (Verbeek 2005: 95)
Building on this critique, postphenomenology explores more effective paths, 
for example in ethical and political deliberation, where it contributes to robust 
imagination of the consequences of specific technologies and their respective 
mediations. As Verbeek says: “Technologies are political, and the theory of 
mediation can help to anticipate, analyze, and modify this ‘material politics’” 
(Verbeek 2009: 260). Along the same lines, postphenomenological studies have 
been geared towards technology design, where they effectively help designers to 
consider how their designs mediate experience and the constitution of subjectivity: 
19. Our phenomenolotical concept of technical mediation does not imply that postphenomenology 
can be reduced to a simple utilitarianism. To point is not that postphenomenology only pursues 
utility, but rather that utility and effect are presupposed in adequately theorizing about phenomena 
called human-technology relations.
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“Technology design, then, becomes a ‘continuation of politics by other means’” 
(Verbeek 2009: 257).20 As in the case of Ihde’s historical work, the value of these 
efforts is not disputed here. Further, the critique of Heidegger can be accepted to 
the extent that it concerns the theoretical analysis of human-technology relations. 
Importantly however, a phenomenological questioning makes clear that these 
human-technology relations are accessed in a theoretically mediated way, and that 
the theory about these relations is technically mediated insofar as its adequacy of 
analysis consists in “what it does”. Verbeek is therefore right in stating that “things 
are only accessible in mediated ways”, but we can now see that this mediation—
which must be phenomenologically interpreted as technical mediation— concerns 
the postphenomenological method in a way that it does not itself recognize.
§3.5.2 Technical Mediation and Enframing
We have argued that postphenomenology is itself technically mediated in an 
ontological way. In this sense, technical mediation has a threefold meaning: first, 
it means that the phenomena called human-technology relations are presented 
as objects for mediation theory (theoretical mediation). Second, the character of 
this object and its contents is pragmatically defined (content-pragmatism). Third, 
the theory about this object is itself technical inasmuch as it is oriented towards 
a pragmatic horizon of utility and effect. Whereas postphenomenology explicitly 
takes account of technological mediation on the ontic level of human-technology 
relations, it overlooks its own technical mediation at an ontological level.
Still, Verbeek’s account can also be interpreted to leave room for a phenomenological 
questioning of technical mediation. His previously cited remarks about the 
ambition of the postphenomenological perspective suggest that its method remains 
an unfinished project. Now, if this ambition consists in finding “concepts with 
which to make visible and understand as many aspects of reality as possible” 
(Verbeek 2005: 162), our phenomenological concept of technical mediation can 
be understood to contribute to this project. It shows how the mentioned “aspects 
of reality” cannot be limited to (ontic) human-technology relations accessed by 
mediation theory, but must further involve the (ontological) relation between being 
and thinking that is involved in encountering these relations. In light of this, we 
argue that Heidegger’s notion of Enframing has been prematurely dismissed by 
postphenomenology and must be rehabilitated as highly relevant for an ontological 
questioning of technology.
20. For the connection of postphenomenology and design, cf. Dorrestijn (2012); Kiran (2012b); 
Verbeek (2005: 203–236; 2011).
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The central point is that Heidegger’s understanding of the essence of modern 
technology – Enframing – concerns what we have discussed in terms of the 
phenomenological concept of technical mediation, and can therefore neither be 
reduced to essentialism (Ihde) nor transcendentalism (Verbeek). Both these critiques 
are situated on the ontic level of humantechnology relations and accordingly 
interpret Enframing as a flawed proposition about these relations. Ihde interprets 
Enframing as a genus and criticizes it because one cannot reduce the complexities 
of human-technology relations to an overarching essence.21 Verbeek interprets 
Enframing as a condition of possibility for modern technologies and finds that 
human-technology relations cannot be reduced to these conditions (cf. 3.3.2). Yet 
Heidegger argues that “Enframing is never the essence of technology in the sense 
of a genus” (1977: 29), which indicates that it is not geared towards a theoretical 
description of technologies or human-technology relations. Rather, if we allow for a 
slight anachronism and use terms from the “early” Freiburg period (§3.4) to discuss 
the “later” questioning of technology, we can say that Enframing does not primarily 
concern the content [Gehalt] of phenomena called human-technology relations, but 
concerns a relation [Bezug] that we already enact [Vollzug] in encountering these 
phenomena.22
Understood on this ontological level, Enframing means a reciprocal setting-upon 
[stellen]23 of being and thinking with regard to function (cf. Blok 2014), which is 
technical inasmuch as utility marks the main trait of the horizon toward which all 
experiential correlations are oriented.24 As in the case of the theoretical attitude, 
21. Recall Ihde’s previously encountered question: “do all technologies fall under this description? No.” 
(2010: 120, our emphasis).
22. This indicates a continuity between Heidegger’s early phenomenology and later work. Of course, 
this should not be taken to imply that the “early” and “late” Heidegger simply fit into a seamless 
whole. As is well known, the orientation of Heidegger’s philosophy changes, particularly with 
respect to the famous “Turning”. The details of this are well documented and are not repeated here 
(cf. Pöggeler 1987). The important point for our paper is that the thought about the difference 
between ontic and ontological constitutes a continuity in Heidegger’s work. The (rather complex) 
details of this are of lesser importance for our argument, since we argue that postphenomenology 
overlooks the ontological question with respect to both Heidegger’s early phenomenology, as well as 
his later work on the essence of technology.
23. Heidegger’s use of the german verb “stellen” has proven rather difficult to translate. To indicate 
the affinity of the later Question Concerning Technology with the early Freiburg lectures discussed 
in Section 3, it is worth pointing out that the theoretical attitude is originally called “Theoretische 
Einstellung”, setting-upon is “stellen”, represent is “vorstellen” and Enframing is Ge-stell. A further 
study of Heidegger’s use of stellen is beyond the scope of this article. For more elaborate remarks on 
the translation of stellen, cf. Heidegger (1977: 15, footnote 14; 2012: 25–27).
24. This is not to say that “utility” sufficiently covers what Heidegger means with “challenging forth” 
[herausfordern] that marks the way of revealing that belongs to modern technology (Heidegger 
1977: 14). This further involves calculability, assurance of availability, and will to power. It is clear, 
however, that utility marks a necessary, even chief characteristic of the mode of revealing associated 
with technology as Enframing.
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this orientation is assumed as self-evident. As Heidegger says: “Humans, in their 
relation to what presences are already challenged [herausgefordert] in advance, and 
therefore everywhere, and thus constantly, to represent what presences as something 
orderable for a requisitioning [das Bestellbare des Bestellens]” (Heidegger 2012: 
29). Now, due its own technical mediation, the postphenomenological method 
unwittingly exemplifies this being “challenged in advance”. On the one hand, it 
aims to “represent what presences” in an adequate mediation theory (§3.4). On 
the other hand, this theory is legitimated in terms of utility, i.e., “as something 
orderable for a requisitioning” (§3.5.1). Hence, postphenomenology dismisses 
Heidegger’s questioning of technology because it provides an insufficiently useful 
theory, and in so doing unwittingly affirms Enframing.
Importantly, adherence to Enframing cannot be understood as a vilification. It is not 
wrong to develop a fruitful theory about technologies, mediations, multistabilities, 
etc. For Heidegger, Enframing does not denote some human failure and can 
therefore not be mobilized as a term of abuse. Although he regularly disparages 
modern technology, his questioning cannot be reduced to a value judgment. The 
point is not to condemn modern technology as demonic (1977: 28) but to take it 
into consideration as a “way of revealing” (1977: 12) Hence, if phenomenology 
asks how things are revealed, and if the postphenomenological method unwittingly 
adheres to the way of revealing associated with technology in the sense of Enframing, 
then a phenomenological study of technology must recognize this as a philosophical 
concern and task.
§3.6 REHABILITATING THE ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION: A 
RESEARCH AGENDA
In light of the above, we plead for a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension in the 
questioning of technology. Heidegger’s question concerning the essence of modern 
technology has not simply been surpassed, and cannot be dismissed as “classical” 
in the sense of “outdated” philosophy of technology, since it takes consideration of 
an ontological structuring of reality to which the postphenomenological method 
unequivocally adheres. Such an orientation is not exclusive to postphenomenology, 
but appears as a chief characteristic of the present epoch. Rehabilitating the 
ontological dimension first of all points to the philosophical task of taking 
consideration of this phenomenon. Evidently, this task remains to be taken up and 
cannot be accomplished here. Yet, in following up on the arguments and analyses 
presented in this paper, we will conclude by sketching a number of trajectories 
pertaining to this task.
zwier-layout.indd   74 08/01/2018   13:57
75
Phenomenology and the Empirical Turn
First, a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension puts the topic of metaphysics and 
essentialism back on the agenda. We have shown that the postphenomenological 
method is not as “anti-essentialst” (Ihde 2009: 10) as it considers itself to be. 
Although Ihde may be right in stating that there “is no essence of technology” 
(2010: 119) on the level of human-technology relations, the postphenomenological 
method encounters these relations in a technically mediated way, thereby involving 
the essence of technology in Heidegger’s sense of Enframing. Rehabilitating 
an ontological consideration of this essence gives rise to the question whether 
Enframing implicates the whole of being and every access we have to beings. Our 
paper then serves as a corrective to understanding and criticizing the totalizing 
aspect of Enframing according to an interpretation of essence as genus (§3.5.2) 
and opens a different line of critical inquiry: with regard to technology, Heidegger 
understood all making, designing, and willing of technologies to be anchored in the 
mode of revealing that belongs to technology as Enframing. He therefore himself 
turned towards an exploration of the possibility of a non-technical, non-willing, 
“gelassen” way of philosophical thinking (Heidegger 1969; cf. Blok 2011a: 195). 
One can question, however, whether each technical making and willing can be 
reduced in such a radical way, and explore the possibility of a concept of making and 
willing that cannot be limited to technology in Heidegger’s sense (cf. Blok 2013). 
This could be a locus for a renewed encounter between the ontological dimension 
articulated by Heidegger and philosophy of technology after the empirical turn. 
Among others, it opens the question about the relation between the “work” of 
technology in the sense of Enframing and the notion of “work” that Heidegger 
discusses in “The Origin of the Work of Art” (Heidegger 2002: 1–56). In the former, 
work is considered in terms of utility and function which adhere to the way of 
revealing of Enframing. In the latter, the creation of the work of art is considered in 
terms of establishing truth, which is to say as an ontological moment beyond mere 
adherence.25 The question that would follow is which understanding of “making” 
holds sway in Heidegger’s thought, how this contrasts with insights deriving 
from philosophy of technology after the empirical turn, and how this relates to 
abovementioned discussions regarding the totality of technology.
Secondly, attention to the ontological dimension raises the question pertaining 
to the meaning and implications of the empirical in an empirical philosophy of 
technology. As it stands, the empirical turn focuses on concrete technical artifacts. 
In light of this paper, we can ask whether focusing on concrete technological 
things is sufficiently empirical. To be empirical in the phenomenological sense 
would mean to take heed of what is most nearby, which is to say of the relation 
25. Heidegger discusses this in terms of “Gestalt”. For an elaborate discussion of this, see Blok (2011b).
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between being and thinking that is usually overlooked and taken as self-evident. 
This gives rise to a question that takes inspiration from both postphenomenology 
as well as Heidegger, and involves a renewed encounter between the two. On the 
one hand, our paper shows that postphenomenology is susceptible to the critique 
that it is not sufficiently empirical, since it overlooks how its own method is 
technically mediated. On the other hand, we can adopt (but must also adapt) a 
postphenomenological line of inquiry and ask whether Heidegger takes sufficient 
consideration of concrete artifacts. Again, this would not be to demonstrate how 
concrete artifacts are not “one size fits all” and cannot be subsumed under the genus 
called Enframing. Rather, the question would concern the relation between the 
ontic (artifacts) and the ontological (the way of revealing). It asks whether and how 
technological artifacts can be said to “mediate” on an ontological level. Do artifacts 
merely respond to a way of being, or can they also be considered to “mediate” how 
being reveals itself (cf. Lemmens 2015)? As a speculative example: What is the 
relation between the artefact called camera obscura and reality understood as res 
extensa? Postphenomenology does not address such a question because its empirical 
scope is limited to ontic human-technology relations. Heidegger does not address 
this question because for him, concrete artifacts are only encountered by way of the 
revealing of modern technology.26 The rehabilitation for the ontological dimension 
called for in this paper then points to a reconsideration of the relation between 
empirical artifacts and the meaning of the empirical in the phenomenological sense.
Finally, and more concretely, we point to the topic of ecology. Postphenomenology 
has regularly been criticized for exceedingly narrowing the scope to concrete artifacts 
and their uses, thereby neglecting the background conditions of these artefacts, be 
in terms of politics (cf. Feenberg 2009; Kaplan 2009; Smith 2015) or with regard 
to ethics and the good life (cf. Scharff 2012). The rehabilitation of the ontological 
dimension called for in this paper can be taken to move in a similar direction, but 
can be specifically oriented towards ecology. This topic is of interest because in a 
basic yet fundamental way, our present ecological situation can be understood as a 
fundamental “how” of how things appear to us. Put bluntly, it raises the question 
whether the “gigantic gasoline station” that Heidegger mentions in his discussion 
of Technology now appears to be encounter a limit insofar as it is leaking, which 
is to say that it is polluting the planet (cf. Zwier et al. 2015). It is clear that this 
situation is deeply related to the topic of technology, be it in terms of causes, 
diagnosis, or (potential) remedies. The question that follows from a rehabilitation 
26. Still, one can detect a tension in Heidegger’s thought concerning this issue, which serves to legitimize 
our question. In Discourse on Thinking, for instance, Heidegger suggests that with the advent of 
synthetic biology (ontic), an attack upon the “nature of man” (ontological) is being prepared “with 
technological means” (Heidegger 1969: 52).
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of the ontological dimension in phenomenology of technology asks whether the 
relation between ecology and technology solely concerns the ontic (e.g., polluting 
vs “green” artefacts) or whether it must also be contemplated in ontological 
terms. A possible line of inquiry involves the relation between world and earth. 
Postphenomenological analyses of technologies generally concern how technologies 
understood as human-technology relations help constitute a world (cf. §3.2.1). Yet 
our present ecological situation indicates something that resists incorporation in 
our meaningful worlds. Understood in terms of planetary ecological dynamics, 
the earth now appears carrying these mentions worlds, while also tending towards 
the large-scale disintegration of these worlds.27 The task for phenomenology of 
technology would be to interpret this situation as phenomenon, which is to say as 
concerning the “what” (e.g., human-technology relations constitutive of worlds), 
while further involving how these worlds appear to us, and whether this “how” 
involves a mutation in due to the earth appearing as unworldly.
These trajectories are mere sketches to indicate directions for future research 
associated with a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension that we argued for 
in this paper. They become feasible only if postphenomenology is recognized to 
be technically mediated in the phenomenological sense portrayed here, and if this 
mediation is considered as a concern for philosophy of technology.
27. Timothy Morton (2013) therefore announces “The end of the World”, implying that the 
phenomenological notion of world is no longer meaningful in light of our ecological situation, 
which he mainly understands in terms of global warming. For a good discussion of the “asymmetry” 
of the earth as dynamic, see Clark (2011).
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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we argue that the Anthropocene is relevant for philosophy of technology 
because it makes us sensitive to the ontological dimension of contemporary 
technology. In §4.1, we show how the Anthropocene has ontological status insofar 
as the Anthropocenic world appears as managerial resource to us as managers of 
our planetary oikos. Next, we confront this interpretation of the Anthropocene 
with Heidegger’s notion of “Enframing” to suggest that the former offers a concrete 
experience of Heidegger’s abstract, notoriously difficult, and allegedly totalitarian 
concept (§4.2). In consequence, technology in the Anthropocene cannot be limited 
to the ontic domain of artefacts, but must be acknowledged to concern the whole 
of Being. This also indicates how the Anthropocene has a technical origin in an 
ontological sense, which is taken to imply that the issue of human responsibility 
must be primarily understood in terms of responsivity. In the final section (§4.3), 
we show how the Anthropocene is ambiguous insofar as it both accords and discords 
with what Heidegger calls the “danger” of technology. In light of this ambiguity, 
the Earth gains ontic-ontological status, and we therefore argue that Heidegger’s 
unidirectional consideration concerning the relation between being and beings 
must be reoriented. We conclude that the Anthropocene entails that Heidegger’s 
consideration of the “saving power” of technology as well as the comportment of 
“releasement” must become Earthbound, thereby introducing us to a saving Earth.
Key words: Anthropocene –  technology –  Enframing –  Earth – Heidegger
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§4.1 THE ANTHROPOCENE IS AT HAND
Although the concept of the Anthropocene was first developed in the scientific 
fields of geology and Earth-system science, it was never a purely disinterested, 
descriptive account, but included an explicit prescriptive dimension. Descriptively, 
the Anthropocene indicates the geological epoch in which the activity of 
industrialized humanity becomes the dominant factor in shaping the Earth and its 
life-supporting systems (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 2007). Supplementing the 
Holocene, in which the (relatively warm) climate was considered to be the central 
geological factor (Crutzen 2002), the Anthropocene places human activity in the 
center, and thus marks the time in which “natural forces and human forces [are] 
intertwined, so that the fate of one determines the fate of the other” (Zalasiewicz et 
al. 2010: 2231). Prescriptively, the Anthropocene takes account of how humanity 
faces the perilous situation in which the ecological aftermath of Earth-shaping 
threatens the very existence of our species (cf. Baskin 2015: 13). Issues like global 
warming, deforestation, pollution, reduction of biodiversity etc. appear to us both 
as consequences of our activity qua geo-force and as an urgent and inescapable 
demand to take responsibility for the faltering sustainability of the planet as life-
support system. We call this the ecological demand of the Anthropocene, since 
it concerns the oikos of the anthropic geo-force which will become uninhabitable 
unless we manage it differently.
In his review of the concept of the Anthropocene in geology and Earth-system 
science, Jeremy Baskin recognizes the pairing of descriptive and prescriptive 
dimensions (2015: 22) and shows how responses to the ecological demand follow 
a paradigm of management:
In almost all of the major accounts of the concept it is assumed that [the 
Anthropocene] requires a trinity of techniques: clear management of the 
Earth and Earth-systems, guided by experts (and scientists/engineers in 
particular), using the most advanced technology possible (including large-
scale technology). (Baskin 2015: 20)
Examples of this paradigm of management include Paul Crutzen and Christian 
Schwägerl, according to whom “we should shift our mission from crusade to 
management, so we can steer nature’s course symbiotically” (2011; cf. Crutzen 
2002) or Erle Ellis who states that “in moving toward a better Anthropocene, the 
environment will be what we make it” (2013; cf. Baskin 2015: 14).
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This paradigm can also be witnessed in various (critical) discussions of the 
Anthropocene in social science and the humanities. For instance, the concept of 
the Anthropocene has been criticized for its hidden normative agenda. The general 
“anthropos” not only excludes non-humans, but is modelled after a particular group 
of humans, namely the western, rich, excessively carbon-footprinted specimen 
(Baskin 2015: 16; cf. Latour 2014: 5). As a result, it appears that decisions 
regarding how to deal with the Anthropocene’s ecological demand (e.g., via 
largescale geoengineering projects) are also limited to this select group of humans 
and exclude other humans and non-humans. Such a critique is oriented towards 
management insofar as it criticizes one form of management whilst calling for a 
more democratic way of managing the Earth—where the associated “demos” is not 
necessarily anthropocentrically limited (cf. Haraway 2015; cf. Lorimer 2016).
A similarly oriented critique holds that the Anthropocene should not have been 
named after humans, since “humans as such” are not responsible for the state of 
the Earth, but that it is primarily capitalism that first connects humanity, fossil 
fuels, and technologies in a way that now shows its geological and ecological 
ramifications. Accordingly, the name capitalocene is deemed more appropriate 
(Moore 2016; cf. Latour 2014: 7; cf. Morton 2016: 3–61). This can be understood 
as a variation on Marxist “suspicion of ideology,” where an abstract idea (e.g., reality 
is the result of anthropos in general) is brought back to a material substrate, i.e., 
a particular politico-economical force field. Such a critique is (unquestioningly) 
oriented towards management insofar as it calls for a reconfiguration of this force 
field in dealing with the ecological demand.
As a final example, various ethicists have developed ways to deal with the ecological 
demand of the Anthropocene in a normative way, for example by arguing for a less 
anthropocentric and more ecological way of dealing with other species, by laying 
bare the normative dimension of carbon footprints (Shue 2010), or by making a 
case for demographic management (Collings 2014: 173–88). Such contributions 
are oriented towards management insofar as they sketch out new ways of managing 
our existence on the planet, including its normative dimension.
The coupling of descriptive and prescriptive dimensions in both the natural 
scientific account of the Anthropocene (geology, Earth-system science) as well 
as in the humanities (social science, political science, economy, ethics) brings to 
light the following philosophically relevant characteristic of the Anthropocene: 
humanity now appears as a geoforce intertwined with other natural forces, and 
reality conversely appears as a configuration of geoforces (including the anthropic 
geoforce) that, due to the ecological demand, urgently needs to be managed by us 
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in order to safeguard our habitat. This managerial orientation envelops the whole 
planet and the identities of all its inhabitants, whereby these identities appear in 
a remarkable way due the pre-eminent Anthropocenic phenomenon of global 
warming. Timothy Morton makes this clear by interpreting global warming as a 
“hyperobject” (2013), which is to say as something that inescapably environs and 
permeates all Earthlings.1 His observation that in any routine conversation about 
the weather today, “the presence of global warming looms into the conversation like 
a shadow” (2013: 99) explicates this inescapability.2 With respect to the identities of 
Earthlings, this means that whereas a tree was formerly understood as a perishable 
instance of an eternal and fixed idea or form (Plato, Aristotle), or as ens creatum 
in a divinely instituted natural order of things (medieval philosophy), it is now 
inescapably environed by global warming and therefore appears as resource that 
must be managed, e.g., as carbon-source or carbon-sink.3
Similarly, whereas humans were formerly identified as terrestrial beings equipped 
with extra-terrestrial, viz., transcendent qualities, e.g., the rationality of the animal 
rationale, such rationality now appears telluric, which is to say as an expression of 
the anthropic geo-force, immanent to the collective geo-forcefield.4 In other words, 
rationality no longer merely appears on Earth as a manifestation of a transcendent 
essence, but decidedly appears as Earth (cf. Blok 2017: 5). It is thereby inescapably 
bound up with global warming, both as its source and potential remedy, thus 
revealing the human identity as anthropic geo-force and planetary manager.
These shifts in identity bring the managerial dimension of the Anthropocene under 
consideration in a way that is not primarily situated on the level of things (whether 
subjective or objective, human or non-human), but first concerns the way in 
which things appear to us, whilst we are included in this mode of appearance. The 
Anthropocene is therefore not merely a description of a planetary condition, nor a 
prescription on how to deal with the (implications of the) ecological demand, but 
has ontological status insofar as it concerns a mode of appearance according to which 
1. Within the limits of this paper, we neither can nor need to elaborate on Morton’s (object oriented) 
ontology to appreciate this observation. For his discussion of hyperobjects, see Morton 2013.
2. For an analysis of the Anthropocene and the weather, see Szerszynski 2010.
3. To clarify, the identity as managerial resource does not imply that a tree can no longer be impressive 
or beautiful to us, but rather means that such experience of beauty is inescapably bound up with 
the threat of global warming—thereby potentially inciting us manage the preservation of trees, or 
manage their multiplication as carbon-sink.
4. Given this immanence and “naturalisation” of rationality, the Anthropocene can be said to herald 
the arrival of Friedrich Nietzsche’s program to “translate man back into nature” (1989: 161) via the 
famous transvaluation of all values.
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the world appears as managerial resource for human beings as planetary managers. 
We can therefore say that the Anthropocene is at hand: it marks our contemporary 
encounter with things under the demand of “handling” or managing them.
If “the Anthropocene is at hand,” how does technology relate to this? The answer 
takes the form of a triptych. First, there is little doubt that the Anthropocene is a 
consequence of the technological exploitation of Earthly materials and processes: 
if the industrial revolution constitutes the bedrock of the Anthropocene,5 this 
revolution was only possible due to the vigorous technological and exploitative 
management of natural resources such as coal and oil, capital, etc. Secondly, the 
Anthropocene can be said to be an epistemological consequence of technology 
insofar as it only appears to us through the (computative) management of large 
amounts of collected scientific data. Global warming cannot be directly seen, 
but can be inferred and computed (cf. Morton 2013: 3; 73; 153). Put in terms 
of philosophy of technology, our knowledge of the Anthropocene is technically 
mediated inasmuch as epistemological access is solely possible via technologies 
(satellites, laboratory equipment, carbon-measurements, etc.).6 Thirdly, as we have 
argued in this section, the Anthropocene further involves technology in a way 
that is neither limited to the objective domain (e.g., material beings such as fossil 
fuels) nor to the subjective domain (e.g., our techno-scientific knowledge of global 
warming), but as concerning the ontological dimension, where reality appears to 
us “at hand” as resource, and we correspondingly appear as planetary manager or 
handler of these resources. In the next section, we further elucidate the ontological 
dimension of the Anthropocene via a confrontation with Heidegger’s consideration 
of the essence of technology as Enframing.
§4.2 THE ANTHROPOCENE ENFRAMED: TOTALITY, ORIGIN, 
AND RESPONSE
In this section, the hypothesis is that the Anthropocene offers an indication of 
Martin Heidegger’s philosophical questioning of the whole of Being on the one 
hand, and a concrete experience of his notoriously abstract and allegedly totalitarian 
consideration of the essence of technology as Enframing on the other. We argue 
that the Anthropocene implies that critiques about the totalitarian character of 
5. Although it remains up for debate whether the industrial revolution can be seen as the origin of 
the Anthropocene, most authors agree that it is of decisive importance (cf. Steffen et al. 2011; cf. 
Lorimer 2016).
6. Don Ihde extensively discusses the technical embedding of science, see, for example, Ihde 2011.
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Enframing must now acknowledge its “total”7 character inasmuch as it concerns 
the whole of Being. Further, the concretization of Enframing gives rise to a re-
examination of the origin of the Anthropocene, which is usually understood in 
terms of particular (industrial) technologies, but is ontologically situated in our 
interpretation. Understanding the origin in this way will subsequently be shown to 
necessitate a reinterpretation of human responsibility for (and in) the Anthropocene.
§4.2.1 The Whole of Being, Concretely Enframed
When Heidegger asks about the whole of Being, this implies the inclusivity of the 
questioner in the question (1998b: 82). Philosophical inquiry is inclusive, meaning 
that it is not principally about a domain of beings that stand over against me as 
isolated objects (which is the case in scientific inquiry; cf. Heidegger 1998b: 83), 
but concerns the mode of appearance according to which I discover such beings.
This mode is not itself a being, i.e., ontic, but ontological inasmuch as I cannot 
isolate myself from it to consider it objectively, but find myself included in it 
insofar as my encounter with the world is already structured so that things appear as 
objects (cf. Zwier, Blok, & Lemmens 2016). Whereas this rendition remains rather 
abstract, the Anthropocene offers a concrete indication of the inclusivity in the 
whole of Being. As indicated in §4.1, the Earth now no longer simply appears as an 
object for our rational scrutiny and technological interventions. Rather, reversely, 
our rationality, objective science, and technological activity appear as expressions 
of the anthropic geoforce, which is to say inclusive to the Earth. As Crutzen and 
Schwägerl put it: “in this new era, nature is us” (2011). The Earth is thereby not 
primarily understood as the objective totality of Earthly things, but as an indication 
of the I, i.e., the inclusive mode of appearance according to which we encounter 
things.
Further, and more specifically, in its managerial orientation, the Anthropocene offers 
a concrete experience of what Heidegger calls the essence of technology. Heidegger 
asks about the essence, i.e., the being of technology and calls this essence Enframing 
(1977: 19–20). Given the ontological direction of questioning, Enframing is not 
theoretically investigated as an objective domain, but comes under consideration as 
a whole, i.e., as the mode of encountering the world. For Heidegger, technology as 
Enframing structures our encounter with things in such a way that beings appear as 
resources which are “challenged-forth” (1977: 16) to “stand in reserve” as potential 
resources for human needs, whilst humans are included in this structuring as the 
7. Anticipating §4.2.1, we write “total” to accentuate the difference between the German “Totalität” 
and “Ganze”. The former is ontic and concerns beings, the latter is ontological and concerns Being.
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managers of these resources or “standing-reserve” (1977: 17; cf. Blok 2014). Again, 
whereas this remains abstract, the Anthropocene offers a concrete experience of 
Enframing. Returning to our example from §4.1, in light of Heidegger’s notion 
of standing-reserve, a tree does not have intrinsic value, but its value derives from 
its identity as resource, e.g., for the paper industry or enjoyment of nature, whilst 
humans are included in this structuring as the consumers of newspapers or the 
ones who appreciate nature after office hours (Heidegger 1977: 18).8 Now, in the 
Anthropocene and due to global warming, the ecological demand structures our 
encounter with a tree in such a way that it appears inescapably environed by a 
managerial horizon (e.g., as carbon sink), and—recalling Morton’s emphasis on 
the pervasiveness of global warming—the same goes for all our encounters taking 
place on a warming globe. What follows is that whereas Heidegger must make a 
strong appeal on our willingness to follow his abstractions when he suggests that a 
stationary airliner offers an experience of Enframing (1977: 17), the Anthropocenic 
ecological demand assuredly compels this experience by rendering planetary 
management inevitable.9
§4.2.2 Managerial Totality, Managerial Whole 
If the Anthropocene involves a concretization of Enframing, this necessitates a 
reconsideration of its alleged totalitarianism. Heidegger explicitly relinquishes 
considerations of specific technological objects via the argument that “rods, 
pistons, and chassis . . . never [comprise] Enframing itself ” (1977: 20–21), since 
“the essence of technology is by no means anything technological” (1977: 4; 
cf. 2012: 58). In consequence to this orientation, the notion of Enframing has 
regularly been criticized for its totalitarian and bloated character, and has conversely 
been interpreted as a regional ontology. To take two examples from philosophy 
of technology, Andrew Feenberg has responded to how Heidegger infers from 
Enframing that “Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry, in essence the 
same . . . as the production of hydrogen bombs” (Heidegger 2012: 27). For Feenberg, 
this account is far too abstract and totalizing, since it fails to discriminate between 
technologies associated with electricity, atom bombs, and agriculture (1999: 187). 
He therefore explores alternative, more democratic or democratizing technologies 
that exceed the totalizing region of Enframing: “Technology can deliver more than 
one type of technological civilization. We have not yet exhausted its democratic 
potential” (2010: 29).
8. Compare Heidegger’s example of the Rhine appearing as “water power supplier” or as resource for 
the “vacation industry” (1977: 16).
9. This additionally makes clear that rather than criticizing or disparaging such management, we 
interpret its inescapability as an indication for an ontological consideration of the Anthropocene.
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Secondly, in postphenomenology, Peter-Paul Verbeek has argued that whereas 
Enframing may be a condition of possibility for modern technologies, it does not 
follow that all dimensions of such technologies can be reduced to this condition 
(2005: 66). Don Ihde has similarly argued that Heidegger’s depiction is “insightful 
and penetrating” insofar as it elucidates “gigantist industrial technologies” (2010: 
119), but cannot simply be scaled up to cover all technologies. Verbeek and Ihde 
thus take issue with the totalitarian aspect of Enframing, and in arguing that it 
depicts a region of beings at most, they emphasize a less reductionist and more 
expansive perspective on the rich intricacy of various human-technology relations 
(cf. Zwier, Blok, and Lemmens 2016).
Both perspectives thus reject Heidegger’s contention that Enframing “rules the whole 
Earth” (Heidegger 1969: 50), and instead aim to show how its resource-oriented 
mode of appearance only covers a limited region of technologies and their uses. 
However, the very concreteness of inescapable managerialism in the Anthropocene 
indicates that Enframing can no longer be reduced to a limited region, but must 
be acknowledged to encompass the whole Earth. This has implications for, on the 
one hand, artefact-oriented philosophical approaches that result from a critique 
of Enframing, and on the other hand for Heidegger’s unidirectional consideration 
of the relation between the ontic and the ontological. In what follows, we first 
elucidate the former, thereby working our way toward a discussion of the latter in 
§4.3.
In philosophy of technology, the critiques concerning the totalitarianism of 
Enframing have given rise to an alternative, less reductionist method of questioning 
technology, which empirically analyzes specific technological artefacts and their 
implications.10 It is noteworthy, first of all, that these approaches have taken 
surprisingly little consideration of the (unsustainable) planetary oikos housing these 
technologies, leading Langdon Winner to critically wonder “upon what planet . . . 
today’s philosophers of technology think they are living?” (2013).11 Furthermore, 
a methodical focus on specific technologies cannot take full consideration of 
the planetary situation because it overlooks its ontological dimension. Recalling 
the triptych presented in the conclusion of §4.1, one can imagine how artefact-
10. This has become known as “The Empirical Turn” in philosophy of technology, i.e., a turn away from 
overarching analyses of technology in general, towards an artefact-oriented philosophical approach 
(cf. Achterhuis 2001).
11. A notable exception can be found in Mark Coeckelbergh’s (2015) “Environmental Skill,” which 
explicitly connects philosophy of technology with environmental thought. Coeckelbergh’s analysis 
of modernity and its alienation serve to explain Winner’s astonishment to a certain extent, but 
because of its different aims, Coeckelbergh’s study does not elaborately question what we here 
discuss as the ontological dimension of technology (cf. Zwier and Gammon 2015).
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oriented approaches may respond to Winner’s remark by focussing on both 
material and epistemological dimensions of the Anthropocene, e.g., democratic 
questions concerned with geo-engineering for Feenberg, or questions pertaining 
to the technological mediation of our knowledge of global warming for post-
phenomenology. This would take the Earth as the meta-region housing all the 
technological regions in question, viz., as a thing housing many technological 
things. However, such an orientation overlooks the third aspect of the triptych, i.e., 
the ontological dimension according to which the Earth is not merely an objective 
thing or (meta)region upon which technologies take place, but concretely marks 
the inclusivity of the mode of appearance of Enframing according to which we 
discover things in the first place. Accordingly, if the Anthropocene offers a concrete 
experience of the mode of appearance according to which we appear as managers of 
the planetary oikos (which jointly appears as managerial resource), this additionally 
makes clear how Enframing cannot be understood as categorical concept under 
which the totality of technological things is (inappropriately) subsumed, but 
concerns the whole of being qua mode of appearance (cf. Heidegger 1977: 29). The 
implication for philosophy of technology is that rejecting Enframing as a bloated 
category and conversely turning to specific technological things concurrently turns 
a blind eye to the ontological dimension, which in the Anthropocene is not only 
experienced concretely, but becomes philosophically relevant and urgent.12
§4.2.3 Origin and Response
An ontological questioning of the Anthropocene is philosophically relevant because 
it gives rise to a reflection on the origin of the Anthropocene, which in turn leads 
to the question of human responsibility. In Earth-system science and geology, the 
origin of the Anthropocene is situated in the industrial revolution, where humanity 
taps into a vast well of fossil fuels on an unprecedented scale, and accordingly 
becomes the dominant Earth-shaper (Crutzen 2002; cf. Lorimer 2016). This origin 
is thereby interpreted on the ontic level, i.e., of beings (e.g., humans in a specific 
social organization) who happen to come across other beings (fossil fuels) and as 
such radically change the face of the being called planet Earth.
Via Heidegger’s interpretation of technology and its concretisation in the 
Anthropocene, however, we can situate this origin ontologically. The encounter 
between beings engendering the Anthropocene (the anthropic geoforce, fossil fuels, 
etc.) is already structured in a resource-oriented way according to which anthropic 
beings encounter other Earthly beings as standing-reserve: factories can only 
12. For an elaborate discussion on Heidegger’s philosophical method and the postphenomenological 
method of studying technologies, see Zwier, Blok, and Lemmens (2016).
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exhume the large amounts of products (prompting swift multiplication of humans 
on Earth) and associated greenhouse gasses (rendering the Earth an unsustainable 
oikos for humans) if the Earth is encountered as raw material that can be exploited 
and managed by humans. Hence, following the Heideggerian dictum that “that 
which is primally early shows itself only ultimately to men” (1977: 22), we can see 
how the Anthropocene may come into view in the wake of the industrial revolution, 
but understood as the concretization of the mode of appearance of Enframing, the 
Anthropocene is ontologically prior to the revolutions of industrial machinery.
Understanding origin in this way sheds light on the question of human 
responsibility. As Latour recognizes: “to claim that human agency has become 
the main geological force shaping the face of the Earth, is to immediately raise 
the question of ‘responsibility’” (2014: 4). This immediacy is evident in the 
Anthropocenic sciences, where the fact of the anthropos as dominant Earth-
shaper immediately translates into the task of taking responsibility for the planet 
according to a managerial paradigm: “it’s we who decide what nature is and what it 
will be” (Crutzen and Schwägerl 2011; cf. §4.1). When seen in light of the above 
asserted ontological origin of the Anthropocene, however, the issue of responsibility 
must be primarily understood in terms of responsiveness. If the Anthropocene 
has ontological status qua concretization of Enframing, this mode of appearance 
cannot itself be anthropogenic, since it concerns the whole of Being and thus 
already includes us. Parallel to Heidegger, for whom Enframing is “no merely 
human doing”, but a mode of appearance by which “man .  .  . has already been 
claimed” (1977: 19), our managerially oriented encounter with the Earth is not of 
our own making, but consists in our responsiveness to what “calls man forth into 
the modes of revealing allotted to him” (1977: 19). Hence, taking responsibility for 
Earthly beings on the ontic level is already responsive to this call on the ontological 
level. What follows is that although humans are now responsible for managing 
the planet, they cannot be held responsible for bringing about the situation in 
which taking responsibility becomes imperative. This does not diminish the role of 
humanity in favor of some absolute determinism but, on the contrary, takes heed 
of how the ecological demand compels us to concretely hear and respond to the 
“call” as the “challenging forth” that Heidegger associates with Enframing, since the 
challenge now resounds as the imminent and urgent call for sustainable planetary 
management (cf. Blok 2015: 936–37).
What follows is that because human responsiveness to the ecological demand is 
situated at an ontological level, humans cannot be irreducibly listed as one geo-
force amongst many (cf. Heidegger 2012: 66). Yet far from returning us to some 
auto-congratulatory celebration of humanity as the “crown of creation” or “masters 
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of the universe”, we will show how this irreducibility instead brings into view how 
the anthropos in the Anthropocene is essentially in danger. In the next section, 
we explore this danger by confronting Heidegger’s consideration of the danger of 
technology with the danger of the Anthropocene.
§4.3 ANTHROPOCENE IN DANGER
In this final section, we ask whether the Anthropocene accords to what Heidegger 
calls the danger of Enframing, as well as its saving power. We will argue that 
the answer is radically ambiguous, meaning that the Anthropocene can be said 
to accord and discord with the danger of Enframing. We subsequently confront 
the radical ambiguity of the Anthropocene with Heidegger’s consideration of the 
“saving power” of Enframing and associated comportment of “releasement,” thereby 
developing the claim that Heidegger’s thought concerning the relation between 
beings and being must be reoriented. We elaborate on this by showing how in the 
Anthropocene, the Earth comes under consideration as having ontic-ontological 
status. We conclude by suggesting that Heidegger’s thought on the saving power of 
Enframing and associated comportment of releasement must become Earthbound, 
which entails the opportunity of thinking a saving Earth.
§4.3.1 Danger and Ambiguity
Heidegger conceives of Enframing as “the supreme danger” (1977: 26). Rather 
than consisting in ontic dangers affiliated with technology, e.g., the destruction of 
nature (cf. 1969: 55–66), the danger of Enframing is ontological and pertains to 
human existence as responsive to the claim of Enframing. As the supreme danger, 
Enframing tends to exclusively structure our encounter with the world in terms of 
standing-reserve, whilst we jointly exclusively appear as its “orderer” or manager 
(1977: 27). This exclusivity is dangerous because “[man] stands so decisively in 
attendance on the challenging-forth of Enframing that he does not apprehend 
Enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one spoken to” (1977: 27). 
Hence, the danger concerns our self-evident understanding of ourselves as manager 
of the planetary standing-reserve, meaning the failure to recognize Enframing as a 
mode of appearance, which entails that we forget how our managerial encounter 
with the world is already responsive to the claiming call of Enframing. In this way, 
Enframing becomes dangerously indifferent in “driving out every other possibility 
of revealing” (1977: 27). 
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Undergirding Heidegger’s consideration of the danger is the idea of ontological 
epochality, i.e., the thought that different modes of appearance have held sway 
throughout the western tradition.13 In his questioning of technology, Heidegger 
articulates this epochality via the example of an old windmill. He interprets the 
windmill to still bear the traces of a now subsided mode of appearance, arguing that 
it does not challenge-forth the wind to unlock and store its energy as does a modern 
wind turbine, but that its sails “are left entirely to the wind’s blowing” (1977: 14). 
At first glance, this perspective may seem nostalgic, since we can also regard the old 
windmill to challenge the wind to deliver energy, but simply to a different end, e.g., 
milling grain as opposed to generating electricity. It is worth considering, however, 
that such a critique, albeit theoretically correct, begs the question of whether it does 
not itself accord with the danger of Enframing insofar as it indifferently and apriori 
encounters both windmill and turbine as standingreserve (energy resource).14 But 
more important for the present discussion is that the Anthropocene not only 
demonstrates the danger of Enframing, it concurrently epitomizes Heidegger’s 
consideration of ontological epochality.
To address the former point first, in what sense can the Anthropocene be said to 
demonstrate the danger of Enframing? In the Anthropocene, the exclusivity of 
the standing-reserve is cemented insofar as we now cannot encounter the Earth 
otherwise than as managerial resource (cf. §4.2.1). Since there is no Earthly 
place left untouched by global warming, no-thing can be left unmanaged, which 
both demonstrates how we are included in the whole of being as Enframing and 
corroborates Heidegger’s assertion that Enframing dangerously “banishes man into 
that kind of revealing which is an ordering” (1977: 27).
Be that as it may, while the Anthropocene is dangerously monolithic in how the 
Earth concretely appears as managerial resource (standing-reserve) for human 
beings as manager of these resources, it simultaneously—and likewise concretely—
conveys the epochal character of this situation. On the one hand, the Anthropocene 
by definition is a geological epoch, implying that it has a geological origin and 
will have a geological termination. On the other hand, following the argument 
put forth in §4.2, the epochal character in question is not merely geological—
which is to say ontic insofar as geology deals with the Earth as objective being—
13. Heidegger calls this the “history of Being” [Seinsgeschichte] (Heidegger 1999). Given the scope 
of this paper, we cannot elaborate on the various “stages” of this history and the way they are 
interrelated, and solely focus on the epochal character of Being and how this is forgotten in the 
epoch of Enframing.
14. See, for example, Ihde 2010: 74–86. We have elsewhere argued that Enframing cannot be 
understood as a theory about technological objects (cf. Zwier, Blok, and Lemmens 2016).
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but ontological because it concerns the whole of Being as the inclusive mode of 
appearance according to which we, as planetary managers, encounter the Earth in 
terms of managerial resources. The Anthropocene can then be seen to epitomize 
Heidegger’s consideration of ontological epochality, because it demonstrates 
that its specific (managerial) mode of appearance arises at some point in time to 
find concrete expression from the industrial revolution onwards. Our previously 
discussed tree offers further clarification: although it would be theoretically correct 
to state that a tree also functioned as a carbon-sink during medieval times, we must 
also apprehend that it was not encountered as such during that epoch. This is to 
say that the identity of the tree has changed, and its current appearance as resource 
in light of global warming (i.e., as carbon source or sink) specifically belongs to the 
epoch of the Anthropocene, thus epitomizing ontological epochality.
The implication for the question regarding the danger of Enframing is that 
the Anthropocene accords and discords with it. The Anthropocene accords to 
the danger insofar as it cements the exclusivity of encountering the Earth qua 
managerial resource (standing-reserve) for human existence qua manager of these 
resources. At the same time, the Anthropocene discords with the danger insofar as 
it offers the opportunity to concretely experience the epochality of the hegemony 
of Enframing. This then constitutes a countertendency to the danger of Enframing 
by explicitly manifesting how human existence as planetary manager is embedded 
in a responsiveness to a specific call arising in the epoch of the Anthropocene (cf. 
§4.2.3). The danger of the Anthropocene is therefore radically ambiguous.
§4.3.2 Saving the Earth—The saving Earth
If the Anthropocene is radically ambiguous with respect to the danger of Enframing, 
this implies that Heidegger’s consideration of the “saving power” associated with 
Enframing (1977: 28) must be reoriented. How does Heidegger understand the 
saving power? Like the essence and danger of technology, the saving power is 
ontological. It therefore neither consists in renouncing technology (cf. Heidegger, 
1969: 53), nor in the production of “safer” or better technologies (e.g., greener, 
smarter, more democratic etc.). Rather, the saving power concerns the awareness 
of human existence as responsive to the call of being, meaning that Enframing is 
perceived as an epochal mode of appearance to which our managerial encounter 
with the world is already responsive.
In citing Hölderlin’s words “But where the danger is, grows the saving power also” 
(1977: 28), Heidegger considers the two in concert, which is to say that in the 
dangerous “frenzied-ness” and “irresistibility of ordering” (1977: 33), we are offered 
a chance to experience Enframing as the epochal mode of appearance that tends 
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to hide its own epochality in indifference. In recognizing this, we can become 
perceptive to how the mode of appearance of Enframing involves a withdrawal 
insofar as the possibility of a different mode of revealing remains hidden. We can 
experience this withdrawal, for instance, in our contemporary tendency towards 
indifferent responsiveness when we find ourselves disposed to regard both the old 
windmill and modern turbine indifferently as energy resources (cf. §4.3.1). Or, 
with specific regard to the Anthropocene, we can experience this withdrawal in our 
self-evident notion of human existence as planetary manager when we recognize 
how both “conservative” reactions to the ecological demand (e.g., mitigation) as 
well as “progressive” reactions (e.g., geoengineering) are already and self-evidently 
disposed towards management (cf. Baskin 2015: 21; cf. §4.1). The saving power 
then means that we become perceptive of this withdrawal, which entails resistance 
to being indifferently absorbed in managerially attending to the standing-reserve, 
thus gaining a glimpse at the possibility of a wholly different mode of revealing 
(cf. Heidegger 1977: 31–33). In other words, the saving power consists in being 
responsive to the call of being as the “challenging forth” belonging to Enframing 
(cf. §4.2.3) whilst remaining attentive to the presently withdrawn possibility of a 
different call.
Now, for Heidegger, the danger and saving power of Enframing solely involve 
the ontological level, meaning that the rise of a different mode of appearance is 
not dependent on human interactions with ontic things (e.g., producing greener 
technologies), but depends on the call of being (Heidegger 1969: 52; cf. 1977: 
28). Since our interactions with things on the ontic level are already responsive to 
a call on the ontological level (cf. §4.2.3), human made solutions to the ecological 
demand of the Anthropocene (e.g., sequestering carbon) indifferently adhere 
to Enframing insofar as they remain oriented towards planetary management 
(§4.1). Accordingly, when Heidegger considers the saving power, he turns away 
from solutions pertaining to ontic dangers and instead calls for an attitude of 
“releasement” (1969: 54). Releasement means, first, not viewing things “only in 
a technical way” (1969: 54), which we can understand as resisting indifferent 
myopism with respect to the standing-reserve. Secondly, releasement acknowledges 
the importance of technologies into our life, whilst simultaneously leaving them 
outside. This offers a glimpse at how technologies are “dependent on something 
higher” (1969: 54), which is to say dependent on an epochal mode of appearance 
that already structures our encounter with technologies (§4.2.1). Thirdly, rather 
than denouncing technologies as meaningless instruments, releasement takes heed of 
how “the meaning pervading the technological world hides itself” (1969: 55, translation 
modified), where this meaning can be understood as the withdrawn possibility of 
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a different world or different way of revealing.15 In this way, Heidegger’s thinking 
concerning releasement is consistent with his relinquishing of the ontic in favor of 
the ontological (§4.2.2) and also demonstrates his unidirectional relating of the two, 
meaning that occurrences at the ontic level (e.g., developing greener technologies) 
never carry over to the ontological level (which already structures our managerial 
encounter with such technologies).
However, the Anthropocene compels a reorientation of Heidegger’s unidirectional 
relating of the ontic and ontological, because it brings into view the Earth as ontic-
ontological condition of possibility for responsiveness to the call of being. In order 
to develop this point, we must first understand how responsiveness is always eco-
logical: whether indifferent or attentive, we are always responsive to the whole of 
being in which we are already inescapably included or at home (oikos), whilst this 
whole is structured according to a specific logic or mode of appearance.16 More 
pointedly, if the Anthropocene can be understood as the concretization of Enframing 
(§4.2.1), it can correspondingly be understood as our oikos inasmuch as it concerns 
our inclusion in a world that appears according to the logic of management. In this 
sense, the oikos is prerequisite for human responsiveness. Next, the Anthropocene 
can be understood as the coalescence of ecology and geology, meaning that the 
Anthropocenic oikos belongs to a specific geological epoch, and as such appears as 
the latest chapter originating out of the vastly elongated, deep timely drama of the 
evolution of the Earth, which itself clearly exceeds its present appearance as the 
managerial ecology called the Anthropocene (cf. Clark 2011; cf. Szerszynski 2012). 
This offers a first characterization of the Earth as ontic condition of possibility for 
the Anthropocene. But further, as we have argued in §4.3.1, the epochal character 
of the Anthropocene is not merely geological insofar as it concerns the Earth as 
geological object, but is ontological insofar as it concerns the whole of being in 
which we are included, which is to say the oikos (qua managerial resource) in 
which we (qua managers) are at home. We can experience our inclusivity in this 
oikos most concretely via the Anthropocenic ecological demand, as it alarmingly 
signals the counterpart of the epochal origin of the Anthropocene, namely its 
end: the massive experience of global warming and associated urgent demand of 
planetary mangement are indubitably oriented towards (avoiding) the becoming 
15. Heidegger’s questioning of technology can therefore itself be interpreted as an exercise in releasement, 
since he acknowledges the obvious importance of technological instrumentality (1977: 6), whilst 
also analyzing instrumentality to belong “to something higher” in retracing instrumentality to 
causality, bringing-forth, and ultimately truth (cf. Heidegger 1977: 5–12).
16. The language of Being And Time famously articulates this as “being-in-the-world”, where our 
responsiveness to such being, whether authentic or inauthentic, is considered as a way of being-in-
the-world (cf. Heidegger 2008).
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uninhabitable of our oikos. In this way, the ecological demand of the Anthropocene 
not only compels an experience of our inescapable inclusion in an oikos that we 
must manage (§4.1), it simultaneously allows us to concretely experience that this 
oikos has originated from the Earth at some point in time (§4.2.3), and appears to 
be on the verge of collapsing back into it. This then offers a further characterization 
of the Earth as condition of possibility for the Anthropocenic oikos in which we 
are included. Now, provided that this oikos is prerequisite for our responsiveness, 
and provided that the Earth is prerequisite for the emergence and decline of this 
oikos, it follows that the Earth is neither merely a geological object, nor a being 
that is encountered according to a unidirectional, ontological mode of appearing. 
Rather, the Earth itself appears as the ontic-ontological condition of possibility for 
responsiveness to the call of being, and by implication for the Anthropocene as 
concretization of Enframing.17 In thus revealing the Earth to have ontic-ontological 
status, the Anthropocene entails a reorientation of Heidegger’s unidirectional 
relating of the ontic and ontological.
The implication for the question of the danger and saving power of Enframing, as 
well as for the associated comportment of releasement is that these must become 
Earthbound. At this juncture, it is worth considering that while Heidegger alludes 
to the threat of a nuclear world war and accordingly discusses the possibility of 
the “complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the Earth” (1969: 
55–56), he resolutely refuses to associate these ontic dangers with ontological 
responsiveness, arguing that the ontological danger of Enframing remains, “precisely 
when the danger of a third world war has been removed” (1969: 56). However, if 
the Earth is the ontic-ontological condition of possibility of human responsiveness, 
then Heidegger’s refusal must be refused. The Anthropocenic ecological demand 
means that the destruction of the Earth and annihilation of humanity must be 
understood as our oikos collapsing back into the Earth, and since this oikos is 
prerequisite for responsiveness, such destruction and annihilation are not merely 
ontic dangers, but have ontological stature.
At the same time, with respect to the saving power, considering the Earth as ontic-
ontological condition of possibility for our Anthropocenic oikos and associated 
identity as managerial geoforce implies that the ontic-ontological Earth can be 
17. Two remarks are in order here: First, it should be noted that this argument is indebted to a similar 
argument that Vincent Blok recently put forth in a discussion about Heidegger and Meillassoux 
concerning the Earth as uncorrelated being and as ancestral (cf. Blok 2016). Secondly, we should 
note that our present discussion of the Earth is primarily informed by our discussion of the 
Anthropocene, and cannot enter into elaborate exegesis of Heidegger’s conceptualization of the 
Earth (e.g., in its strife with “World,” or with respect to “the fourfold”). For an elaborate analysis of 
these points, see Blok 2016.
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observed to withhold the possibility of a wholly different eco-logy and human 
identity. Paraphrasing Heidegger, we might say that the Earth has granted a 
temporarily stable basis for the various anthropic ecologies—with the Anthropocene 
being the most recent—whilst withholding the possibility of a wholly different 
ecological structuring. Since we then become perceptive to how the present 
appearance of the Earth as managerial resource for us as planetary managers is not 
all-encompassing and does not exhaust what the Earth has to offer, the Earth itself 
can be taken to indicate the possibility for a different Earthly encounter. Parallel to 
Heidegger, for whom the danger of Enframing appears in concert with its saving 
power, the Anthropocenic Earth as Enframed whole appears in concert with its 
withheld ecological possibilities. Accordingly, and in contrast to Heidegger, neither 
the danger nor saving power is ontologically isolated, but becomes Earthbound by 
way of the ontic-ontological Earth.
Hence, while the Anthropocene compels a concrete experience of our (dangerous) 
inclusion in the whole of Being characterized as Enframing, this very concreteness 
also demonstrates how the ontic-ontological Earth conditions this experience, 
thereby offering a glimpse at how it withholds a different ecological possibility. The 
Anthropocene can therefore be said to introduce us to the saving Earth.
§4.4 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have argued that the Anthropocene neither merely involves a 
geological or historical description of the Earth, nor a normative prescription 
regarding how to manage the Earth, but has ontological status insofar as the Earth 
appears to be managerially “at hand” (§4.1). We subsequently argued that the 
Anthropocene involves a concretization of Heidegger’s notoriously difficult and 
abstract notion of Enframing (§4.2). We put forth the implication that questioning 
technology in the Anthropocene cannot be limited to the ontic domain of 
technological artifacts, but must address the essence of technology in terms of the 
whole of Being (§4.2.1, §4.2.2). Further, we considered the Anthropocene to have 
an ontological origin, which in turn implied that the question of responsibility with 
respect to the Anthropocenic ecological demand at the ontic level already involves 
the question of responsiveness on the ontological level (§4.2.3). This in turn 
gave rise to a reconsideration of the danger and saving power of Enframing. We 
showed how with respect to the danger, the Anthropocene is radically ambiguous 
(§4.3.1). We subsequently argued that as a result of this ambiguity, Heidegger’s 
thought concerning the saving power and comportment of releasement must be 
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reoriented to become Earthbound. On the one hand, this brought the Earth under 
consideration as having ontic-ontological status. On the other hand, it implied the 
saving Earth.
The consideration thus offered neither saves us from the ecological threat witnessed 
in the Anthropocene, nor does it provide managerial means for practically dealing 
with the ecological demand. It does, however, offer a reflection on the horizon 
that orients both these ecological questions and managerial answers. Above all, 
it gives rise to a question concerning the human condition. In accordance with 
Heidegger, we have argued that due to the issue of human responsiveness, the 
anthropos in the Anthropocene cannot be reduced to the ontic level, i.e., listed as 
one geoforce amongst many (§4.2.3). Yet against Heidegger, we have argued that 
this responsiveness can no longer be isolated to the ontological level of being, but 
must in light of the Anthropocene be reconsidered in a telluric way, which is to 
say as deeply associated and coalesced with the Earth. The question then becomes 
how we should think the relation between technological humanity and the Earth. 
The arguments presented in this paper serve to guide this path of questioning by 
indicating two cul-de-sacs, as it neither suffices to equate the anthropos with Earth 
as geoforce and planetary manager, nor to completely unearth it as the “shepherd of 
Being” (Heidegger 1998a: 260). This then points to a future task for reflection in 
the Anthropocene: to examine the human as Earthling.
zwier-layout.indd   99 08/01/2018   13:57
100
Chapter IV
REFERENCES
Achterhuis, H. (ed.) (2001). American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn (trans: R. 
Crease). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Baskin, J. (2015). Paradigm Dressed as Epoch: The Ideology of the Anthropocene. 
Environmental Values, 24: 9–29. https://doi.org/10.3197/096327115X14183182353746
Blok, V. (2014). Reconnecting with Nature in the Age of Technology: The Heidegger and 
Radical Environmentalism Debate Revisited. Environmental Philosophy, 11(2): 307–32. 
https://doi.org/10.5840/envirophil20149913
Blok, V. (2015). The Human Glance, the Experience of Environmental Distress and the 
‘Affordance’ of Nature: Towards a Phenomenology of the Ecological Crisis. Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 28(5): 925–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-
015-9565-8
Blok, V. (2016). Thinking the Earth: Critical Reflections on Quentin Meillassoux’s and 
Heidegger’s Concept of the Earth. Environmental Ethics, 38(4): 441–62. https://doi.
org/10.5840/enviroethics201638437
Blok, V. (2017). Earthing Technology: Towards an Eco-centric Concept of Biomimetic 
Technologies in the Anthropocene. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 21(2–
3). https://doi.org/10.5840/techne201752363
Clark, N. (2011). Inhuman Nature: Sociable Life on a Dynamic Planet. London: Sage 
Publications.
Coeckelbergh, M. (2015). Environmental Skill: Motivation, Knowledge, and the Possibility of 
a Non-romantic Environmental Ethics. New York: Routledge.
Collings, D. (2014). Stolen Future, Broken Present: The Human Significance of Climate 
Change. Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press. https://doi.org/10.3998/
ohp.12832550.0001.001
Crutzen, P. (2002). Geology of Mankind: The Anthropocene. Nature, 415: 23. https://doi.
org/10.1038/415023a
Crutzen, P. & Schwägerl, C. (2011). Living in the Anthropocene: Toward a New Global Ethos. 
Yale Environment 360. http://e360.yale.edu/feature/ living_in_the_Anthropocene_
toward_a_new_global_ethos/2363/. Accessed 20 October 2016.
Ellis, E. (2013). Overpopulation Is Not the Problem. New York Times, 13 September. http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/opinion/overpopulation-is-notthe-problem.html. 
Accessed 20 October 2016.
Feenberg, A. (1999). Questioning Technology. London: Routledge.
Feenberg, A. (2010). Between Reason and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Haraway, D. (2015). Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making 
Kin. Environmental Humanities, 6: 159–65.
Heidegger, M. (1969). Discourse on Thinking (trans: J. M. Anderson & H. Freund). New 
York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1977). The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays. (trans. W. 
Lovitt). New York: Harper and Row.
zwier-layout.indd   100 08/01/2018   13:57
101
Saving Earth
Heidegger, M. (1998a.) Letter on ‘Humanism. (trans. F. A. Capuzzi). In Pathmarks (ed. 
W. McNeill), pp. 239–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9780511812637
Heidegger, M. (1998b). What Is Metaphysics?. (trans. D. F. Krell). In Pathmarks (ed. W. 
McNeill), pp. 82–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511812637
Heidegger, M. (1999). Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). (trans: P. Emad & K. 
Maly). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2008). Being and Time. (trans: J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson). New York: 
Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (2012). Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic 
Principles of Thinking. (trans: A. J. Mitchell). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Ihde, D. (2010). Heidegger’s Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives. New York: 
Fordham University Press.
Ihde, D. (2011). Husserl’s Galileo Needed a Telescope! Philosophy and Technology, 24: 69–82.
Latour, B. (2014). Anthropology at the Time of the Anthropocene: A Personal View of What 
Is to be Studied. http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/ files/139-AAA-Washington.
pdf. Accessed 20 October 2016.
Lorimer, J. (2016). The Anthropo-scene: A Guide for the Perplexed. Social Studies of Science 
47(1). https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312716671039
Moore, J. (ed.). (2016). Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of 
Capitalism. Oakland, CA: PM Press.
Morton, T. (2013). Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Morton, T. (2016). Dark Ecology: For a Future of Coexistence. New York: Columbia University 
Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/mort17752
Nietzsche, F. (1989). Beyond Good and Evil. (trans: W. Kaufmann). New York: Vintage.
Shue, H. (2010). Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions. In Climate Ethics: Essential 
Readings (eds. Gardiner, S. et al.) New York: Oxford University Press.
Steffen, W., P. Crutzen, and J. McNeill. (2007). The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now 
Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature? Ambio, 36(8): 614–21. https://doi.
org/10.1579/0044-7447(2007)36[614:TAAHNO]2.0.CO;2
Steffen, W., J. Grinevald, P. Crutzen, and J. McNeill. (2011). The Anthropocene: Conceptual 
and Historical Perspectives. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 369: 842–
67. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2010.0327
Szerszynski, B. (2010). Reading and Writing the Weather. Climate Technics and the 
Moment of Responsibility. Theory, Culture & Society, 27(2–3): 9–30. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0263276409361915
Szerszynski, B. (2012). The End of the End of Nature: The Anthropocene and the Fate 
of the Human. Oxford Literary Review, 34(2): 165–184. https://doi.org/10.3366/
olr.2012.0040
Verbeek, P. P. (2005). What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and 
Design (trans: R. P. Crease). State College: Penn State University Press.
zwier-layout.indd   101 08/01/2018   13:57
102
Chapter IV
Winner, L. (2013). A Future for Philosophy of Technology—Yes, but on which Planet? 
Keynote lecture at SPT biannual meeting, Lisbon, Portugal.
Zalasiewicz, J., M. Williams, W. Steffen, and P. Crutzen. (2010). The New World of 
the Anthropocene. Environmental Science & Technology, 44: 2228–31. https://doi.
org/10.1021/es903118j
Zwier, J. & Gammon, A. (2015). Mark Coeckelbergh: Environmental Skill: Motivation, 
Knowledge, and the Possibility of a Non-romantic Environmental Ethics (Book Review). 
Human Studies, 38(3), 439-444.
Zwier, J., V. Blok, and Lemmens, P. (2016). Phenomenology and the Empirical Turn: A 
Phenomenological Analysis of Postphenomenology. Philosophy & Technology, 29(4): 
313–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0221-7.
zwier-layout.indd   102 08/01/2018   13:57
zwier-layout.indd   103 08/01/2018   13:57
zwier-layout.indd   104 08/01/2018   13:57
Chapter V
SEEING THROUGH THE FUMES – 
TECHNOLOGY AND ASYMMETRY 
IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
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And Earth, our blood-warm Earth, a shuddering prey
To that frigidity of brainless ray – George Meredith
INTRODUCTION
The theme of this paper concerns technology and the Anthropocene. We argue that 
in the Anthropocene, technological existence becomes ontologically symmetric by 
way of its inclusion in a relationality that Heidegger associated with cybernetics. At 
the same time, we show how in the Anthropocene, technology involves a rapport 
with what remains asymmetric to cybernetics. This encounter between symmetry 
and asymmetry will be developed by staging a confrontation between Heidegger 
and Bataille on the questions of technology, waste, and our Earthly oikos in the 
Anthropocene.
From this encounter, we infer that technology is ontologically forgetful inasmuch 
as it entails a symmetric way of relating to beings, which both engenders the 
Anthropocene and concretely manifests itself there. On the other hand, by 
interpreting technology from a Bataillean perspective, we find technology itself 
retaliating against ontological forgetfulness, as its very own waste-trail of CO2 
emerges as a souvenir of its Earthly constitution. Our conclusion will be that in the 
Anthropocene, technology opens to a twofold asymmetry, and we therefore offer 
a conceptualization of Anthropocenic technology that it ontologically significant 
inasmuch as fosters responsivity to being, i.e. to what always already structures 
the way in which we technologically, i.e. symmetrically encounter things, whilst 
remaining asymmetric to this encounter.
In order to clarify all this, we begin by interpreting the Anthropocene as a concrete 
cybernetic phenomenon in Heidegger's sense (§5.1). In emphasizing its ontological 
symmetry, we subsequently articulate an asymmetry on the part of the anthropocenic 
Earth (§5.2). This will be shown to unsettle Heidegger's ontological interpretation 
of cybernetics, particularly with regards to the Earth and to technology (§5.3). 
This subsequently allows to introduce a Bataillean reading of technology that flanks 
but finally strays from Heidegger’s interpretation. By interpreting Bataille’s work as 
a philosophy of technology, we will articulate technology as diverting from what 
ontologically constitutes it, which is to say as ontologically forgetful. At the same 
time, we argue that in the Anthropocene, technology comes to be reminded of 
this forgetful diversion, notably due to abundance and waste (§5.4). We conclude 
that in the Anthropocene, technology is ontologically forgetful, but not wholly 
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oblivious, as it fosters – through the fumes of the technological waste named CO2 
– a responsivity to that what ontologically constitutes technological existence whilst 
remaining asymmetric to it (§5.5).
§5.1 THE ANTHROPOCENE AS CYBERNETIC PHENOMENON
In this section, we interpret the Anthropocene as cybernetic phenomenon, thereby 
using Heidegger’s considerations of phenomenology and cybernetics as a guide.
The Anthropocene is commonly understood as the epoch in which the technological 
activity of industrialized humanity becomes the dominant factor shaping the earth 
and associated life-supporting systems (Steffen et al. 2007). Supplementing the 
Holocene in which the relatively warm climate was considered to be the central 
geological factor (Crutzen 2002), the Anthropocene places anthropic technological 
activity in the center, thereby marking the time in which “natural and human 
forces [are] intertwined, so that the fate of one determines the fate of the other” 
(Zalasiewicz et al. 2010: 2231).
As Hamilton, Bonneuil, and Gemenne note, the concept of the Anthropocene is 
not isolated to the scientific fields of geology and earth-system science, but moves 
beyond these fields insofar as it more generally “represents the ground-breaking 
attempt to think together earth processes, life, [and] human enterprise (…) into 
a totalising framework” (Hamilton et al., 2015: 2). This convergence of human 
life and other earthly processes is philosophically relevant because it renders them 
symmetric, meaning that both appear in the same register of geo-forces whose 
operation constitutes the earth-system. By implication, human rational thought 
is not merely considered to appear on earth as manifestation of some transcendent 
essence, but decidedly appears as earth, i.e. as one earth-shaping force amongst 
many, albeit one of considerable magnitude (cf. Zwier & Blok 2017). This becomes 
particularly palpable via the convergence of rationality, industrial technologies, and 
fossil fuels (the residue of antecedent geo-forces, e.g. organisms compressed via 
plate tectonics), as this convergence renders the human geo-force the dominant 
earth-shaping force amongst many (cf. Crutzen 2002; Steffen et al. 2007; 2011). 
The Anthropocenic symmetry between thought and other earthly processes 
suggests that theoretical thought can no longer assume an isolated perspective 
that merely observes the configuration of geo-forces as an object, but is itself 
always already implicated and included in this configuration. This inclusivity 
prompts an interpretation of the Anthropocene as a phenomenon to be questioned 
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phenomenologically.1 Following the work of Martin Heidegger, a phenomenon 
never stands over against us as thing or object, but concerns the relation that we 
always already enact in our encounter with things (cf. Heidegger 2004; cf. Zwier 
et al. 2016). Heidegger famously exemplifies this relationality when he shows how 
a theoretical perspective on a hammer (e.g. considered as a material object with 
particular weight, strength etc.) already enacts a specific relation by means of which 
the hammer can appear as a theoretical, “present-at-hand”,  object (Heidegger 
2008: 93; 95). Such a theorizing relation is not universal but specific: in using a 
hammer, one does not encounter the hammer as theoretical object, but rather enacts 
a kind of relation in which the hammer is “ready-to-hand” (95-102), meaning that 
it withdraws in favour of the project that is to be hammered out. Now, although 
the kind of relation with a being may vary, the point of significance is that we are 
always already and inescapably included in a relation. More pointedly, we are always 
already included in a relation between being and thinking, whether this concerns an 
'embodied' kind of thinking enacted in praxis (using a hammer) or a more 'abstract', 
theoretical thinking (studying the hammer as object). Now, since the Anthropocene 
involves a similar inclusivity inasmuch as human (practical and theoretical) activity 
is considered to be inescapably implicated in a play of geo-forces, the Anthropocene 
can be understood as phenomenon (cf. Zwier & Blok 2017).
Questioning the phenomenon of the Anthropocene then means questioning the 
character of its inclusive relationality. We propose to call this relationality cybernetic. 
This follows Heidegger's interpretation of cybernetics as a “foundational” or 
“fundamental science” [Grundwissenschaft] (Heidegger 1972: 58). This means that 
cybernetics is not one particular scientific discipline apropos a specific domain of 
objects at the ontic level (technological, organic, social etc.), but is ontological in that 
it concerns the relation between being and thinking that already “defines and steers” 
(1972: 58, translation modified) the objective sciences, meaning that it structures 
the way in which objects are encountered and how propositions regarding such 
objects are made and evaluated.2 This ontological relationality is called cybernetic 
because being and scientific thinking couple in a feedback-loop: in the same way 
that an anti-aircraft cannon constantly feeds-back information pertaining to the 
flightpath of an aircraft into its actuators (speed of rotation, angle of barrel etc.) 
1. The concept of the Anthropocene has come to be interpreted in many different ways. Instead of 
providing an exhaustive overview involving its many (both critical and eulogistic) conceptualizations, 
this paper limits itself to an interpretation the Anthropocene as phenomenon. For a recent overview 
of the discourse around the Anthropocene, see Lorimer 2016. 
2. Our discussion of cybernetics will be limited to Heidegger’s understanding of cybernetics as 
fundamental science, meaning that the question regarding how other interpretations of cybernetics 
relate to this is left open. 
zwier-layout.indd   109 08/01/2018   13:57
110
Chapter V
to constitute an adaptive system, the sciences feed-back propositions, categories, 
hypotheses, and (experimental) results into a functioning whole, constantly adapting 
or discarding dysfunctional elements, for instance via a process of falsification (cf. 
Heidegger 2001: 91-92; 1972: 58-59). Our hypothesis is that the phenomenon 
of the Anthropocene involves a similar cybernetic relation between being and 
thinking, whilst offering a concrete experience of our inclusion in such cybernetic 
relationality, and can therefore be characterized as cybernetic phenomenon. This 
hypothesis is developed by analysing both sides of the relation between being and 
thinking.
On the one hand, on the side of being, the anthropocenic objective sciences (most 
notably earth-system science) consider the being in question, i.e. the Earth, as 
earth-system. This system has a cybernetic character insofar as various functional 
elements (e.g. temperature, pH, chemical composition of the atmosphere, 
ecosystems, etc.) are coupled in a feedback-loop which regulates the conditions of 
the planet understood as integral system. Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill accordingly 
understand the earth-system as
“the suite of interacting physical, chemical and biological global-scale cycles 
and energy fluxes that provide the life-support system for life at the surface 
of the planet. [A] critical feature is that forcings and feedbacks within the 
Earth System are as important as external drivers of change, such as the flux 
of energy from the sun. [The] Earth System includes humans, our societies, 
and our activities; thus, humans are not an outside force perturbing and 
otherwise natural system but rather an integral and interacting part of the 
Earth System itself ”. (Steffen et al. 2007: 615; cf. Hamilton 2016: 94)
Hence, considered as anthropic geo-forces, human beings appear symmetric to 
other earthly processes and are therefore integrated in the cybernetic earth-system 
as one of its many regulatory elements.
On the other hand, on the side of thinking, it can be observed that scientific 
thought is not merely about some cybernetic being called the earth-system and its 
configuration of geo-forces. Rather, scientific thought can be said to be included 
in this cybernetic system, insofar as it is oriented towards regulation of the human 
habitat. To clarify, science has not only disclosed how the Anthropocene signals – 
most eminently via global warming – the advent of an earthly regime that may well 
be uninhabitable for humanity, but immediately responds to this by mobilizing 
its knowledge about the earth-system to regulate earthly parameters in order to 
ward off such a regime (cf. Hamilton et al. 2015:4; cf. Baskin 2015:13; cf. Clark 
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2011). Instances of this can be found in Crutzen’s aim to “guide society towards 
environmentally sustainable management during the era of the Anthropocene” 
(2002: 23), the task to “steer nature's course symbiotically” (Crutzen & Schwägel 
2001), the idea of “Planteary Stewardship” (Steffen et al. 2011), whether via geo-
engineering or via other ways of technologically managing the planet (cf. Lorimer 
2016; cf. Zwier & Blok 2017; cf. Lynas 2011). As Jeremy Baskin sums up:
“In almost all of the major accounts of the concept it is assumed that [the 
Anthropocene] requires a trinity of techniques: clear management of the 
Earth and Earth-systems, guided by experts (and scientists/engineers in 
particular), using the most advanced technology possible (including large-
scale technology)” (2015: 20).
With respect to the relation between being and thinking, this regulative response to 
global warming indicates how scientific thought is not merely about the cybernetic 
being called the earth-system, but immediately feeds back into this earth-system 
to regulate thermal parameters that are presently witnessed to drift towards fatal 
levels. This is to say that scientific thought not only encounters the earth-system as 
a cybernetic being on the ontic level, but that this encounter itself is “defined and 
steered” by cybernetics at an ontological level. With regard to the phenomenon of 
the Anthropocene, we can say that the way in which scientific thinking  'feeds-back' 
into the cybernetic being called the earth-system demonstrates how the relation 
between being and scientific thinking is itself cybernetic.
Yet what is more, this cybernetic character of the relation between being and 
thinking is not limited to the scientific thought (e.g. of earth-system science) vis-à-
vis the earth-system, but equally envelops the mundane thinking that we enact in, 
for example, having a cup of coffee. Indeed, the phenomenon of the Anthropocene 
precisely and quite literally renders a cup of coffee mundane insofar as its earthly 
character becomes pronounced: in the same way that we can no longer have routine 
conversations about the weather without having global warming intrude upon the 
conversation (cf. Morton 2013: 99), neither can we have a cup of coffee that is 
not shadowed by its earthly trace, e.g. a carbon-footprint (related to production, 
shipping, brewing, etc.) that cannot be dissociated from global warming and by 
implication from the earth-system. Of course, this earthly shadow is not always 
obtrusive: we do not experience it when stopping by the coffee machine before 
rushing into a meeting. Yet when it does come to the fore – for instance when the 
emptied beaker made out of 100% biodegradable materials catches our eye during 
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a tedious meeting3 – it not only reveals our preceding activity of drinking (ready-
to-hand) coffee as feeding back into the earth-system, but further makes clear that 
this feedback is unavoidable: opting for ecologically certified coffee that includes 
emission compensation precisely takes account of such feedback. The takeaway here 
is not some normative vilification of coffee, but a phenomenological indication of 
how the cybernetic character of the Anthropocene does not merely concern the 
relation between being and scientific thinking, but likewise envelops the relation 
between being and the mundane, ‘practical’ thinking involved in brewing, ordering, 
or drinking a cup of coffee.
In this way, the Anthropocene can be said to render Heidegger’s arguably rather 
abstract ontological interpretation of cybernetics concrete, as it manifests how we are 
inescapably included in a relationality that can be phenomenologically characterized 
in terms of cybernetic, regulative steering.4 In the Anthropocene, we experience 
this concretely insofar as we find ourselves part and parcel of a warming globe that 
must be regulated to remain habitable. If the abovementioned coffee merely offers 
an easily overlooked glimpse, more blatant examples include starting the ignition 
of a car after refuelling (where feed-back into a thermally drifting earth-system 
increasingly becomes a burning concern), or proudly studying the yields of one's 
rooftop solar array to record the “kg's of CO2-emissions saved”. The experience 
here is how, just as we cannot step outside our warming globe, neither can we 
escape relating to this globe as an earth-system needing to be regulated. As such, 
we can say that the Anthropocene both concurs with Heidegger’s interpretation of 
cybernetics and concurrently offers a concretisation of what he articulates as our 
being “enclosed” (Heidegger 1983: 145) in a cybernetic relationality.5
§5.2 THE ANTHROPOCENE AND THE INTRUSION OF 
ASYMMETRY
The previous section took notice of Anthropocenic symmetry, not only with 
regard to humans being symmetrically registered as one of many geo-forces 
comprising the earth-system, but also, phenomenologically, with respect to how 
3. We will return to the specific question of waste (here: the used-up coffee container) in §5.4 and §5.5. 
4. Heidegger discusses such cybernetic “steering” as “phenomenon” in the seminars on Heraclitus, 
fragment 64 (cf. Heidegger & Fink 1979: 10-14). 
5. This also demonstrates how Heidegger’s interpretation of cybernetics can be read as a different 
articulation of his questioning of technology (cf. Heidegger 1977). In “The End of Philosophy and the 
Task of Thinking”, Heidegger writes: “[The] fundamental characteristic of [the] scientific attitude is 
its cybernetic, that is, technological character” (Heidegger 1972: 58). For an analysis of Heidegger’s 
questioning of technology in relation to the Anthropocene, see Zwier & Blok (2017); Williston 
(2017). 
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earthly beings (including ourselves as scientists, coffee drinkers, car refuelers, etc.) 
appear “enclosed” in a cybernetic relationality. We can therefore say that in the 
Anthropocene, the relation between being and thinking becomes symmetric, 
inasmuch as it “enclosed” in a collective measure (sym-metry) of cybernetic, 
regulative steering. In foregrounding the Earth in the Anthropocene, the present 
section introduces an Earthly asymmetry.
If the phenomenon of the Anthropocene entails a relation between being and 
thinking that is characterized by cybernetic regulation, such regulation evidently 
pertains to the Earth, but in a twofold way. On the one hand, our regulative 
encounter with things takes place on Earth as habitat or oikos. As noted, this 
Earthly oikos is symmetric inasmuch as the regulative steering enacted by humanity 
qua anthropic geo-force inheres in an Earthly interplay of many symmetric geo-
forces. To reiterate the example from §5.1, we can think of fossil fuels (the residue 
of antecedent geo-forces, e.g. organisms compressed via plate tectonics) existing 
in an interplay with the rational, technological, and exploitative regulation of the 
human geo-force and its combustion engines. In short, this concerns the Earth as 
the oikos where being and thinking become symmetric inasmuch as they couple in 
a regulative feedback-loop.
On the other hand, however, the Anthropocene also involves an asymmetry 
between oikos and Earth. This comes into view as the flipside of symmetrically 
understanding humanity as a geo-force: while the current dominance of the 
anthropic geo-force may validate its very own epochal nameplate, it becomes 
equally evident that its dominance is not its own Munchhausen-like doing, but 
is conditioned by the Earth. Not only does the forcefulness of the anthropic geo-
force hinge on the Earth granting it access to its vast depot of fossil fuels, but 
the very existence of the anthropic oikos turns out to be contingently premised 
on the earth-system going through a (Holocenic-Anthropocenic) period of relative 
climatic stability (cf. Szersynski 2012: 168). And at this juncture, global warming 
makes its dreaded entrance, not only as the consequence of the infernal coupling 
of the anthropic geo-force and fossil fuels (cf. Clark & Yusoff 2014), but also as 
compelling a concrete experience of what earth-system science and geology have 
long since known objectively, namely that the Earthly stability that supports our 
oikos and which we take for granted, is no longer self-evidently granted, and turns 
out to be an exception to the rule of a deeply unstable, constantly fluctuating and 
capricious earth (cf. Clark 2011; cf. Zwier& Blok 2017). This demonstrates how in 
the Anthropocene, the cybernetic regulation of our habitat (oikos) not only belongs 
to the Earth (as the symmetric oikos upon which the interplay of symmetric geo-
forces such as humans and fossil-fuels occurs), but is also pitted against the Earth 
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insofar as we find it withdrawing its stable support. In correspondingly experiencing 
the necessity to regulate against such withdrawal (i.e. by way of technological 
management, cf. §5.1), we (en)counter the intrusion of an Earthly regime that 
exceeds our oikos and thus remains asymmetric to it. Hence, in the Anthropocene, 
we do not merely inhabit the Earth (as symmetric oikos), but in so doing (en)
counter the intrusion of the asymmetric Earth.6  
This interpretation of the Anthropocene thus gives rise to a twofold consideration 
of the Earth: as symmetric (oikos) and asymmetric (intrusion). The question that 
follows from this concerns the implications of such asymmetry for cybernetic 
symmetry. 
§5.3 PHENOMENON AND ASYMMETRY
In responding to the question raised at the end of the previous section, the hypothesis 
developed here is that the intrusion of asymmetry in the Anthropocene engenders 
a reorientation of Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of cybernetics, which 
implicates how technology is to be understood. To see this, we must first further 
elucidate Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of cybernetics, and subsequently 
confront it with the Anthropocene.
§5.3.1 Heidegger - Cybernetic Oblivion
In characterizing the relation between being and thinking, ontological cybernetics 
structures the way in which beings are encountered (§5.1). For Heidegger, such 
structuring is unidirectional, meaning that our (technological) interactions at the 
ontic level neither affect nor escape the ontological relationality in which they are 
always already included:
“The world-relations of humans and with them the collective societal 
existence of humans, are enclosed in the hegemonic domain of cybernetic 
science.” (Heidegger 1983: 145)
6. What we here articulate as the intrusion of the asymmetric Earth resonates with what Isabelle 
Stengers has called “the intrusion of Gaia”, implying “the need to take into account a protagonist 
that will never recede into the background, and whose the [sic] stability ‘we’ will never again be able 
to take for granted (2015:137; cf. Stengers, 2009). However, further elaboration of the figure of 
Gaia exceeds the scope of this paper. 
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As noted, this “cybernetic science”  must be understood as ontological, i.e. as 
“foundational science” (§5.1). For Heidegger, the enclosure in the “hegemonic 
domain”, i.e. our inescapable inclusion in a cybernetic relation between being and 
thinking, entails what he calls an “occlusion”:
“The most expansive feedback-loop [i.e. of cybernetics] encompasses the 
interrelation  of man and world (…) [and its] occlusion [Verschlossenheit] 
can never be disjointed by human beings  (…) not by way and means of 
scientific-technical planning and making” (Heidegger 1983: 145-146)
This occlusion is considered as an “occlusion vis-à-vis the destining [Geschick]” 
(Heidegger 1983: 146). Put in terms of our discussion of phenomenology (§5.1), 
such destining can be understood as the characterization of the ontological 
relationality in which we are always already included, which for Heidegger takes 
on different configurations throughout  the “history of Being” (Heidegger, 1999) 
of the Western philosophical tradition. Leaving aside an elaborate analysis of these 
various configurations and their coherence, it presently suffices to emphasize how 
such destining belongs in what Heidegger calls the concealing-unconcealing of 
being (cf. Heidegger 1998a). This is to say that in the emergence of a destining 
(unconcealment), the possibility for a different destining remains withdrawn 
(concealment).
Now, Heidegger considers cybernetics as such a destining, but its “occlusion” entails 
that this destining itself is forgotten, meaning that it is not recognized as belonging 
in the concealing-unconcealing of being. Conveying both the meaning of “enclosed” 
as well as “being closed off from”, the cybernetic occlusion then implies that while 
we are “enclosed” in the destining of cybernetics (i.e. included in a cybernetic 
relationality), we are concurrently “closed off from” recognizing cybernetics as 
a specific way of ontological destining.7 The reason for this is that inasmuch as 
cybernetics “defines and steers” the relation between being and thinking, thinking 
exclusively looks to beings as things to be regulated, but overlooks – and is “closed 
off” from recognizing – that it thereby already enacts a relation between being and 
thinking. Due to this occlusion, Heidegger associates cybernetics with the “oblivion 
of being” (Heidegger 1998b: 259).
7. In his questioning of technology (cf. note 5), Heidegger articulates this as the “Danger of 
Technology” (1977: 27). For a discussion of this danger in relation to the Anthropocene, see Zwier 
& Blok 2017. 
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§5.3.2 Cybernetics and the Anthropocene
Although the Anthropocene concurs with Heidegger’s interpretation of cybernetics 
and offers a concrete experience of our being “enclosed” in cybernetics (§5.1), this 
does not imply the ontological forgetfulness that Heidegger associates with the 
oblivion of being. Rather, we will here argue that the Earth engenders a reorientation 
of Heidegger’s interpretation, meaning that rather than its oblivion, the Earth in 
the Anthropocene offers an indication of the concealing-unconcealing of being.
To develop this point, we must consider cybernetics in relation to the previously 
discussed twofold Earth (§5.2). We recall that the concrete experience of being 
“enclosed” in the “hegemonic domain” of cybernetics, i.e. of our regulative 
encounter with things, takes place on Earth as symmetric oikos, where things (the 
earth-system, coffee, empty fuel tanks, etc.) are inescapably encountered in light of 
global warming and thus in terms of technological management. At the same time, 
the regulation of this symmetric oikos is explicitly pitted against the intrusion of 
the asymmetric Earth. This ‘against’ entails that we (en)counter the withdrawal of 
stable, earthly support that sustains this oikos, thereby demonstrating that the Earth 
qua oikos is only a momentary, stable exception to the Earth’s deeply unstable and 
volatile rule.
Now, this oikos can be understood as an ontic condition of possibility for ontological 
cybernetics and its “hegemony”. If cybernetics characterizes an ontological relation 
between being and thinking, human existence enacts such a relation and is thus a 
necessary condition for cybernetics, while an Earthly oikos is a necessary condition 
for human existence (cf. Blok, 2016). This seemingly trite observation is made 
pertinent by the Anthropocene, because the intrusion of the asymmetric Earth 
revokes our liberty of taking this oikos for granted and ignoring its transient Earthly 
support. On the one hand then, the Earth sustains the oikos upon which human 
existence can enact a cybernetic relation between being and thinking. On the other 
hand, in the Anthropocene, the intrusion of the asymmetric Earth makes clear that 
the support that sustains this oikos is not at all unconditional. Instead, it is itself 
Earth-conditioned by way of an exceptionally stable, yet short-lived chapter that 
belongs to the vast, deep timely drama of the volatile geo-dynamics that make up 
what D. T. Ansted called “the great stone book” of the Earth (1863; cf. Szerszynski 
2012; ). In other words, the Earthly oikos  appears as only a transitory moment of the 
Earth, which becomes distressingly tangible by the experience of global warming, 
as this forebodes that the closing pages of this momentary chapter are nearing, 
meaning that the Earth appears on the verge of withdrawing the support for this 
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transient oikos. We can therefore say that besides offering a concrete experience of 
cybernetics, the Anthropocene also engenders the literal con-cretion, i.e. growing 
together of cybernetics and the Earth. Three things follow from this.
First, the prior con-cretion entails that Heidegger’s unidirectional interpretation 
of the relation between the ontic and the ontological must be reoriented in the 
Anthropocene. While the Earth as symmetric oikos concurs with Heidegger’s 
interpretation, this oikos itself appears as only a transitory moment of the Earth. 
Since the Earth is the condition of possibility for this oikos, and since this oikos 
is condition of possibility for ontological cybernetics, we can say that rather than 
being merely encountered as a being that concurs with the ontological structuring 
of cybernetics, the Earth itself emerges as the ontic-ontological condition of 
possibility for cybernetics (cf. Zwier & Blok, 2017).
Secondly, and following from the first, the con-cretion of cybernetics and the Earth 
entails that cybernetics in the Anthropocene is not oblivious to the concealing-
unconcealing of being. If we recall that for Heidegger, the “occlusion” of cybernetics 
“can never be disjointed by human beings” (Heidegger 1983: 145-146; cf. §5.3.1), 
we can say that the Earth in the Anthropocene does imply such a “disjointing”. 
The reason for this is that rather than symmetrically enclosed in the collective 
measure (sym-metry) of cybernetics, the ontic Earth qua symmetric oikos emerges 
(i.e. is unconcealed) as condition and support for ontological cybernetics, while 
concurrently withdrawing from the cybernetic “destining” inasmuch as the Earth 
also remains asymmetric to this oikos and by implication to the cybernetics (i.e. 
concealment). Hence, although the Anthropocene engenders a concrete experience 
of our “enclosure” in cybernetics (§5.1), it is not wholly ontologically “closed 
off”, and does not entail ontological oblivion. Instead, by way of the con-cretion 
cybernetics and the Earth in the Anthropocene, the ontic-ontological Earth offers 
an indication of the concealing-unconcealing of being.
Thirdly, the con-cretion of cybernetics and the Earth suggests that technology is 
more ontologically relevant than Heidegger allows for when he says that it is always 
already included in the “most expansive feedback-loop” of cybernetics and can 
therefore “never disjoint” the cybernetic occlusion (Heidegger 1983: 145-146; cf. 
§5.3.1). To develop this point, we begin by observing how the abovementioned 
indication of the concealing-unconcealing of being is deeply entangled with our 
technological activity in two ways. On the one hand, it is technologically mediated 
inasmuch as we can only encounter the global warming that heralds the intrusion 
of asymmetry through technologies, for instance via satellite data rendered in 
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graphs. On the other hand, the experience of asymmetry emerges in concert with 
the necessity of responding to this intrusion, and countering it by technologically 
regulating our Earthly habitat.
This then suggests that technology is more relevant than Heidegger admits to, 
because the Anthropocene entails a twofold relation between technology and the 
Earth. First, technology relates to the Earth in its appearance (or unconcealment) 
as the symmetric oikos that supports the cybernetic hegemony and symmetric 
interplay of geo-forces. This relation concurs with Heidegger’s diagnosis, as it is 
characterized by an ‘enclosure’ in cybernetics, meaning that technological activity 
is structured according to the collective measure (sym-metry) of regulative steering 
– as is concretely evidenced by the Anthropocenic inescapability of regulating our 
Earthly habitat (§5.1). Yet on the other hand, technology explicitly relates to the 
asymmetric Earth. This discords with Heidegger's diagnosis, because it involves an 
explicit response to the Earth in a sense that remains asymmetric to this oikos. 
Although this response evidently consists in countering the intrusion of asymmetry 
via cybernetic regulation, it is significant that such regulation is responsive, namely 
to something that itself withdraws from the oikos that supports cybernetics. In 
other words, although technology appears “enclosed” in cybernetics, it does not 
appear ontologically “closed off” and oblivious, since it precisely comes under 
consideration as a counter-measure to the Earth that conditions it whilst remaining 
asymmetric to it.
To summarize: in the Anthropocene, the Earth appears as ontic-ontological 
condition of the possibility for ontological cybernetics. This implies that the Earth 
is not merely a being that is encountered from within a cybernetic relationality – 
i.e. as oikos governed by cybernetic symmetry – but concurrently withdraws from 
cybernetics by remaining asymmetric to it. The Earth in the Anthropocene therefore 
indicates the concealing-unconcealing of being. Given how this indication is deeply 
entangled with our technological activity, technology appears less enclosed, closed 
off, and ontologically oblivious than in Heidegger's interpretation of cybernetics. 
Rather than exclusively symmetric, i.e. enclosed in the collective measure (sym-
metry) of cybernetics, technology enters into a relation with what remains 
asymmetric to the such symmetry, which is to say it involves an opening towards 
asymmetry.      
Now, while it is clear that an engagement with Heidegger’s thought on 
phenomenology and cybernetics in the Anthropocene gives rise to this idea, its 
further development and clarification must part ways with Heidegger. The reason 
for this is that Heidegger neither considers the ontic-ontological Earth, nor the 
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technological opening towards asymmetry that follows from it.8 He therefore directs 
his questioning of the implications of cybernetics for human existence elsewhere, 
and most importantly for the theme of this paper: away from technological activity.9 
However, in light of the Anthropocene, a good case can be made for keeping our 
questioning closely tied to technology. First, the Earth in the Anthropocene appears 
as condition for any ontological relationality (whether cybernetic or other), and 
technology increasingly appears as a necessary condition for keeping the Earth 
habitable. Secondly, technology in the Anthropocene involves an opening towards 
asymmetry, and we do well to not turn away from it, but question it further.
In what follows, we therefore part ways with Heidegger and encounter in Georges 
Bataille a thinker whose considerations of technology in relation to human 
existence opens up an alternative path that flanks Heidegger’s relating of being and 
beings, whilst revolving around asymmetry. As such, we will show how Bataille’s 
thought offers a way to better understand technology in relation to the symmetric 
and asymmetric Earth.10
§5.4 BATAILLE – ASYMMETRY AND TECHNOLOGY
Although Bataille does not systematically engage with the question of technology 
as such, the way in which it figures in his interpretation of human existence is 
instructive for understanding the implication of the aforementioned anthropocenic 
technological rapport with the Earth, as well as the associated opening towards 
asymmetry. As will become clear, the reason for this is that contrary to Heidegger, 
Bataille allows for a consideration of an ontological asymmetry that is engendered 
by technology itself.
8. Heidegger does of course speak of the Earth on various occasions, but not in its Anthropocenic 
manifestation as the ontic-ontological condition for the ontological destining of cybernetics. For a 
discussion of Heidegger and the Earth, see Blok 2016. 
9. Heidegger does consider what we might call ‘a way out’ of the cybernetic enclosure, but because this 
is solely situated at the ontological level and does not look to technological activity, it is not further 
discussed here. It is worth noting however, that it is closely aligned with what Heidegger discusses 
as the “danger” and associated “saving power” of technology (see note 5), which we have elsewhere 
discussed in relation to the Anthropocene (cf. Zwier & Blok 2017).
10. In what follows, we will specifically interpret Bataille in light of the previous discussion with 
Heidegger, meaning that the vocabulary of Heidegger (specifically with regards to the relation 
between ontic and ontological) will flank that of Bataille, thus allowing us to address the issue 
of technology and asymmetry in relation to Heidegger’s thought. For a more generally oriented 
confrontation between Heidegger and Bataille, see Comay (1990), and Lee Jr. (2007).
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§5.4.1 Divertive Technology
To see this, we begin by noting how for Bataille, technology stands at the basis of 
how human existence diverts from that what constitutes it, namely nature. Nature is 
constituted by what Bataille calls “the general economy” (1991), which is principally 
characterized by abundance, i.e. the abundant energy flowing from the sun. This 
energetic abundance of the sun constitutes natural organisms and propels life on the 
surface of the Earth. Bataille takes it as “a basic fact” that because the influx of solar 
energy is unremitting, natural organisms receive more energy than strictly required 
for maintaining life, resulting in excess energy (Bataille 1991: 21). He articulates 
this in terms of "pressure” (29-36), the first effect of which is expansion, as this 
reduces pressure via spatial distribution. However, since growth must eventually 
run out of space, and since the sun remains impartial to such limits and continues 
to relentlessly bestow its energizing gift, surplus energy can eventually no longer be 
incorporated via growth, but must be dissipated, i.e. wasted. In nature therefore, 
“the impossibility of continuing growth makes way for squander” (29) via “the 
production of increasingly burdensome forms of life” (33). Where, for instance, 
plants make relatively efficient use of the sun’s gift for growth,11 higher organisms 
eat plants and other animals without growing to the same extent, thus making self-
preservation and growth a more ‘burdensome’ affair. Additionally, the extravagant, 
intricate, and painstakingly extensive sexual behaviors of higher organisms imply 
a relatively inefficient way of procreation: “the mammalian organism is a gulf that 
swallows vast quantities of energy” (Bataille 1986: 60; cf. Stoekl 2007b: 255). 
To be clear, this does not deny that natural life occasionally faces shortages and 
accordingly engages in a struggle for survival, but Bataille interprets such a struggle 
to be constituted by, and partaking in the general movement of energy that is 
characterized by abundance and ultimately by squander. For example, a hungry 
lion faces a shortage of food, but its hunting and eating of a zebra (which itself 
'swallows vast quantities of energy' by inefficiently feeding on grass) partakes in the 
carnivorous squander of the abundant energy that constitutes the grass, the zebra, 
and the lion. In short, put in terms flanking the above discussion with Heidegger, 
while the (ontic) level of individually constituted beings may face scarcity and 
struggle, their (ontological) constitution itself is characterized by the abundance of 
the general economy.  
Now, for Bataille, natural organisms are fully immersed in nature “like water in 
water” (1989a: 19), implying that they blindly partake in both the struggle for 
survival and the therewith implicated squander of energy. Conversely, he interprets 
11. Although relatively efficient (in comparison to higher organisms), plants also involve their own 
'burdensome' ways, e.g. the fruitless sexuality of flowering plants (cf. Wendlin 2007: 39).
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the human being as the natural organism that, by way of technology, diverts from 
nature and from the general economy that constitutes it,12 meaning that humans 
enter into a specific – as we shall see: not blind, but forgetful – relation with the 
energy that (ontologically) constitutes them.
Bataille refers to this relation as the “restricted economy” (1991: 19-41), meaning 
that human existence restricts itself to dealing with individual beings and goods, 
thereby forgetting about the abundance of the general economy that ontologically 
constitutes such beings (cf. Zwier et al. 2015). Analogous to our colloquial 
understanding of economy, the restricted economy is characterized by scarcity, 
necessity, and work. In diverting from nature and the general economy, human 
existence abhors the re-submergence in nature called death (Bataille 2007: 73, 
79-86), and the corresponding strife for self-maintenance needs resources that do 
not come naturally, but are considered as scarce goods, thus demanding productive 
work to compensate for this deficit. One may think of agriculture as an example, 
where the constitutive abundance of the sun is forgotten inasmuch as its energy is 
'restrictively' encountered as a scarce good that needs to be put to work in order to 
secure a good harvest, the crops of which are similarly considered as scarce goods 
to be traded in an economy where their value derives from supply and demand (cf. 
Zwier et al. 2015: 360-362).
Although human existence in the restricted economy seems similar to a hungry lion 
inasmuch as both strive towards self-maintenance, Bataille stresses that:
“The purpose of a plow is alien to the reality that constitutes it; and (…) the 
same is true of a grain of wheat or a calf.” (Bataille 1989a: 41).
Hence, whereas a lion is immersed in the 'reality that constitutes it' (like water 
in water), technology (e.g. the plow) induces human existence to engage in an 
'alienated', which is to say diverted relation to this reality. This relation differs from 
the lion's immersion in two significant ways, both of which turn out to be relevant 
to the Anthropocene: 
First, relating to things according to the restricted economy involves thinking, 
namely “the consciousness of a necessity, or an indigence” (Bataille 1991: 23), 
which means that we think that work is needed to meet our necessities. Interpreting 
12. With respect to this diversion, Bataille follows a Hegelian trope: “Man is the animal that negates 
nature: he negates it through labor, which destroys it and changes it into an artificial world; he 
negates it in the case of life-creating activity; he negates it in the case of death.” (2007: 61; cf. 2007: 
52). For an elaborate discussion of Bataille’s Hegel interpretation, see Gemerchak (2003). For a 
discussion of Hegelian negation, the Anthropocene, and the Earth, see Zwart (2017).
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this in light of our discussion of phenomenology (§5.1), we can understand the 
restricted economy as a relation between being and thinking, where being (reality 
in the above citation) is thought of in terms of beings that are scarce, needed, and 
thus require work. This is relevant to our discussion of the Anthropocene, because 
this 'restricted' relation between being and thinking aligns with Heidegger's 
interpretation of cybernetics, given how both articulate an encounter with beings 
that is principally characterized by regulative, purposeful work. To reiterate the 
aforementioned example, where Heidegger considers the sciences to be “steered” 
cybernetics insofar as they feed-back propositions, hypotheses, and results into 
a functioning, i.e. work-oriented whole, Bataille's restricted economy similarly 
encounters beings in terms of scarcity and work. We can therefore say that due to 
a technologically induced diversion, humanity enters into the restricted economy 
and thus comes to inhabit the Earth as symmetric oikos (§5.2), where the relation 
between being and thinking becomes symmetric inasmuch as it is structed according 
to the collective measure (sym-metry) of scarcity, necessity, and (regulative) work.
Secondly, for Bataille, the diversion that gives rise to this symmetric, 'restricted' way 
of relating is never definitive. Instead, human existence in the restricted economy 
remains exposed to what it diverts from in two ways, which we will discuss as 
abundance and waste. As will become clear, this twofold exposure is relevant for the 
Anthropocene and the previous discussion of Heidegger, because it implies that the 
technologically induced diversion and associated forgetful habitation of the Earth 
as oikos in which being and thinking become symmetric, comes to be reminded of 
the general economy that constitutes it whilst remaining asymmetric to it.13
§5.4.2 Diversion and Abundance
Abundance implies that the symmetric, restricted way of relating to beings is not 
definitive, because the technologically induced diversion and associated habitation of 
a symmetric oikos does not disconnect this oikos from the abundance that constitutes 
it. Although it forgets about the constitutive abundance of the general economy, 
human existence remains exposed to its ceaseless influx of energy. Bataille's twofold 
diagnosis of his own time is instructive here: First of all, in considering energy 
as a scarce good of which more is always needed, modern, industrial humanity 
accumulates and produces massive amounts of energy via large-scale extraction of 
fossil fuels and nuclear power (cf. Stoekl 2007a: 40-41). Secondly, forgetfulness 
of the general economy gives rise to equating a healthy economy with a growing 
13. This is specific to humanity: immersed in nature like water in water, a lion neither forgets nor is 
reminded of the general economy. 
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economy, which celebrates employment whilst scowling at wastefulness.14  Bataille 
sees the pairing of the two as a recipe for catastrophe: because the large influx of 
energy is not allowed to be wasted, the human oikos can only expand under the 
pressure of abundance (which is welcomed as economic growth). However, when 
growth eventually runs out of space, pressure builds up, and as with any limited 
system that is subjected to increasing pressure, it ultimately explodes. Writing in 
the aftermath of two world wars which he understands as “the greatest orgies of 
wealth that history has recorded” (1991: 37), Bataille envisages – with Argus' eyes 
– the eruption of another war as the explosive and catastrophic outcome of – or 
rather outlet for – uncontainable pressure. As with other constituents of the general 
economy, “the impossibility of continuing growth makes way for squander” (1991: 
29), which in the case of forgetful human existence takes the catastrophic form of 
war. In this way, the restricted way of relating to things in terms of scarcity, necessity, 
and (regulative) work – i.e.  the human habitation of a symmetric oikos – is not 
definitive and must ultimately come to terms with what remains asymmetric to it, 
as the habitation of a symmetric oikos postpones but cannot avoid the consequences 
of its abundance-driven constitution.
However, because of the abovementioned diversion from nature, humans are unlike 
other natural organisms, and do not blindly, but forgetfully partake in the growth 
and squander engendered by the abundance of the general economy. On the one 
hand, in light of its recipe for catastrophe, Bataille considers such forgetfulness “a 
failure of humanity” (2007: 15; cf. 1991: 21). On the other hand, because forgetful 
human existence is not blindly preordained to this failure, Bataille maintains that a 
different way of relating is possible.
In exploring this possibility, Bataille investigates cultural history for ways of 
“exhausting the surplus without war” (2007: 428), and finds a pressure exhaust 
in the ritual of potlach, where the indigenous people in the American northwest 
wasted surplus energy by way of the destruction of accumulated and produced 
resources, for instance by killing one's own slaves, wrecking one's canoes, up to 
setting one's own village on fire (Bataille 1991: 67-68).15 Other examples include 
pyramids as a rather inefficient burial method (119), Lamaist monks who avoided 
activity in contemplative life, thus dissipating the surplus generated by Tibetan 
14. Elaborately analyzing Bataille’s (cultural) diagnosis of how this entrenchment and associated 
forgetfulness of the general economy came about – in which the rise of Protestantism, capitalism, 
and industrialism are central – is beyond the scope of this paper (Cf. Bataille 1991, particularly pp. 
115-141). 
15. Bataille emphasizes the importance of potlach in a note: “reflection on potlach led me to formulate 
the laws of general economy” (1991: 193, note 25).
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workers (93-110), jewels, works of art (Bataille 1989b; cf. Wendlin 2007: 39), and 
eroticism (Bataille 1986; 2007). All of these indicate a different way of relating to 
energy: rather than symmetrically considering it a scarce good to be put to work, 
they acknowledge rather than forget what remains asymmetric to the restricted 
economy, namely the constitutive abundance of the general economy. They 
accordingly attest to how “it is not necessity but its contrary, “luxury” that presents 
living matter and mankind with their fundamental problems”. (Bataille 1991: 12). 
To recapitulate how technology figures in all of this: on the one hand, technology 
incudes humanity to divert from nature and the general economy (§5.4.1), thus 
facilitating habitation of an oikos that is characterized by a symmetric relation 
between being and thinking, meaning that beings appear in terms of scarcity, 
necessity, and (regulative) work. As such, technology engenders forgetfulness of 
the constitutive abundance of the general economy, entailing that the human 
symmetric oikos tends towards expansion. On the other hand, inasmuch as this 
forgetful diversion remains exposed to the general economy, technology also gives 
rise to a specific (catastrophic or other) confrontation with the abundance that 
remains asymmetric to it.
Transposing all of this to the Anthropocene, we can see the Anthropocene as a 
concrete manifestation of the human oikos being exposed to the abundance of the 
general economy. If abundance engenders pressure which in turn effects expansion, 
the Anthropocene can be seen as its result. Whatever its exact starting point (cf. 
Lorimer 2017: 120), it is evident that the Anthropocene involves an enormous 
increase of human beings on the planet since that point, paired with an equally 
tremendous accumulation, production, and transformation of natural and energetic 
resources. The following graphs depicting what has come to be known as “the Great 
acceleration” (Hibbard et al, 2006) express this better than anything.
In light of this expansion, we can see the Anthropocene as an effect of humanity’s 
(technologically induced) diversion from the general economy and associated 
entrenchment in the restricted economy. If such entrenchment entails forgetfulness 
of the constitutive abundance of the general economy, and if such forgetfulness 
entails that the human, symmetric oikos must expand (as it considers energy as a 
scarce good that must be accumulated and not wasted), then the Anthropocene has 
this oikos expanding to a planetary scale, thereby rendering its anthropic inhabitant 
the dominant geological factor.
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Figure 1. Trends from 1750 to 2010 in globally aggregated indicators for socio-economic
development. (1) Global population data according to the HYDE (History Database of the
Global Environment, 2013) database. Data before 1950 are modelled. Data are plotted as
decadal points. (2) Global real GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in year 2010 US dollars.
Data are a combination of Maddison for the years 1750 to 2003 and Shane for
1969–2010. Overlapping years from Shane data are used to adjust Maddison data to
© 2015 by SAGE Publications
Figure 1: The Great Accelleration. Image source: Steffen et al., 2015: 84.
In light of this interpretation of Bataille, we can add an economic dimension to 
our previous discussion of cybernetics. We have seen how the Anthropocene offers 
a concretisation of our inclusion in a cybernetic, symmetric relationality (§5.1). We 
can now interpret this relationality to belong to a technologically induced diversion 
from the general economy, by which humanity comes to inhabit the Earth as the oikos 
in which being and thinking become symmetric. As with Heidegger's cybernetics, 
this symmetric way of relating to things is ontologically forgetful (§5.3), but unlike 
Heidegger, is it not wholly “enclosed”  and thus oblivious, since the diversion that 
engenders such forgetfulness is not definitive, as it postpones but cannot avoid 
the consequences of its abundance-driven constitution. What follows is that the 
forgetful, symmetric way of relating to things and goods eventually comes to be 
reminded of its diversion and must therefore, whether catastrophically or other, 
come to terms with the constitutive abundance that remains asymmetric to it.
In the Anthropocene, however, this reminder of forgetfulness occurs in another 
significant way as well. We therefore turn to waste as the second way by which 
human existence remains exposed to what is diverts from.
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§5.4.3 Unceasing departure - Diversion and Waste
As noted in §5.4.1, human existence diverts from nature, meaning that instead of 
being immersed in it “like water in water”, it departs from nature and thereby enters 
into a specific, forgetful relation with it. This diversion is not definitively forgetful, 
because human existence remains exposed to the nature from which it diverts “and 
from which man does not cease to have departed” (Bataille 2007: 62).
For Bataille, this unceasing departure from nature is evidenced by “the horror of 
nature, which was the first movement of the process (…) that established humanity” 
(2007: 77). This horror becomes most eminently manifest in the form of our own 
abhorred natural waste: decaying corpses, vomit, feces, urine, menstrual blood, the 
odor of sweat, etc. (Bataille 2007: 61-88). Whilst from the perspective of nature, 
there is nothing extraordinary about these dejecta (feces are simply a resource for 
the continuation of organic life, as are rotting corpses),16 they invoke disgust and 
abhorrence in us, because they serve as a horrific reminder of a nature with which 
we no longer coincide inasmuch as we have diverted from it.
If technology induces this diversion or departure from nature, it also serves to 
contain the horrors associated with not having ceased this depart from it. Think of 
sewer-systems, toilets, tampons, deodorant, cemeteries, etc. Such containment is 
rather successful, particularly in highly technological societies17, but is never flawless 
and definitive, e.g. when we occasionally encounter an unflushed, rancid toilet, or 
are overwhelmed by the fetid stench of a passing garbage truck. In those cases, when 
technological containment momentarily hampers and we are confronted with our 
natural waste, we usually shudder, flush the toilet, divert or avert ourselves once 
more, and go about our business. This entails that technology both induces the 
departure from nature, and serves to contain its consequent horrors, thus affording 
human existence to mostly forget about its unceasing departure.
What does this have to do with the Anthropocene? In the Anthropocene, we are 
confronted with the waste that technology itself dejects in its diversion from nature 
and the general economy. We have seen how it is due to this diversion that the Earth 
becomes inhabited as symmetric oikos that, propelled by the large-scale exploitation 
and combustion of fossil fuels, expands to Anthropocenic, i.e. planetary dimensions 
(§5.4.2). Indeed, it is only because of the (symmetric and infernal) coupling of 
humans and fossil fuels that the Anthropos becomes the dominant geo-force (§5.2). 
16. In this regard, Bataille also notes how “the [human] loathing of decay (…) is not shared by animals” 
(2007, 79).
17. For a historical overview of the developments of such technologies, see Scanlan (2005).
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Now, the waste of this combustive exploitation goes under the name of CO2. We 
propose that in the Anthropocene, CO2 acquires a status once occupied by natural 
dejecta. 18
In order to see this, we must engage in a phenomenological exercise and investigate 
the experience of CO2. The first thing to note is that we neither directly see CO2, 
nor experience the horrific disgust as when confronted with vomit, excrements, or 
rotting corpses. We only have a remote experience of CO2 – as data rendered in 
graphs. Be that as it may, today, in the Anthropocene, CO2 encroaches and becomes 
less and less remote. Consider the following graph:
Figure 2: Full Mauna Lau CO2 Report. Image source: Earth System Research Laboratory. 
Retrieved from: https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/full.html
If we let this graph sink in, it becomes something other than just another graph 
depicting abstract and remote scientific data. Instead, put phenomenologically, it 
quite literally sinks in, namely into our way of relating, as it becomes con-crete in 
the sense that it grows together with everything we see, as if etched in our peripheral 
vision. The line above 400ppm attaches itself to the trails of airplanes we see when 
looking at the sky, to the freight train carrying a batch of new cars to the harbour, 
to the warning light that signals an empty fuel tank, to the adverts for exotic holiday 
destinations, to the trees in the garden (which, upon this graph sinking in, appear 
as a carbon-sink, cf. Zwier & Blok, 2017), to the powerlines across the field, etc.
18. CO2 is obviously not the only form of waste exhausted by the anthropic geo-force, but it is arguably 
the most significant, as evidenced by the fact that the impact of affiliated forms of waste are often 
expressed in CO2-equivalence.
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When pausing over what this (concrete, sunk in) graph actually says, one 
feels queasy to say the least – one dreads it and feels gutted. Why? Because in 
engendering global warming, CO2 stands as a stark reminder of how the symmetric, 
fossil-fueled, and now planetary oikos that we inhabit and usually take for granted, 
remains encompassed by the asymmetric Earth that constitutes it and momentarily 
grants it stable support. And through the fumes of CO2 that thicken the air, we 
behold the intrusion of the asymmetric Earth, the associated withdrawal of stable 
support, and catch a glimpse of how this stable support is but an exception to the 
rule of a deeply unstable and unsettled Earth (§5.2).
It is for this reason that in the Anthropocene, CO2 can be ascribed similar status as 
natural dejecta. As with natural dejecta, there is nothing extraordinary about CO2 
from the perspective of the Earth as such, since it is but one of many parameters of 
the cybernetic Earth-system, including natural life for which it is a resource. Yet for 
human existence, it emerges as a horrific souvenir of its unceasing departure from 
the Earth that constitutes our oikos whilst remaining asymmetric to it.
The response to the confrontation with the horrific waste of CO2 follows along this 
parallel, as it consists in once more diverting oneself by way of technology. In the 
same way that technologies like toilets and cemeteries contain natural dejecta, we 
can buy carbon compensation when booking a flight, drink ecologically certified 
coffee from “100% biodegradable” cups, and put up solar panels to contain CO2. 
In contrast to natural waste however, the Anthropocene testifies to a clogged toilet, 
no longer able to contain the flurry of waste. This is to say that technologically 
containing and thus diverting from the waste called CO2 becomes increasingly 
impossible as the fumes linger. One of the dreaded lessons that Earth-system science 
teaches is that CO2 is not simply present or absent, and cannot simply be flushed, 
since it figures as a parameter in all kinds of intricate cybernetic feedback-loops of 
the Earth-system, including positive loops. As a simple example, if CO2 engenders 
global warming and effects the melting of the arctic, less sunlight is reflected, thus 
fomenting further warming, more rapid melting, even less reflection, etc. (ad 
nauseam indeed). Hence, whereas with respect to the horrific reminder of natural 
dejecta, technological containment affords human existence to mostly forget about 
its departure from nature and go about its business, the dejecta of CO2 – the very 
waste-trail of this technologically fueled departure – cannot be contained in this 
way, and therefore do not allow for forgetting about our unceasing departure from 
the asymmetric Earth. 
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What follows, in sum, is that while technology induces a diversion that proceeds 
towards symmetry and habitation of the Earth as a symmetric oikos, the waste-trail 
of CO2 engendered by this technological diversion compels – through the fumes 
– an experience of how technological existence does not cease to divert from that 
from which remains asymmetric to it.
§5.5 CONCLUSION: ASYMMETRIC EXPOSURE
Compounding the previous sections, we can interpret the Anthropocene as the 
time in which we are inescapably reminded of asymmetry, since the Anthropocene 
concretely shows that the technological, restricted symmetry is not definitive, 
but is instead confronted with what remains asymmetric to it. On the one hand, 
the Anthropocene concretely appears as an effect of our technologically induced, 
forgetful diversion from the abundance of the general economy, where continued 
exposure to this constitutive abundance entails that under pressure, our symmetric 
oikos expands to planetary dimensions, and continues to do so, even in (twi)light 
of horrific CO2. We can take this as another indication of the pressurizing general 
economy, i.e. the asymmetric constitutive abundance from which symmetric human 
existence continues to divert, with no foreseeable end in sight. On the other hand, 
the very waste-trail exhausted by this technological diversion does direct sight to a 
foreseeable end, by compelling – through the fumes – attention to the intrusion of 
the asymmetric Earth. The technological waste of CO2 thereby comes to serve as 
a horrific reminder of how our symmetric oikos does not cease to depart from the 
asymmetric Earth, whilst alarmingly signaling how it stands on the verge of in fact 
ceasing from this departure and collapsing back into the Earth.
From this confrontation between Heidegger and Bataille in the Anthropocene, we 
conclude from this that technology in the Anthropocene is ontologically forgetful, 
but not wholly oblivious. Retracing our steps, we saw Heidegger associating 
technological activity with the oblivion of being, since he considers it to be both 
“enclosed” and “closed off” from the ontological destining of cybernetics and its 
sym-metric of regulation (§5.3). We refused Heidegger's interpretation by arguing 
that the ontic-ontological Earth offers an indication of the concealing-unconcealing 
of being. Furthermore, since this indication is deeply entangled with technology, 
we suggested that technology involves an opening towards asymmetry, because its 
regulative symmetry appears as a counter-measure to the intrusion of the asymmetric 
Earth, which conditions cybernetics on the (unconcealed) Earth as symmetric oikos, 
whilst concurrently withdrawing from it (or concealing itself ).
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Bataille helps to further understand this technological opening towards asymmetry, 
since he articulates how technology induces a diversion that proceeds towards 
symmetry, but does not, due to abundance and waste, definitely accomplish a 
symmetric enclosure. On the one hand then, technology is forgetful, given how 
technological human existence diverts from nature and the abundance of the 
general economy that constitutes it, engendering a forgetful entrenchment in the 
restricted economy and habitation of the Earth as the oikos in which being and 
thinking become symmetric. The Anthropocene concretely gives the reckoning of 
this, as the human oikos expands to planetary dimensions, rendering its forgetful 
inhabitant the dominant geo-force. Furthermore, inasmuch as it serves to contain 
the horrific natural dejecta that remind human existence of its departure from 
nature, technology affords forgetfulness of its own diversion.
On the other hand, in the Anthropocene, the uncontainable waste-trail of this 
technological diversion itself – CO2 – emerges as the horrific souvenir that retaliates 
against forgetfulness. By way of its own dejecta, technology can then be said to 
come to terms with itself as it awakens a twofold memory, incriminating what 
technology diverts from (the asymmetric Earth and the general economy), and that 
it unceasingly does so.
We conclude that the Anthropocene gives rise to a twofold conceptualization 
of technology according to which technology becomes ontologically significant. 
First, technology is conceptualized as always already and forgetfully “enclosed” in 
a symmetric relation between being and thinking. Secondly, technology offers a 
reminder of how its own symmetric enclosure results from an unceasing diversion 
from that which remains asymmetric to it. On the one hand, technology diverts 
from the asymmetric Earth as the ontic-ontological condition for the oikos that 
this symmetric enclosure inhabits (§5.3). On the other hand, technology diverts 
from the general economy to which this oikos remains exposed (§5.4). This 
conceptualization is ontologically significant, because in coming to terms with 
its own forgetful diversion, technology fosters responsivity to being, i.e. to what 
always already structures how we symmetrically encounter things, whilst remaining 
asymmetric to this encounter.
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Conclusion
This study has concerned itself with the question: "How to come to terms with 
technology on an unsettled planet?" In retracing the path that was explored and by 
documenting what was found along the way, this concluding chapter will formulate 
an answer to this question. Additionally, it offers some markers to orient further 
explorations in the philosophical questioning of technology.
§6.1 REHABILITATING ONTOLOGY 
Returning to the first part of the threefold hypothesis that was formulated in the 
first chapter (Introduction), this dissertation has argued that, when it comes to 
philosophically questioning technology, we find ourselves in an unprecedented 
situation.  We are indeed dealing with technological being, and not just technological 
beings. It has become clear that human existence on Earth inescapably involves 
an interaction with many technological beings. Yet, this study has argued that 
such interactions with concrete things are themselves included in a technological 
way of encountering them. A case has been made, therefore, for a rehabiliation 
of the ontological dimension in the philosophy of technology, i.e. of questioning 
technology as involved in how we encounter our technological worlds on Earth.
Such a maneuver goes against the grain of philosophy of technology after the empirical 
turn in general, and its postphenomenological branch of empirically questioning 
technologies in particular, both of which protest against the essentialism of classical 
philosophy of technology. However, as has become clear, going against the grain 
of the empirical turn and making a case for a rehabilitation of the ontological 
dimension in the philosophical questioning of technology neither implies (a return 
to) essentialism, nor a unilateral retaliation against contemporary philosophy of 
technology. Were we to put it in dialectical terms, we can say that it involves two 
movements, the first of which rehabilitates ontology as an inevitable dimension of 
a viable philosophy of technology; the second confronts such a rehabilitation with 
its habitation on an Earthly oikos. 
With respect to the first movement, the rehabilitation of ontology as presented in 
this thesis does not seek to simply negate the empirical turn (which itself negates 
classical philosophy of technology), but rather aspires to 'elevate' or 'uplift' (i.e. 
‘sublate’) the questioning of technology to an ontological level.  The latter does 
thereby not endorse the essentialism that, alledgely at least, classical philosophy of 
technology adheres to, which is to say that the rehabilitation of ontology does not 
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seek to once again present an essential, general category under which all technologies 
can be subsumed. Rather, it involves ontology as an articulation of the way in which 
our encounter with things is structured.
This study has undertaken this movement by laying bare how the 
postphenomenological way of investigating technologies and technological 
mediation at an ontic level, is itself unwittingly technically mediated at an ontological 
level. It has been argued that postphenomenology addresses technology in terms 
of human-technology relations, where these relations are themselves encountered 
as beings, i.e. as wordly sites in which the technologically mediated constitution 
of subjects and objects takes place, and about which postphenomenology can 
make adequate theoretical propositions (whilst arguing that essentialist, classical 
philosophy of technology cannot). Because it encounters technologies in this way, 
postphenomenology has been diagnosed to adhere to the theoretical attitude. 
Furthermore, this theoretical attitude has itself been shown to be technically 
mediated inasmuch as the adequacy of its theoretical propositions is ultimately 
measured in technical terms of use: namely in terms of its contribution to solving 
problems emerging in concrete technological innovations and to furthering the 
societal embedding of these innovations.
Two conclusions can then be drawn from our first dialectical movement. First, 
this study offers a rebuttal to the postphenomenological critique of Heidegger, 
by pointing out how this critique is itself technically mediated by the selfsame 
ontological 'essence of technology' (Enframing) that it renounces. We have argued 
that the alleged inadequacy of Heidegger’s articulation of Enframing is ultimately 
considered as a technical inadequacy according to which Enframing is deemed 
insufficiently useful. But this does not diminish the relevance of Heidegger’s 
thinking on the ontological level.
Therefore, secondly, by identifying the technical mediation that is inherent in 
both the postphenomenological critique of Heidegger as well as in its empirically 
oriented method of investigating concrete technologies, this study indicates and 
rehabilitates an ontological dimension of questioning that is obfuscated (forgotten) 
in contemporary philosophy of technology.
§6.2 BEING EARTHBOUND
The relevance of rehabilitating an ontological dimension in the philosophy of 
technology has been demonstrated by marking its ecological and economic 
significance, addressed under the heading of the Anthropocene. This affirms the 
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second part of the threefold hypothesis that was presented in the first chapter, which 
stated that our contemporary habitation of the Earth as oikos gives rise to a specific, 
oiko-nomic interpretation of the ontological question of technological being.  
This point is best elucidated by recalling how chapter IV engaged in a 
phenomenological interpretation of the Anthropocene to demonstrate its ontological 
relevance. This was done by pointing out how the Anthropocene compels a concrete 
experience of our inescapable inclusion in the technological encounter with the world 
that Heidegger conceptualized as Enframing. The Anthropocene underscores such 
inclusivity, because it leaves no viable outside to technology, as the anthropocenic 
world on a warming globe inescapably appears as a planetary standing reserve to 
be managed by human existence as planetary manager of our Earthly oikos.This 
does not only mean that this oikos is interlaced with a vast variety of technological 
beings and associated human-technology relations, but first and foremost means 
that the Anthropocene concretely discloses  technological being, which is to say 
that the manner according to which beings appear is itself technically mediated 
at an ontological level. Reiterating an example from chapter IV, in the pervasive 
light of global warming, a tree inescapably appears as a managerial resource, i.e. as 
a carbon-sink or carbon-source, i.e. as an exemplification of technological being. As 
such, this study not only indicates the ontological relevance of the Anthropocene, 
but also underscores the significance of rehabilitating the ontological dimension of 
questioning in the philosophy of technology.
In accordance with such a questioning of technology, the prior rehabilitation of 
ontology has been confronted with the issue of habitation, which in the Anthropocene 
distincly appears as habitation of an Earthly oikos. From this confrontation, this 
study concludes that the unsettled, anthropocenic Earth inevitably unsettles 
Heidegger's understanding of the relation between the ontic and the ontological, 
i.e. between technological beings and technological being. Hence, while it rebuts 
the postphenomenological critique of Heidegger's questioning of technology, this 
study criticizes Heidegger in a different way. By arguing that the Anthropocene 
entails an experience of the Earth as ontic-ontological condition of possibility for 
Enframing, this study refuses Heidegger's segregation  of the ontological from the 
ontic.
To recapitulate the line of reasoning that undergirds this critique, chapter IV took 
notice of how the Anthropocene not only offers a concrete experience of Enframing, 
but further entails its literal con-cretion, i.e. coalescence with the Earth. The 
chapter consequently conducted an Earthbound interpretation of what Heidegger 
conceptualizes as the danger and saving power associated with Enframing, both of 
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which were demonstrated to orbit around the issue of human responsiveness to 
the 'call' of being as Enframing. By way of this Earthbound interpretation, it was 
argued that, rather than engendering a dangerously indifferent responsiveness, the 
Anthropocene entails a concrete experience of the epochality of Enframing, due 
to its con-cretion with the epochality of the Earth. The Earth was thereby neither 
merely considered as a geological object, nor as a being that is unidirectionally 
encountered according to an isolated ontological mode of appearance. Instead, it 
was argued that in the Anthropocene, the Earth emerges as the (ontic) habitat or 
oikos that conditions ontological responsivity to the call of Enframing, implying that 
the Earth acquires ontic-ontological status. Therefore, although the Anthropocene 
inescapably discloses the Earth as a managerial resource, while framing human 
existence as manager of the planetary standing reserve, it was concurrently found to 
epitomize the epochality of this mode of appearance, thereby concretely manifesting 
how our inclusion in a technological, managerial way of relating belongs to a 
specific epoch, with a specific beginning and an impending end. This in turn led to 
an articulation of the Saving Earth since, due to its epochality, the Earth itself was 
found to foster responsivity to how the Earth's appearance as a managerial resource 
(for human beings as planetary managers) is not all-encompassing and does not 
exhaust what the Earth has to offer, thus countering dangerous indifference by 
indicating the possibility of a different Earthly encounter.
Once again, two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, while the Anthropocene 
concretely manifests technological being on Earth, i.e. our inclusion in the 
ontological structuring of the reality of Enframing, it concurrently reveals how this 
does not commit us – pace Heidegger – to technology's “greatest danger”. Rather, 
the ontic-ontological Earth also engenders a “saving power” inasmuch as it does 
not indifferently coincide with its anthropocenic appearance as planetary standing 
reserve. The Earth, as the condition of possibility for Enframing, discloses how 
current technological modes of Enframing – i.e. our current responsiveness to its 
call – belong to one particular ontic-ontological epoch, therefore not precluding the 
emergence of other modes of responsiveness.
Secondly, this study concludes – with Heidegger – that because of its ontological 
responsiveness, human existence in the Anthropocene cannot be understood 
as merely one (dominant) geo-force amongst others. At the same time, such 
ontological responsiveness cannot be isolated from the ontic domain. This is to say 
that the question of human existence as responsive to the call of being must become 
Earthbound, meaning that the anthropos of the Anthropocene must be considered 
as Earthling.
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§6.3 THE ASYMMETRIC MEASURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL BEING
The confrontation between the rehabilitation of an ontological dimension in the 
philosophical questioning of technology on the one hand, and the habitation of 
the ontic-ontological Earth on the other, gave rise to a path of questioning that 
trails between ontology and economy (as Earthly oiko-nomy). In chapter V, we 
addressed the third part of the threefold hypothesis that was formulated in the 
introduction, which stated that the issue of technological waste is relevant to 
understanding the tryptic of ontology, economy, and technology – and thus to 
understanding the relation between technological being and the Earth. Chapter V 
accordingly questioned technology in the Anthropocene and developed the claim 
that, although technology is included in an ontological relationality that is usually 
forgets, its own waste-trail retaliates against such forgetfulness. The waste-trail of 
technology not only indicates that technology is forgetful in this way, but also 
reveals how technology is ontologically significant. 
This claim was developed by interpreting technology in terms of symmetry and 
asymmetry. First of all, a phenomenological interpretation of the Anthropocene 
was offered to interpret the Anthropocene as a cybernetic phenomenon. We argued 
that the Anthropocene concurs with Heidegger’s ontological understanding of 
cybernetics, whilst offering a concretization of his claim that human existence 
becomes "enclosed" in cybernetics, meaning that our encounter with things 
becomes characterized by an inescapable symmetry, i.e. a collective measure of 
regulative steering. Technology thus appeared as symmetric, and the Anthropocene 
was interpreted as the concretization of this symmetry, via the inescapability of 
relating to our warming, fuming globe as a cybernetic earth-system in need of 
regulation.
Secondly, it was argued that the Anthropocene not only exemplifies this experience, 
but also engenders its literal con-cretion, i.e. the growing together of cybernetics 
and the Earth. As a result, the Earth appears in a remarkable, twofold way. On 
the one hand, the Earth appears as the "symmetric oikos" that offers the support 
upon which the 'enclosive' cybernetic way of relating takes place and becomes, in 
Heidegger’s terms, “hegemonic”. On the other hand, the intrusion of what was 
articulated as the "asymmetric Earth" makes clear that such stable support is not 
unconditional, but is granted by the Earth in a momentary, stable exception to its 
deeply unstable and volatile rule. 
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Two conclusions were drawn from the concretisation of cybernetic symmetry 
and the Earth. First, chapter V reiterated and buttressed the prior conclusion that 
the unsettled, anthropocenic Earth unsettles Heidegger's consideration of the 
relation between the ontic and ontological, now specifically considered in terms of 
ontological cybernetics and its Earthly support. The Earth was considered as ontic-
ontological, meaning that rather than being encountered as a being that concurs 
with the ontological structuring of cybernetics, the Earth itself is at the same time 
the condition which supports ontological cybernetics, whilst withdrawing from the 
cybernetic, hegenomic 'enclosure' by remaining asymmetric to it.
The second conclusion was that the Earth during the Anthropocene compels us to 
resist Heidegger's association of cybernetics with the oblivion of being. Heidegger 
argues that cybernetics is occluded, i.e. entails a forgetfulness of how it belongs in 
the concealing-unconcealing of being. Chapter V offered a rebuttal to this claim, 
by arguing that instead of being "enclosed" in cybernetics whilst "closed off" 
from recognizing its ontological “destining”, the Earth during the Anthropocene 
disjoints the "occlusion" of cybernetics. Rather than enclosed in the symmetry of 
cybernetics, the ontic Earth (qua symmetric oikos) emerges (i.e. is unconcealed) as 
condition and support for ontological cybernetics, while concurrently withdrawing 
from the cybernetic “ordaining” insofar as the Earth also remains asymmetric to this 
oikos, and thus to cybernetics (i.e. concealment). Therefore, instead of its oblivion, 
it was argued that the ontic-ontological Earth offers an indication of the concealing-
unconcealing of being. 
As the next, third step in this line of reasoning, technology was brought into relation 
with this Earthly indication of concealing-unconcealing being. It was argued that 
this indication is deeply entangled with technology, not only in the sense that our 
experience of global warming – and thus of the intrusion of the asymmetric Earth – 
is technologically mediated, but also in the sense that technological, i.e. symmetric 
cybernetic regulation of our oikos, distinctly appears as a counter-measure to the 
intrusion of asymmetric Earth. From this, it was inferred that there is more to 
technology than its "occlusive enclosure" in cybernetic symmetry as Heidegger 
argued, since technology involves a peculiar opening to what remains foreign, i.e. 
asymmetric to the technological, regulative way of relating to beings. In other words, 
it was suggested that technology is not solely enclosed in cybernetic symmetry, but 
open to asymmetry.
As a fourth step, this consideration of technology and asymmetry necessitated a 
parting of ways, allowing us to introduce Bataille’s contribution to philosophy of 
technology.
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It is remarkable perhaps that, in contemporary philosophy of technology, Bataille’s 
work is hardly, if ever mentioned.1 This study has demonstrated the relevance 
of a mutual exposure of Bataille and the philosophy of technology, by showing 
how Bataille’s economic interpretation of technology opens up an alternative path 
flanking Heidegger's relating of being and beings, and is therefore specifically 
significant for the question that has been central to this study, i.e. of technological 
being in relation to the unsettled Earth.
Accordingly, in taking a Bataillean perspective, technology was interpreted in terms 
of a diversion from nature and its ontological constitution, i.e. the general economy, 
thus proceeding towards entrenchment in what Bataille refers to as the restricted 
economy. The restricted economy was correlated with the aforementioned symmetry 
because, like Heidegger's cybernetics, it involves a way of relating to beings that is 
characterized by a collective symmetry of scarcity and regulative work, implying 
that the restricted economy engenders habitation of the Earth as a symmetric oikos. 
Due to this diversion, technology was considered as forgetul in two ways. It entails 
forgetfulness of the abundance of the general economy as well as forgetfulness of its 
own diversion (namely via the technological containment of the horrors that result 
from its departure from nature).
On the other hand, although ontologically forgetful, technology was considered as 
un-oblivious as well, notably because the confrontation with abundance and waste 
entails a diversion that is never definitive. This was elucidated by connecting it with 
the challenges of the Anthropocene.
First, the Anthropocene was interpreted as a concrete effect of the technologically 
induced entrenchment in the restricted economy and habitation of the Earth as 
symmetric oikos which, due to its forgotten exposure to the abundance of the 
general economy, expands towards a planetary scale, entailing that human beings 
as inhabitants become the dominant geological factor. At the same time, it was 
argued that such a forgetful aversion from abundance is never definitive, as from 
a Bataillean perspective growth eventually gives way to (glorious or catastrophic) 
squander. As such, it was suggested that the forgetful symmetry of technology, i.e. 
its way of relating to things in terms of a collective measure (sym-metry) of scarcity 
and regulative work, ultimately engenders a surpassing of symmetry and thus an 
opening towards what remains asymmetric to it.
1. A notable exception can be found in Tomassi (2007). Otherwise, Bataille is hardly ever discussed in 
the discours of philosophy of technology. For instance, his name is not mentioned in Scharff and 
Dusek’s comprehensive anthology of the philosophy of technology (cf. Scharff & Dusek, 2014). 
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Secondly, Bataille's philosophy of waste was extrapolated to the current 
Anthropocenic condition. CO2 as technological waste now acquires a status once 
occupied by natural dejecta. Where horrific natural dejecta (vomit, excrements, 
etc.) remind human existence of its unceasing departure from nature, CO2 was 
portrayed as the horrific souvenir of our unceasing departure from the asymmetric 
Earth.
Hence, this study concludes that the issue of waste is specifically relevant to 
understanding the relation between technological being and the unsettled Earth. 
By way of its own waste-trail, which serves as a souvenir of unceasing departure, 
technology during the Anthropocene awakens a twofold memory. First, it highlights 
what technology is diverting from – i.e. from that what ontologically constitutes 
it, to wit the asymmetric Earth and the general economy. Secondly, it highlights 
how we are unceasingly involved in this diversion. Thus, technology becomes 
ontologically relevant, because it offers an indication of the asymmetry from which 
it diverts, thereby revealing that technology is divertive in and by itself.
Finally, by interpreting technology on an unsettled Earth, this thesis offers a twofold 
conceptualization of technological being. First, technology is conceptualized as 
always already and forgetfully “enclosed” in a symmetric relation between being 
and thinking. Secondly, technology offers a reminder of how its own symmetric 
enclosure results from an unceasing diversion from that which remains asymmetric 
to it. On the one hand, technology diverts from the asymmetric Earth as the 
ontic-ontological condition for the oikos that this symmetric enclosure inhabits. 
On the other hand, technology diverts from the general economy to which this 
oikos remains exposed. This conceptualization is ontologically significant, because 
in coming to terms with its own forgetful diversion, technology fosters responsivity 
to being, i.e. that which always already structures how we symmetrically encounter 
things, whilst remaining asymmetric to this encounter.
§6.4 A THREEFOLD ANSWER
In light of the above elaboration of the threefold hypothesis that was posited in 
chapter I, we can return to the question: "How to come to terms with technology on 
an unsettled planet?" The threefold answer we arrive at is: in ontological terms; in 
economic terms; and in terms of asymmetry.
First, with regards to the ontological terms pertaining to technological being, we 
conclude that our encounter with our anthropocenic world is structured in such 
a way that beings appear symmetrically, i.e. according to a collective measure of 
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regulative technology and work. Technological being thereby entails ontological 
forgetfulness inasmuch as the symmetric structuring is itself forgotten, while the 
beings that appear by way of such structuring take precedence. The criticism 
of philosophy of technology after the empirical turn (developed in chapter II) 
was precisely this, that rather than questioning this symmetric structuring, it is 
endorsed and even reinforced in this approach. To amend this, the consideration 
of technological beings (artefacts) must be complemented by a (rehabilitated) 
questioning of the very mode of Enframing at work here.
Secondly, with regards to the economic terms by which technological being is bound 
to its habitation of an Earthly oikos, we conclude that although technological 
being may be ontologically forgetful, its Earthly habitation offers a reminder 
that counters such forgetfulness. Our habitation of an unsettled Earth entails 
that technological being neither is all-encompassing, nor implies “dangerous” 
indifference and forgetfulness of its own symmetric, ontological structuring. On 
the one hand – with respect to Heidegger – technological being appears in light of 
the saving Earth. While the Earth concretely appears as a planetary standing reserve 
for us as planetary managers, it concurrently allows us to become perceptive (rather 
than forgetful) of the ontological epochality of Enframing that allows the planetary 
standing reserve to appear in such a way. On the other hand – with respect to Bataille 
– technology appears ontologically forgetful but not oblivious. While technology 
induces a forgetful diversion and entrenchment in the symmetry of the restricted 
economy, the technological dejecta – notably the lingering fumes of CO2 in the 
Anthropocene – come to serve as a horrific souvenir, explicating how technological 
existence is entrenched in the restricted economy and forgetfully diverts from that 
what ontologically constitutes it, so that this diversion is never definitive. In other 
words, the forgetfulness can in principle be unfolded and opened up, by taking the 
anthropocenic fumes seriously.
Thirdly, with regards to asymmetry, we conclude that rather than symmetrically 
enclosed and ontologically occluded, technological being on an unsettled Earth 
opens to what remains asymmetric to it, namely the asymmetric Earth and the 
general economy.
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§6.5 DISCUSSION AND PROSPECT
While this thesis has indicated how technological being on an unsettled Earth 
opens to asymmetry, this still leaves open the question how to come to terms with 
this twofold asymmetry. Only an outline for this even more unsettling question can 
be provided here, thereby setting out some markers for future research.
It is worth noting first of all that today, on an unsettled Earth, coming to terms with 
asymmetry is more complicated than how Bataille considered it, since he “only” took 
notice of the asymmetry of the general economy. In chapter V we explained  how 
for Bataille, the restricted, symmetric way of relating to things in terms of scarcity, 
necessity, and (regulative) work is never definitive, as it postpones but cannot avoid 
the consequences of the abundance from which it diverts (§5.4.1). Accordingly, 
since growth must eventually make way for squander, humanity is eventually 
confronted with the possibility of either facing the catastrophic squander of war, 
or engaging in a different way of relating that surpasses the symmetric restricted 
economy, and (as in potlach, jewels, works of art, pyramids, etc.) acknowledges how 
the ultimate problem is not “necessity” but “luxury” (Bataille 1991: 12).
On an unsettled Earth, however, such acknowledgement becomes more complicated. 
The reason for this is that Bataille solely considers the symmetric Earth, which is to 
say that his analysis relies on a stable Earthly support upon which the symmetric 
oikos is subjected to pressure, grows, and eventually either bursts out in war, or finds 
other ways of dissipation. This perspective does not yet consider the ecological threat 
engendered by the intrusion of the asymmetric Earth2 (cf. Stoekl 2007a; Painter-
Morland et al. 2017) . Put simply, where Bataille is concerned with burning off 
excessive energy (chapter II; V), the Anthropocene confronts us with the aftermath 
of the excessive burning of fossil fuels. What follows is that, like Bataille's analysis, 
our technological existence in the Anthropocene remains exposed to the abundance 
of the asymmetric general economy – the “great acceleration” does not seem to 
decelerate. Yet unlike Bataille, we face this abundance through the fumes of CO2, 
in the harrowing light of the intrusion of the asymmetric Earth. This complicates 
the possibility of wavering between necessity and luxury, because meeting this 
possibility relies on a habitable Earth, which increasingly needs technological 
regulation. Denial of this situation has become a “luxury” we can no longer afford. 
2. Stoekl offers an instructive contextualization as to why ecology was not a primary concern for 
Bataille (cf. Stoeckl 2007a: 38-42). Yet where Stoeckl thereupon engages Bataille with the depletion 
of fossil fuels (2007a: XVII; 2007b: 274), the Anthropocene primarily concerns the aftermath of 
their combustion, i.e. global warming via CO2. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly clear that our 
present stockpile of fossil-fuels suffices to render our oikos uninhabitable (cf. Bonneuil 2015: 26). 
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It is in this sense that initiatives like the bio-based economy make sense, and 
have to be taken seriously. Yet they also stand in need of philosophical scrutiny. 
Not primarily with a theoretical glance at all the aspects involved but – to put it 
with reference to the unease that spurred this dissertation on its way –  with the 
philosophical glance that questions the perspectives which are already actively taken 
in such contemporary initiatives, practices, and discourses, to inquire into the 
way in which such initiatives encounter the world and allow the world to appear. 
Chapter II can be seen as an example of this, as it engages in such a questioning to 
demonstrate how the ideal of a bio-based economy runs the risk of being nothing 
but a momentary reprieve, as it entrenches itself in the symmetry of the restricted 
economy, thereby putting itself en route to a bio-based catastrophe.
Moreover, in terms of chapter V and with respect to the question of technological 
being, if technological waste offers a reminder of our unceasing departure from 
the asymmetric Earth and thus fosters ontological responsivity, the ideal of a zero-
waste bio-based economy compares to how we respond to the sudden discovery 
of a rancid toilet, where we shudder, avert ourselves, forget about our unceasing 
departure, and go about our business.
We might see a task for philosophy of technology here, namely to acknowledge 
the need for such initiatives to keep the intrusion of the asymmetric Earth at bay, 
whilst simultaneously cultivating the question what such asymmetry has to teach 
us about the way in which we inhabit our planet. Whereas the role of technology 
will increasingly consist in symmetric maintenance of our habitat, it is the vocation 
of the philosophy of technology to explicitly address the way in which technology 
allows the unsettled planet to appear, and to explicitly question what this appearance 
means for its forgetful yet responsive inhabitants.
Like Prometheus, we find ourselves chained to our Earthly bedrock, and the 
question is whether the consolations by Minerva’s owls, taking flight in the fumes 
of dusk, help us to find our footing.
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I INTRODUCTION: REGARDING ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY
This study aspires to contribute to the philosophical questioning of technology. 
The first chapter gives a brief account of an unsettling ecological experience that 
spurs this dissertation on its way by inducing a topical shift. This experience entails 
that the topic that was supposed to be investigated in the research project leading 
up to this dissertation, to wit the philosophical aspects of new and emerging bio-
technologies, appears in light of im-permafrost, rising sea-levels, global warming, 
the ongoing shattering of temperature records, crop failure, and the looming 
presence of 400 ppm+ of CO2 in the air.
The introductory chapter explains how as a result of this experience, the topic of 
this dissertation shifts away from (bio)technologies towards their ecological context, 
and ultimately to their Earthly habitat. The Earth takes center stage, notably in 
its contemporary manifestation as an unstable and unsettled Earth, which now 
appears to withdraw itself as a stable and self-evident support and resource base for 
humanity’s technological modus vivendi.
Subsequently, the chapter illustrates how this unsettling experience invokes a 
thematic shift as well, meaning that rather than questioning technology in the 
sense of the aspects of specific technologies, the theme comes to concern the more 
primordial manner according to which we already attain a perspective, i.e. how we 
encounter technologies, the unsettled Earth as their settlement, and ourselves as 
Earthly inhabitants.
In light of this, chapter I formulates the research question to which this dissertation 
aims to contribute as follows:
“How to come to terms with technology on an unsettled planet?”
The chapter further formulates a threefold hypothesis to be developed and 
delineated in this thesis:
First, technology does not primarily concern technological beings but technological 
being, which is to say that the unsettled Earth commits us to an ontological way 
of questioning technology. Secondly, the habitation of the unsettled Earth as oikos 
gives rise to a specific oiko-nomic interpretation of this ontological question. 
Thirdly, the issue of technological waste is relevant to understanding the tryptic of 
ontology, economy, and technology, and is of significance for coming to terms with 
technology and the Earth.
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II THE IDEAL OF A ZERO-WASTE HUMANITY: 
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMAND FOR A 
BIO-BASED ECONOMY
Chapter II makes the first attempts to address the central question. It takes the 
first strides in transposing the issue of specific technologies towards their ecological 
context, which is specifically addressed as the economical context of the bio-based 
economy (BBE). Accordingly, the chapter investigates the fundamental assumptions 
that underpin the ideal of the bio-based economy as it is currently developed. The 
chapter offers an interpretation of the bio-based economy from Georges Bataille’s 
philosophical perspective on economy, thereby critically investigating and laying 
bare the assumptions that undergird this ideal, particularly with respect to the 
relation between energy and economy.
In the first section, an overview of the central constituents of the ideal of the bio-
based economy is given, namely economical circularity, cascade, and zero-waste. 
Additionally, several critiques that have been leveled at this ideal are discussed, to 
demonstrate how both proponents and critics of the BBE leave the philosophical 
question regarding the relation between energy and economy unconsidered.
The second and third section introduce Bataille’s concepts of “restricted economy” 
and “general economy”  in order to raise this presently overlooked philosophical 
question. In confronting Bataille’s thought with the BBE, it is argued that the latter 
can be understood as the ultimate “restricted economy”  sensu Bataille, which is to 
say that it solely understands the relation between energy and economy in terms of 
scarcity and efficiency. In taking a Bataillean perspective, the chapter demonstrates 
how this excludes considerations of abundance and wastefulness, which not only 
entails a number of internal tensions and inconsistencies with regard to the ideal of 
the BBE, but ultimately comes to undermine this ideal itself.
The fourth and final section suggests that the bio-based economy should be 
understood in light of the abundance that Bataille associates with “the general 
economy”. The chapter accordingly argues for an introduction of the presently 
excluded question of abundance and wastefulness, and explores the implications 
for such a question for the ideal of a zero-waste humanity.
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III PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE EMPIRICAL 
TURN – A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF 
POSTPHENOMENOLOGY
Chapter III engages in the thematic shift that was mentioned in the introduction, 
meaning that it moves away from the aspects of specific technologies towards the 
question of how we already encounter technologies. Explicitly engaging with 
the contemporary discourse of philosophy of technology, the chapter provides a 
phenomenological analysis of postphenomenology.
The first two sections provide an evaluation of the postphenomenological method 
of questioning technologies. These sections demonstrate how postphenomenology 
understands the phenomenon of phenomenology as a human-technology relation, 
and how it rejects Heidegger’s analysis of technology by deeming it incapable of 
providing an adequate depiction of such human-technology relations.
The third section confronts postphenomenology with Heidegger’s understanding 
of phenomenology and the phenomenon. It shows how Heidegger contrasts the 
phenomenological method with what he calls “the theoretical attitude”, which 
implies that for Heidegger, the phenomenon concerns a relation that we always 
already enact in our encounter with things. In light of this, it is argued that 
postphenomenology adheres to this theoretical attitude and should therefore be 
understood as “mediation theory”.
Building on this argument, the fourth section demonstrates how in spite of its critique 
of Heidegger’s questioning of technology, postphenomenology (qua mediation 
theory) unwittingly adheres to what Heidegger calls Enframing. The chapter thereby 
offers a rebuttal to this critique, as it shows how postphenomenology misinterprets 
Enframing as a general category instead of interpreting it phenomenologically. 
Furthermore, the chapter develops the claim that postphenomenology is itself 
technically mediated at an ontological level. This is made clear by showing how 
the alleged inadequacy of Heidegger’s work is considered as a technical inadequacy, 
meaning that Heidegger’s understanding Enframing is deemed insufficiently useful.
In the fifth and final section calls for a phenomenological questioning of technology 
that postphenomenology presently leaves unconsidered, thus making an appeal for 
a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension in the philosophical questioning of 
technology.
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IV SAVING EARTH. ENCOUNTERING HEIDEGGER’S 
PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
Chapter IV associates the rehabilitation of ontology in the philosophy of 
technology with the ecological issue of the unsettled Earth that we encounter in 
the Anthropocene. It argues that the Anthropocene is relevant for philosophy 
of technology because it makes us sensitive to the ontological dimension of 
contemporary technology.
The first section offers an ontological interpretation of the Anthropocene and 
demonstrates how in the Anthropocene, the world appears as managerial resource 
to human existence as manager of its planetary oikos. This interpretation thereby 
suggest that the Anthropocene offers us a concrete experience of Heidegger’s 
abstract, notoriously difficult, and allegedly totalitarian notion of Enframing.
The second section argues that technology in the Anthropocene cannot be limited 
to the ontic domain of artefacts, but must be acknowledged to concern the whole 
of being. Furthermore, it shows the issue of human responsibility must be primarily 
understood in terms of responsivity, namely to what Heidegger articulates as the 
“call” of being.
The third section indicates a crucial ambiguity that is inherent in the Anthropocene 
insofar as it both accords and discords with what Heidegger calls the “danger”  of 
technology. It shows how in light of this ambiguity, the Earth has to be understood 
as ontic-ontological condition of possibility for Enframing, which entails that 
Heidegger’s unidirectional consideration of the relation between being and beings 
must be reoriented.
The chapter concludes by arguing that the Anthropocene implies that Heidegger’s 
consideration of “the saving power”  of technology, as well as the associated 
comportment of “releasement” must become Earthbound. It thereby introduces 
the concept of the saving Earth.
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V SEEING THROUGH THE FUMES – ASYMMETRY AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
Chapter V turns to the question of technology in the Anthropocene. By staging 
a confrontation between Heidegger and Bataille on the questions of technology, 
waste, and our Earthly oikos in the Anthropocene, it conceptualizes technology as 
ontologically forgetful, but not wholly oblivious. The chapter argues that through 
the fumes of the technological waste named CO2, technology in the Anthropocene 
fosters a responsivity to what ontologically constitutes technological existence, 
whilst remaining asymmetric to it.
The first section offers an interpretation of the Anthropocene as a concrete 
cybernetic phenomenon in Heidegger’s sense. It argues that inasmuch as we are 
inescapably included in a regulative encounter with the anthropocenic world, 
the Anthropocene offers a concrete rendition of what Heidegger calls our being 
“enclosed” in a cybernetic relationality.
The second section interprets cybernetics in terms of symmetry, i.e. a collective 
measure (sym-metry) of regulative steering. By subsequently questioning the 
Anthropocenic Earth, the section offers a twofold consideration of the Earth as 
symmetric and asymmetric.
The third section confronts the asymmetric Earth with symmetric cybernetics to 
suggest that the Anthropocene entails a reorientation of Heidegger’s unidirectional 
understanding of the relation between the ontological and ontic domains. First, it is 
argued that in the Anthropocene, the Earth must be understood as ontic-ontological 
condition of possibility for ontological cybernetics. Secondly, the section shows 
how the Earth thereby offers an indication of what Heidegger calls the concealing-
unconcealing of Being. Thirdly, by showing how technology is deeply entangled 
with this indication on the one hand, and how Heidegger does not allow for such 
a consideration of technology on the other, the chapter introduces a Bataillean 
reading of technology that flanks but finally strays from Heidegger’s interpretation.
The fourth section investigates how technology figures in Bataille’s understanding 
of human existence with respect to the “restricted economy” and the “general 
economy”. This engenders an articulation of technology as diverting from what 
ontologically constitutes it, whilst forgetting that it does so. Accordingly, it is 
argued that in the Anthropocene, technology comes to be reminded of this forgetful 
diversion, notably due to abundance and waste. The chapter concludes by claiming 
that in the Anthropocene, technology is ontologically forgetful, but not wholly 
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oblivious, since it fosters – through the fumes of the technological waste named 
CO2 – a responsivity to that which ontologically constitutes technological existence 
whilst remaining asymmetric to it.
VI CONCLUSION
Chapter IV revisits the questions that were raised in this thesis and retraces the 
steps that were taken in answering them. It summarizes the preceding chapters and 
recapitulates the line of questions and answers that have been developed throughout 
the various chapters of this study. This is done by returning to the hypothesis 
that was formulated in the first chapter. Accordingly, the chapter formulates and 
explicates an answer to the central question: "How to come to terms with technology 
on an unsettled planet?" The threefold answer that it arrives at is: in ontological 
terms; in economic terms; and in terms of asymmetry.
Finally, the chapter indicates how this answer gives rise to the arguably even more 
unsettling question: how to come to terms with asymmetry? It shows how this 
question becomes both complicated and pressing on our unsettled Earth, thereby 
pointing to a future task for the philosophical questioning of technology.
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I INTRODUCTIE: MET OOG OP ASPECTEN VAN 
TECHNOLOGIE.
Deze studie levert een bijdrage aan de techniekfilosofie. Het eerste, inleidende 
hoofdstuk schetst hoe een ontstellende ecologische ervaring het vertrekpunt 
van dit onderzoek vormt. Dankzij deze ervaring verschijnt het onderwerp 
van het oorspronkelijke projectvoorstel, te weten de filosofische aspecten van 
nieuwe biotechnologieën, in het beklemmende licht van im-permafrost, een 
stijgende zeespiegel, de opwarming van de aarde, constante doorbraken van 
temperatuurrecords, mislukte oogsten en de dreigende aanwezigheid van 400 
PPM+ CO2 in de atmosfeer.
Als gevolg van deze ervaring verschuift het onderwerp van deze studie van specifieke 
(bio)technologieën naar hun ecologische context, en uiteindelijk naar hun aardse 
habitat. De aarde neemt derhalve een centrale plek in, waarbij de aandacht vooral 
uitgaat naar haar huidige verschijning als onstabiele en ontstelde aarde, die de stabiele 
en rijke ondergrond die onze technologische modus vivendi als vanzelfsprekend 
aanneemt niet langer blijkt te garanderen.
Vervolgens laat het hoofdstuk zien hoe de genoemde ontstellende ervaring 
eveneens een thematische verschuiving inhoudt. Hierdoor betreft het thema van 
onderzoek niet primair de aspecten van specifieke (bio)technologieën, maar liever 
de oorspronkelijkere vraag naar hoe we reeds een perspectief innemen ten aanzien 
van zulke technologieën, de ontstelde aarde als hun ondergrond, alsmede onszelf 
als aardbewoners.
In het licht van bovenstaande wordt de onderzoeksvraag van deze dissertatie als 
volgt geformuleerd:
“Hoe moet technologie op een ontstelde planeet begrepen worden?”
Het hoofdstuk formuleert een drievoudige hypothese, welke ontwikkeld uit 
uitgewerkt zal worden in deze dissertatie. Ten eerste: technologie betreft niet primair 
technologische zijnden maar technologisch zijn, waarmee wordt uitgedrukt dat de 
ontstelde aarde ons committeert aan een ontologische bevraging van technologie. 
Ten tweede: de bewoning van de ontstelde aarde als oikos geeft aanleiding tot een 
specifieke, oiko-nomische interpretatie van deze ontologische vraag. Ten derde: 
technologisch afval is relevant om het drieluik ‘ontologie, economie, technologie’ te 
thematiseren.
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II HET IDEAAL VAN EEN AFVALLOOS, ‘ZERO-WASTE’ 
MENSDOM: FILOSOFISCHE REFLECTIES OP DE EIS VOOR 
EEN BIO-BASED ECONOMIE.
Hoofdstuk II onderneemt de eerste poging om de hoofdvraag te adresseren. De vraag 
naar specifieke technologieën wordt hier getransponeerd naar de ecologische context 
van deze technologieën. Deze context wordt gespecificeerd door het initiatief en de 
huidige ontwikkeling van de bio-based economie (BBE) te onderzoeken. Door de 
BBE te interpreteren vanuit Georges Batailles filosofische denken over economie 
wordt de aandacht gevestigd op de aannames die in de huidige ontwikkeling van 
de BBE gemaakt worden, met name op de fundamentele aannames over de relatie 
tussen economie en energie.
Het eerste deel geeft een overzicht van de belangrijke elementen van de BBE, 
namelijk economische circulariteit, cascade, en afvalloosheid of zero-waste. Vervolgens 
worden verschillende kritieken op het initiatief van de BBE doorgenomen om te 
laten zien hoe zowel voor- als tegenstanders van de BBE de filosofische vraag naar 
de relatie tussen energie en economie onbesproken laten. 
In het tweede en derde deel worden Batailles concepten van “de beperkte economie” 
en “de algemene economie” geïntroduceerd om bovengenoemde filosofische vraag 
te articuleren. Door het denken van Bataille met de BBE te confronteren wordt 
laatstgenoemde als ultieme “beperkte economie” begrepen. Dit houdt in dat de 
relatie tussen energie en economie louter in termen van schaarste en efficiëntie 
wordt opgevat. Vanuit een Bataillaans perspectief laat het hoofdstuk vervolgens zien 
hoe dit niet alleen een aantal tegenstrijdigheden ten aanzien van het ideaal van de 
BBE met zich meebrengt, maar dit ideaal uiteindelijk zelf ondermijnt.
Het vierde en laatste deel stelt dat de bio-based economie begrepen dient te worden 
in het licht van de overvloed die Bataille met “de algemene economie” aanduidt. Het 
hoofdstuk sluit enerzijds af met een pleidooi voor de introductie van de momenteel 
buitengesloten dimensie van overvloed en verspilling en verkent anderzijds de 
bijbehorende implicaties voor het ideaal van een afvalloos, zero-waste mensdom.
Samenvatting
zwier-layout.indd   174 08/01/2018   13:57
175
III FENOMENOLOGIE EN DE EMPIRISCHE WENDING. 
EEN FENOMENOLOGISCHE ANALYSE VAN DE 
POSTFENOMENOLOGIE
Hoofdstuk III voltrekt de thematische verschuiving die in de introductie genoemd 
is, waarbij de aspecten van specifieke technologieën plaatsmaken voor de vraag naar 
hoe zulke technologieën reeds tegemoet getreden worden. Door het gesprek aan 
te gaan met het huidige discours van de techniekfilosofie, biedt dit hoofdstuk een 
fenomenologisch analyse van postfenomenologie.
De eerste twee delen van dit hoofdstuk evalueren de postfenomenologische 
ondervraging van technologieën, alsmede haar methode. Hier wordt duidelijk 
dat de postfenomenologie het fenomeen van de fenomenologie begrijpt als mens-
techniek relatie, alsmede dat de postfenomenologie Heideggers analyse van de 
techniek verwerpt omdat deze geen adequate weergave van zulke mens-techniek 
relaties kan geven.
Het derde deel confronteert de postfenomenologie met Heideggers begrip van de 
fenomenologie en het fenomeen. Hier wordt duidelijk gemaakt hoe Heidegger de 
fenomenologische methode contrasteert met de zogeheten “theoretische instelling”. 
Daarbij wordt eveneens inzichtelijk hoe Heidegger het fenomeen begrijpt als een 
betrekking die we altijd reeds voltrekken wanneer we de dingen tegemoet treden. 
Vervolgens wordt de stelling verdedigd dat de postfenomenologie zich schikt naar 
de genoemde theoretische instelling en daarom begrepen moet worden als “mediatie 
theorie”.
Door voort te borduren op deze stelling wordt in het vierde deel getoond 
hoe de postfenomenologie (qua mediatie theorie), ondanks haar kritiek op 
Heideggers bezinning op techniek, zich onbewust schikt naar wat Heidegger het 
“Gestell” noemt. Door te laten zien hoe de postfenomenologie het Gestell niet 
fenomenologisch, maar als algemene categorie interpreteert, wordt een weerlegging 
van de postfenomenologische kritiek op Heidegger geformuleerd. Bovendien 
stelt dit hoofdstuk dat postfenomenologie zelf technisch gemedieerd is op een 
ontologisch niveau. Deze stelling wordt inzichtelijk gemaakt door te tonen hoe 
de postfenomenologie Heideggers analyse van techniek als inadequaat beoordeelt, 
waarbij deze beoordeling zelf een technische oriëntatie heeft, omdat ze Heideggers 
begrip van het Gestell onvoldoende nuttig acht. 
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Het vijfde en laatste deel van dit hoofdstuk roept op tot een fenomenologische 
bevraging van datgene wat de postfenomenologische techniekfilosofie ongedacht 
laat. Er wordt derhalve een pleidooi gehouden voor een rehabilitatie van de 
ontologische dimensie in de techniekfilosofie.
IV REDDENDE AARDE. EEN ONTMOETING MET HEIDEGGERS 
TECHNIEKFILOSOFIE IN HET ANTHROPOCEEN
Hoofdstuk IV associeert de rehabilitatie van de ontologie in de techniekfilosofie met 
de ecologische situatie en de ontstelde aarde in het Anthropoceen. Het verdedigt de 
stelling dat het Anthropoceen relevant is voor de techniekfilosofie omdat het ons 
gevoelig maakt voor de ontologische dimensie van de techniek.
Het eerste deel van dit hoofdstuk biedt een ontologische interpretatie van het 
Anthropoceen en laat zien hoe de Anthropocenische wereld verschijnt in termen 
van management voor het menselijk bestaan als manager van haar planetaire oikos. 
Deze interpretatie suggereert vervolgens dat het Anthropoceen een concrete ervaring 
biedt van Heideggers abstracte, berucht moeilijke, en van totalitaire neigingen 
betichtte concept van het Gestell.
In het tweede deel wordt de stelling verdedigd dat het Anthropoceen niet beperkt 
kan worden tot het ontische domein van technische artefacten, maar dat het 
ontologisch begrepen moet worden. Daarnaast wordt duidelijk dat de kwestie van 
menselijke verantwoordelijkheid primair als responsiviteit begrepen moet worden, 
namelijk een responsiviteit naar wat Heidegger de “roep” van het zijn noemt.
Het derde deel wijst op een cruciale ambiguïteit van het Anthropoceen, waarbij 
het Anthropoceen zich enerzijds schikt naar Heideggers “gevaar van de techniek”, 
maar zich er anderzijds uit terughoudt. In het licht van deze ambiguïteit wordt de 
aarde geïnterpreteerd als ontisch-ontologische mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde voor het 
Gestell. Deze interpretatie voert vervolgens tot een heroriëntatie van Heideggers 
unidirectionele begrip van de relatie tussen zijn en zijnden.
In het laatste deel van het hoofdstuk wordt beargumenteerd dat Heideggers begrip 
van “het reddende” van de techniek, alsmede de daarmee geaffilieerde houding van 
“gelatenheid” op de aarde afgestemd dienen te worden. Het hoofdstuk besluit dan 
ook met de introductie van het concept reddende aarde.
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V ZIEN DOOR DAMPEN – ASYMMETRIE EN TECHNOLOGIE 
IN HET ANTHROPOCEEN.
Hoofdstuk V betreft de vraag naar de techniek in het Anthropoceen. Het 
confronteert Heidegger en Bataille op het gebied van de vraag naar techniek, afval, 
en onze aardse oikos in het Anthropoceen. In het licht van deze confrontatie biedt 
dit hoofdstuk een conceptualisatie van techniek, waarbij deze geduid wordt als 
ontologisch vergeetachtig, maar waarbij deze vergeetachtigheid niet totaal is. De 
verdedigde stelling is dat het Anthropoceen, doorheen het afval van CO2-dampen, 
responsiviteit bevordert naar datgene dat technologische existentie ontologisch 
enerzijds constitueert, terwijl het daar anderzijds asymmetrisch aan blijft.
Het eerste deel interpreteert het Anthropoceen als een concreet, cybernetisch 
fenomeen in de zin van Heideggers ontologische duiding van de cybernetica. Dit 
laat zien dat het Anthropoceen concreet voelbaar maakt wat Heidegger bedoelt 
wanneer hij spreekt over onze “ingeslotenheid” in de cybernetica.
Het tweede deel begrijpt bovengenoemde cybernetica als symmetrisch, als een 
collectieve maat (sym-metrie) van regulatief sturen. Door vervolgens de aarde in het 
Anthropoceen te bevragen wordt een tweevoudig begrip van de aarde geformuleerd: 
als symmetrisch en asymmetrisch.
Het derde deel confronteert de asymmetrische aarde met de symmetrische cybernetica. 
In het licht van deze confrontatie wordt de stelling verdedigd dat het Anthropoceen 
aanleiding geeft tot een heroriëntatie van Heideggers unidirectionele begrip van de 
relatie tussen het ontische en het ontologische domein. Ten eerste wordt de aarde 
in het Anthropoceen begrepen als ontisch-ontologische mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde 
voor Heideggers ontologische cybernetica. Ten tweede biedt de aarde daarbij een 
indicatie van Heideggers thematisering van de on-verborgenheid van het zijn. 
Ten derde wordt duidelijk gemaakt hoe technologie diep verweven is met deze 
indicatie. Omdat Heidegger geen ruimte laat voor een dusdanige interpretatie van 
technologie, gaat het hoofdstuk over tot een Bataillaanse lezing van technologie. 
Deze lezing flankeert Heideggers interpretatie weliswaar, maar wijkt er uiteindelijk 
van af.
Het vierde deel onderzoekt de rol van techniek in Batailles begrip van het menselijk 
bestaan, met name in termen van de eerdergenoemde “beperkte economie” en 
“algemene economie”. Technologie wordt hierbij begrepen als datgene dat zich 
enerzijds afwendt van haar ontologische constitutie, terwijl het deze afwending 
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anderzijds vergeet. Vervolgens wordt de stelling verdedigd dat het Anthropoceen 
aanleiding geeft tot een herinnering aan deze afwending. Dit wordt uitgewerkt door 
overvloed en afval te thematiseren.
Het hoofdstuk sluit af met de bewering dat technologie in het Anthropoceen 
ontologisch vergeetachtig is, maar dat deze vergeetachtigheid niet totaal is. Liever 
voert het tot ontologische responsiviteit, omdat de afvaldampen van CO2 een 
herinnering aan haar eigen constitutie en afkomst vormen.
VI CONCLUSIE
Hoofdstuk IV vat de voorgaande hoofdstukken kort samen en herneemt een aantal 
van de vragen die in deze dissertatie op zijn gekomen, alsmede de antwoorden 
die erin uitgewerkt zijn. Zodoende keert dit hoofdstuk terug naar de drievoudige 
hypothese uit de introductie en wordt een antwoord geformuleerd op de 
hoofdvraag: “Hoe moet technologie op een ontstelde planeet begrepen worden?”. Het 
eveneens drievoudige antwoord luidt: ontologisch, economisch, en met betrekking 
tot asymmetrie.
Tot slot laat dit hoofdstuk zien hoe dit antwoord tot een wellicht nog moeilijkere 
vraag voert: hoe moet technologische asymmetrie begrepen worden? Hierbij wordt 
duidelijk dat deze vraag zowel gecompliceerd als urgent is op onze nu ontstelde 
planeet. Dit wijst op een taak voor een toekomstige filosofische bevraging van 
technologie.
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